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Abstract 
Since the International Criminal Court’s (ICC) establishment in 2002, its 
interventions in African situations have produced a mix of results. Whereas many 
observers have hailed the ICC’s forays onto the continent for expanding the avenues 
of justice for mass atrocities, there are also political connotations to some of its 
interventions, as evidenced in narratives of selectivity and neo-colonialism. 
Building on the latter impacts of the Court’s interventions in Africa, this thesis seeks 
to discern the shape of local/regional uptake of international criminal justice (ICJ). 
This follows from contrasting the ICC’s qualification as a moral agent in the global 
war on impunity for international crimes, with domestic political translations of the 
Court’s interventions and subsequent collective action at local and regional levels. 
Thus, the principal argument from this thesis is that contextual normative adaptions 
produce global-local exchanges that result in viable conditions under which the 
ICC’s interventions are politicized, to the detriment of its investigative activities 
and legacy in situation countries. More specifically, elite level exchanges in sub-
national, national, regional and international realms produce blends of local and 
global realities, resulting into the ICC’s exposure to politicization. These findings 
are instructive for wider debates on the subtle ways in which the ICC is undermined 
(rather than outright defiance), with spiralling effects on long term peace-building 
and other regional contexts.  
In discerning the aforementioned conclusions, I asked the simple research 
questions: (1) why and how is an ostensibly international legal response to heinous 
crimes susceptible to (mis)appropriation and subversion by domestic political 
elites? (2) what are the far-reaching consequences of politicizing the ICC’s 
interventions on creating conditions for lasting peace in fragile societies? Given the 
duality of the ICC’s politicization –  through (mis)appropriation and subversion, 
the thesis adopted a comparative study of Uganda and Kenya, which exemplify the 
two forms of domestic translations of ICJ. The thesis employed a qualitative 
methodological approach that drew upon secondary data sources, as well as primary 
data collected through personal key informant interviews in the Netherlands, 
Uganda and Kenya, with ICC officials, politicians, government officials, 
representatives of local and international organizations and affected communities.  
Some of the secondary data sources include: journal articles, media reports, 
government documents, books, online sources, legal instruments, the ICC’s 
documents and official speeches. The data collected was analyzed through 
grounded theory, in which evidence collected raised new sub-questions for further 
interrogation. All available evidence was then triangulated to develop a critical 
analysis of the research questions posed. Conceptually, I built on three interrelated 
concepts (the ICC’s projection of a moral universe, the narrative lens and spatial 
hierarchies) to discern the ICJ norm diffusion in local/regional contexts. 
The thesis concludes that the various forms of political resistance to the ICC have 
pernicious effects on peace-building beyond national boundaries. Perhaps, a greater 
degree of the Court’s acceptance will be driven by its proactive steps towards the 
universality of justice, whose absence partly informed the construction of narratives 
on some of its foremost interventions in Africa.
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Introduction 
The International Criminal Court in retrospect  
The commencement of this thesis towards the end of 2014 coincided with the 
International Criminal Courts’ (ICC) active interventions in African countries, namely: 
Uganda, the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), Sudan, the Central African 
Republic (CAR), Kenya, Libya, Côte d'Ivoire and Mali. The thesis was therefore 
timely, given that I was able to closely monitor various perceptions on the Court as 
they unfolded in international, regional and local realms.   
Notably, the ICC’s interventions in Africa attracted various sets of views that oscillated 
between acceptance and resistance. On the one hand, acceptance was often justified by 
arguments that the ICC expanded the avenues of justice for international crimes in a 
continent that had a long history of impunity (Braima 2014; African Group for Justice 
and Accountability, 2016; Annan, 2016). On the other hand, indications of the Court’s 
resistance included the construction of narratives on some of its interventions as 
selective and neo-colonial. 
Narratives are critical entry points in assessing the shape of the ICC’s reception in local 
and regional contexts, owing to their utility in producing, transforming and contesting 
meanings (Riedke and Rottenburg 2016, 5). The narrative lens derives its significance 
from its ontological orientation, as well as its ability to derive meaning of the world 
around us and make sense of political realities (ibid). Narratives also incorporate 
“material inscriptions and constitutive influence of material and non-human actors” 
(ibid, 6). In other words, they enable us to track the constitution of agency and 
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configure power relations against the backdrop of competing interpretations of reality 
(ibid, 11). 
Political narratives are defined by four interrelated dimensions – performance, political 
rule, power and authority, and plot (ibid, 10). In this regard, narratives perform critical 
roles in political communication and constituting political rule because of their salience 
on “(de) legitimating rule-based relations” (ibid, 10). Narratives also entail 
authoritative discourses, multiplicity of interpretations and processes of establishment 
(ibid, 10). In the plot dimension, narratives feature in shaping, producing and diffusing 
politicized knowledge, as well as triggering collective sentiments by bringing together 
various elements into a significant whole.  
Besides their orchestration by political elites, the narratives on the ICC’s interventions 
in some of the African situations gained traction amongst some critical constituencies 
in local and regional realms.  Unlike in the international arena where justice was seen 
to be done, some affected communities, victim groups and regional actors shared in the 
narrations of some of the Court’s interventions as selective or neo-colonial. In so doing, 
the narratives partly shaped domestic/ regional uptake of ICJ, and by extension, 
contributed to the ICC’s legacies on the continent. As such, Stahn (2012, 275) rightly 
attributed the legacies of international criminal tribunals to external judgements and 
incremental progression, as opposed to unilateral construction. 
More significantly, the narratives on the ICC’s interventions were interconnected with 
domestic political struggles. In other words, the Court’s connotations with selectivity 
and neo-colonialism were orchestrated by political elites in their endeavours to settle 
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political scores, gain legitimacy, and ultimately influence the nurture of their respective 
post-conflict transitions.  
To illustrate, the ICC’s accusations of selectivity were prevalent in situations whereby 
the Court was invited by similarly liable domestic authorities to investigate their 
military or political opponents (Branch, 2007; Clarke, 2008; Peskin, 2008). On this 
note, Uganda’s and the DRC’s situations followed state referral of insurgents to the 
ICC in January and June 2004, respectively (ICC, 2017a). In a similar vein, the ICC 
intervened in Côte d’Ivoire in 2011 under its proprio motu provision (own motion), 
after the President reconfirmed the country’s acceptance of the Court’s jurisdiction in 
December 2010 and May 2011 (ibid). Côte d’Ivoire had initially accepted the ICC’s 
jurisdiction in 2003 but was yet to ratify the Rome Statute (ibid).  
The Ugandan situation arose from the protracted northern conflict between the National 
Resistance Movement (NRM) regime and the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) 
insurgency. Based, at least in part, on perceived marginalization of the north and poor 
governance, the LRA expressed its desire to overthrow the NRM and establish a 
theocracy (Titeca, 2010; Refugee Law Project, 2014). As a result, the Government of 
Uganda (GoU) employed a combination of military offensives and peace overtures to 
end the war. The ICC was subsequently enlisted in the NRM’s goals of ending the war 
with the insurgents’ annihilation.  
Besides the Ugandan, the DRC and Côte d’Ivoirean experiences, the ICC was also 
accused of fostering neo-colonialism in Africa. This precedent followed the UNSC’s 
referrals of Sudan and Libya to the ICC, and the Court’s proprio motu intervention in 
Kenya. Triggered by some of the affected political elites, the neo-colonial narrative 
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galvanized their domestic support base and aroused the Pan-African spirit of 
safeguarding the continent’s territorial integrity and dignity of the African people.  
For example, during a political rally in Darfur in 2009, the ICC indicted Sudanese 
President, Omar al Bashir, interpreted the Court’s intervention as Western neo-
colonialism and an effort to undermine the country’s sovereignty and peace (Xinhua 
2009, 1). In turn, some politicians and members of mass organizations spoke against 
the ICC and chanted “Down, down ICC!” and “Down, down Ocampo!” (ibid, 1). 
Similarly, some Libyan officials rejected the ICC’s jurisdiction after the indictment of 
Muammar Gaddafi (former president), his son Saif al-Islam Gaddafi, and former 
intelligence chief, Abdullah al-Senussi. The officials argued that the ICC “had a 
vendetta against African states” (Chulov, 2011), and was “overly preoccupied with 
pursuing African leaders” (BBC 2011,1). 
The neo-colonial narrative gained unprecedented momentum with the ICC’s 
intervention in Kenya’s 2007/2008 post-election violence (PEV). Two of Kenya’s 
accused – Uhuru Kenyatta and William Ruto – formed a new political alliance under 
which they counter-shamed the Court’s intervention as neo-colonial. In the run-up to 
the 2013 elections, they formed the Jubilee Alliance, as a coalition of Kenyatta’s The 
National Alliance (TNA) party, Ruto’s United Republican Party (URP) and their 
respective Kikuyu and Kalenjin communities (Lynch and Rozej, 2013; Lynch, 2014; 
Mueller, 2014). Despite their ICC cases, and in part because of them, they won the 
March 2013 elections, after which they formed a government and continued to 
propagate the neo-colonial narrative in national and regional platforms.  
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Due to the linkages between ICJ and transitional justice (TJ) as roadmaps to liberal 
peace, this thesis simultaneously discusses the grounds for, and impacts of the 
narratives in shaping the courses of the ICC’s processes and TJ discourses. In so doing, 
the thesis draws on a comparative study of Uganda and Kenya to discern the conditions 
under which the ICC’s interventions are potentially politicized in local contexts and 
resulting implications for TJ mechanisms. The thesis goes further to deduce the 
implications of the Ugandan and Kenyan experiences to other regional contexts – the 
DRC, Côte d’Ivoire, South Sudan and Burundi. These broad objectives informed the 
framing of this thesis’ underlying and subsidiary research questions.  
Research Questions 
The fact that the ICC’s interventions are not immune to politicization in domestic 
spaces by some of the accused or potential suspects begs several questions. This 
concern is particularly significant, given that politicization of the Court’s interventions 
undermines both its capacity to successfully conduct cases, and the international 
community’s aspirations towards zero tolerance on impunity for serious crimes.  
Thus, this thesis seeks to answer the underlying research question: why and how is an 
ostensibly international legal response to heinous crimes susceptible to 
(mis)appropriation and subversion by domestic political elites? This primary research 
question leads to avenues of exploring some of the reasons for and the modalities of 
politicizing the ICC’s intervention, as observed in the Ugandan and Kenyan situations. 
With regard to the why question, this thesis explores conditions under which the ICC’s 
interventions were potentially politicized in Uganda and Kenya, with lessons for other 
regional contexts. Towards this end, the thesis analyzes actor and institutional 
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interactions on the Court’s interventions across local, regional and international spaces. 
In so doing, points of convergence and divergence within spatial hierarchies are 
assessed in equal measure. This leads to a contrast of the normative foundations of 
international criminal interventions vis-à-vis the ICC’s confrontations with local and 
regional realities. 
The underlying research question also triggers an explanation of how the ICCs 
interventions were recast in the situations under study. Precisely, the question leads to 
an elaboration of the mechanisms under which the Court’s interventions were 
embedded within everyday politics and subsequent immersion in domestic political 
struggles. 
Moreover, the contemporaneous nature of ICJ and TJ discourses guided the 
construction of this thesis’ subsidiary research question, namely; what are the far-
reaching consequences of politicizing the ICC’s interventions on creating conditions 
for lasting peace in fragile societies? Within the parameters of this question, this thesis 
assesses the resulting implications of the narratives on the ICC’s interventions for TJ 
in local spaces, and by extension, on other regional contexts. The question also provides 
the latitude for assessing state cooperation with the ICC in implementing the principle 
of complementarity as an additional effort towards liberal peace-building.  
By answering these research questions, which have received relatively little attention 
in the existing scholarship, this thesis offers significant contributions to the literature 
on the ICC, TJ and the Ugandan and Kenyan politics. Therefore, the findings in this 
thesis are significant in the disciplines of law and political science. On the one hand, 
the thesis intersects with aspects of the utility of international criminal law (ICL) for 
7 
 
conflict management, normative challenges for ICL in deeply divided societies, and 
the transferability of the ICC’s principles to local spaces.  On the other hand, the 
research confronts the practical political problems the Court faces in situation 
countries, such as struggles for cooperation, domestic political translations, and 
challenges to its authority and legitimacy in the politics of transitions. 
Specific contributions to the literature 
Over the years, there has been a remarkable attention in the scholarship to politicization 
of the ICC’s interventions in Africa (for example Branch, 2007; Clarke, 2008; Knoops 
and Zwart, 2013; Burbidge, 2014; Lynch and Rozej, 2014; Lynch, 2014; Mueller, 
2014; Kagwanja, 2015; Wolfe, 2015). Some ground has also been covered on the 
interaction between the ICC or international criminal tribunals and local/regional 
contexts (Peskin, 2008; Peskin, 2009; Hoile, 2014; Stahn, 2015; Boehme, 2017). This 
thesis engages with and builds on this literature to make multiple contributions to the 
fields of political science and law. 
First, this thesis, to my knowledge, is among the first to concurrently explore 
politicization of the ICC’s interventions and resulting implications for transitional 
justice (TJ) or long-term peace-building. This includes attention to case specific 
examples – Uganda and Kenya – and an extrapolation of their precedents to other 
regional contexts, namely: the DRC, Côte d’Ivoire, South Sudan and Burundi. 
Second, the aforementioned literature mainly consists of single country study analyses. 
This thesis closes this gap by adopting cross-case comparisons. Whereas single case 
studies have invaluable relevance in exploring case specific details and generating 
hypothesis (Oskar et.al. 2010), the comparative approach enables us to detect both 
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convergence and variation (Azarian 2011, 118). In addition, the comparative method 
is useful in drawing useful insights on causality for the discovered similarities and 
differences, hence the development of a causal theory that can elucidate cases under 
study (ibid, 119). Also, comparative studies have a “general reflexive function” -  they 
widen our scope, broaden our insight and enable us to see things in perspective (ibid, 
117).  
Third, the thesis is amongst the first to analyze the ICC’s interventions within spatial 
hierarchies of the local, regional and international realms. This thesis partly departs 
from the existing scholarship (Peskin, 2008; Peskin, 2009; Stahn, 2015; Boehme, 2017) 
that centres on the interaction between the ICC or international criminal tribunals and 
local/regional contexts. While the aforementioned multi-level analyses build from the 
top (the international versus national or regional spheres), my analysis builds from the 
bottom upwards. 
Towards this end, the thesis contrasts normative dispositions on ICJ within the national 
(sub-national spaces), and between the national/regional and the international realms. 
Building on Peskin’s (2008) illustration of power struggles between the ICC and states, 
I go further and analyze elite level exchanges and their reconfiguration of cooperation 
amongst targeted audiences within the spatial hierarchies. In so doing, thesis offers 
novel insights on the role of varying power positions on the ICC’s politicization and 
legitimation.  
Overall, this thesis highlights the salience of the narratives on the ICC’s interventions, 
and their negations of the foundational aspirations of the Rome Statute and the Court’s 
positionality as a last resort. Equally put in jeopardy is the vision of the international 
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community in constructing a moral universe where international crimes do not go 
unpunished. 
More concretely, the principal argument in this thesis is that contextual normative 
adaptions produce global-local exchanges which result in viable conditions under 
which the ICC’s interventions are politicized, to the detriment of its investigative 
activities and legacy in situation countries. In other words, elite level exchanges in sub-
national, national, regional and international realms produce blends of local and global 
realities, which lead to the Court’s exposure to politicization. These findings are 
instructive for wider debates on the subtle ways in which the ICC is undermined (rather 
than outright defiance), with spiralling effects on long term peace-building and other 
regional contexts.  
The aforementioned arguments were preceded by a considered research design, besides 
an appropriate methodological and conceptual choice that incorporated the roles, goals 
and power positions of most actors and institutions in ICJ and TJ. These approaches 
enabled a rigorous analysis of actors and institutional interactions (on ICJ and TJ) at 
the local, regional and international levels, and the diffusion of the global norm of ICJ 
across time and space.  
Conceptual and methodological choices 
This thesis’ analysis of politicization of the ICC’s interventions and resulting 
implications for TJ built on three related concepts. These include (1) the ICC’s 
projection of a moral universe, (2) narratives on the ICC’s interventions, and (3) spatial 
hierarchies or post-conflict spaces (local, regional and international realms). 
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The idea of a moral universe stems from the ICC’s futuristic vision of combating 
impunity for international crimes, with the ultimate aim of creating a safer world. In 
order for this dream to be realized, concrete steps have to be taken as stipulated in the 
Rome Statute. These range from the preamble’s recollections of unimaginable 
suffering of millions of children, men and women during atrocities, affirmations of zero 
tolerance to impunity for international crimes, and calls for national efforts and 
international cooperation in prosecutions. To these ends, the ICC positions itself as a 
Court of last resort by its formation as complementary to national institutions.   
Before the ICC’s establishment, it was argued that there was a missing link in the 
international legal regime (UN, 1998). As such, it was recalled that the International 
Court of Justice’s jurisdiction is limited to conflicts between states, and ad hoc 
international criminal tribunals were only applicable to case specific contexts (ibid). 
Therefore, the ICC’s creation filled the international systems’ void in paying attention 
to individual criminal accountability on the commission of mass atrocities across 
multiple contexts.  
Nonetheless, the ICC’s expression of a moral universe is also contested or shaped by 
political actors who also think of themselves as ethical actors. Such was the case with 
some of Uganda’s and Kenya’s political elites who orchestrated narratives on the ICC’s 
interventions as selective or neo-colonial. Therefore, the narrative lens is useful in 
assessing forms of resistance to the ICC’s normative imperatives in domestic/regional 
spaces, and their ensuing effects on TJ discourses.  
Closely linked to domestic contestations of the ICC’s goal of a moral universe is the 
concept of post-conflict spaces or spatial hierarchies. As Heathershaw and Lambach 
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(2008) argue, post-conflict spaces are best understood as fields of power that are 
constantly negotiated and contested amongst global, elite and local actors. In other 
words, post-conflict spaces are empirical reflections of authorities that emerge during, 
and after episodes of political violence or civil war (ibid). The scholars frame post-
conflict societies into three layers of space: local (subordinates); elite (local, national 
and regional authorities); and the global/international sphere. However, I reconstitute 
the levels of hierarchies as; local, regional and international spaces. I deliberately omit 
the elite level, as these actors are included in all the three levels of analysis. 
In the reorganized spatial hierarchies, the international space encompasses the UNSC, 
owing to its leadership roles in some of the ICC’s activities, and Chapter VII of the UN 
Charter on maintaining international peace and security. Whereas regional spaces 
portend as elite solidarity spheres due to their collective approach to global issues, local 
spaces emerge as contested sovereignties, with a multiplicity of interest groups that lay 
claim to legitimacy and authority. 
Given that the ICC’s interventions involve the interaction of multiple actors and 
institutions (at the international, regional and local levels), I contend that the 
reconstituted spaces do not exist in isolation, but exhibit overlaps and constant 
linkages. This interpretation also links to Heathershaw and Lambach’s (2008, 10) 
arguments on the intersection of spaces (or selves), which results into hybridity and 
production of multiple spaces under conditions of hegemony. 
The inclusion of spatial hierarchies in this thesis’ conceptual framework escapes the 
dangers of analysing the state as a unitary actor, which Heathershaw and Lambach 
(2008, 14) argue is an analytical misstep. As such, the single sovereign view point 
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obfuscates the numerous forms of ‘state’ during international interventions. Seen from 
this angle, viewing the state as a unitary actor assumes its individuality, and fails to 
assess the subversion, appropriation and resistance to international strategies in local 
contexts. (ibid, 7). Moreover, the single sovereign standpoint oversimplifies conceptual 
dichotomies, while attention to spatial hierarchies captures the complexities in hybrid 
forms of governance (ibid, 14).  
In turn, this thesis’ analysis of the ICC’s interventions beyond the state level fits within 
a new shift in direction of the TJ scholarship. As documented in the 2017 special issue 
of the International Journal of Transitional Justice, the literature is tilting towards 
“beyond borders as the new the architecture of TJ.”  In the journal’s editorial note, it is 
posited that the increasing significance of transnational non-state actors and 
international criminal interventions in many conflicts call for challenges to the state as 
the first call of contemplating on, and designing TJ mechanism (Hazan 2017, 1). 
Further, the nation state, which used to be the basis for international relations and TJ, 
is challenged by: neoliberalism, diffusion of information technologies across 
communties, and the increasing influence of multinationals (ibid).  
Broadly speaking, the three conceptual frameworks are useful in this this thesis because 
of their specific functions and relations to one another. Whereas the concept of a moral 
universe expresses the ICC’s vision of guaranteeing human security, the narrative lens 
offers empirical evidence to the ICC’s resistance, and the frame of spatial hierarchies 
maps out power relations amongst diverse actors and institutions in the ICJ enterprise.  
Taken together, the three concepts elucidate complexities and linkages that predispose 
the ICC to politicization in domestic contexts.   
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Besides the adoption of the three interlinked conceptual frames, this thesis is also a 
deeply empirical study, which also counts as one of its strengths. Primarily, this thesis 
contrasts popular perceptions on the ICC at the international level with local/regional 
perspectives and realities. In so doing, I evaluated secondary literature and other 
documents as the research unfolded, in addition to collecting primary data through 
qualitative interviews.  
Data collection unfolded as follows. It began at The Hague, the Netherlands, in July 
2015, where I interviewed an ICC official, journalists reporting on the ICC, and some 
representatives of the Coalition for the International Criminal Court (CICC). This was 
followed by additional interviews in Kenya and Uganda, from August 2015 to May 
2016. In both countries, the selected interview locations included members of 
communities affected by the conflicts and thus by the ICC’s interventions (Gulu in 
Uganda; and Kiambu, Nakuru, Eldoret and Kisumu in Kenya). Some of the interviews 
were also conducted in Kampala, Uganda, and Nairobi, Kenya, with government 
representatives, ICC officials, governance and human rights activists and members of 
affected communities. 
Before conducing the interviews, I consulted secondary sources from research 
institutions, non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and media organizations. For 
these tasks, I recruited a Research Assistant in Kenya (with funding from the BIEA) 
who mapped the relevant literature and potential interview partners. In Uganda, I was 
affiliated to the CBR, whose archives and occasional seminars were useful in 
understanding the country’s political contexts and the northern conflict. 
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During primary data collection, I conducted over 80 personal in-depth interviews with 
key informants in the Netherlands, Uganda and Kenya. Most of the interviews were 
conducted in English, although in some instances, I used a combination of English and 
Swahili for clarity from some of the respondents. 
In selecting most of my interview partners, I employed non-probability sampling. 
According to Ritchie et.al. (2003, 78) this approach involves the deliberate selection of 
units, in order to reflect distinct characteristics of groups in the sampled populations. 
Specifically, I adopted purposive sampling, which is a subset of non-probability 
sampling. The sampling technique takes into account unique experiences and socio-
demographic features, thus allowing exhaustive examinations of key issues to be 
studied (Ritchie et.al. 2003, 78). In this case, I selected heads of institutions or 
individuals who were directly involved with Uganda’s and Kenya’s ICC cases, such 
as: opinion leaders, religious leaders, the youth, ICC officials, political elites and other 
relevant stakeholders.  
After identifying some key informants, I used the snowballing technique to map some 
other critical actors, some of whom responded in the affirmative for interviews. The 
technique was specifically useful in this particular study, because of the confidential 
nature of most people associated with conflict scenarios. These included: victims and 
perpetrators, ICC officials, political elites, governance and human rights activists, as 
well as government officials. Indeed, and as Atkinson and Flint (2001, 1) have 
suggested, snowballing is useful amongst more impermeable segments of society. 
In conducting the interviews, I used semi-structured interview guides which were 
useful in asking open-ended questions and probing for clarity. Semi-structured or in-
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depth interviewing is generally flexible and can provide room for changing the order 
of asking questions, or their phrasing (Arthur and Nazroo, 2003, 111). This approach 
was valuable in controlling the interviewing process, as well as sequencing the relevant 
questions. Each actor and institutional category was asked separate sets of questions, 
depending on their roles and interactions with the ICC and TJ processes in the countries 
under study. 
The primary data collected was then analyzed through a grounded theory approach 
where evidence collected raised new sub-questions for further investigations. For 
example, during data collection and analysis, there was a recurrent theme of mixed 
perceptions on the ICC’s resistance and acceptance in equal measure, which called for 
further interrogation and rigorous analysis. Essential to grounded theory is concurrent 
data collection and analysis, as opposed to other methodologies where data is first 
collected or theoretical positions are constructed and the data analyzed later (Birks and 
Mills, 2011). Within this approach therefore, I consistently analyzed the primary data 
collected and drew themes as they emerged. 
I also triangulated primary data with additional secondary sources that I continuously 
evaluated. Triangulation is a useful methodology for data analysis owing to its 
corroboration and validation of evidence (Jick, 1979). Some of the secondary sources 
evaluated were government and non-governmental reports, the ICC’s judgements and 
media briefings, legal instruments, media sources, blogs, journal articles, books, survey 
data and working papers. During triangulation of primary and secondary sources, my 
analysis changed over time as new themes emerged.  
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The entire primary data collection process was guided by University of Warwick’s 
research ethics policy. The policy calls for the integrity and well-being of people 
involved in the research and the wider community. In order to safeguard the integrity 
of the research project, I sought written or oral permissions from authorities, as well as 
from my interview partners. From the authorities, I obtained formal consent through 
submitting the requisite permit forms and paying research fees. With regards to 
interviewees, I sought written consent, or verbal permission in case this was not 
possible. 
Due to the potential risks in conducting research on the ICC, and in conflict societies, 
I opted for elite interviewing as a trade-off between research do-ability and ethics, 
excellence, avoidance of harm, and integrity. To further ensure the safety of all 
involved, the interview locations (offices, restaurants, coffee shops) were selected by 
the interviewees. I also promised all the interviewees anonymity, with specific 
references to their roles – such as government official, political activist, religious 
leader, elder or youth – instead of mentioning their actual names. I also gave assurances 
on data protection, which I followed through password protection and non-closure of 
interview partners and their responses. The primary data was recorded, then transcribed 
and analyzed through manual coding. All the data will be stored for a period of five 
years, after which it will be deleted.    
Besides the standardized regulations, I also took into account my positionality as a 
researcher in shaping and planning field work, as well as data analysis. Given more 
familiarity with the Kenyan context (as a citizen), I chose to conduct interviews in the 
country as I reached out to potential interview partners in Uganda. This was followed 
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by back and forth interviews in the two countries, which was also useful for the 
comparative nature of this research. 
Nonetheless, my positionality as a Kenyan from a community other than those that 
were under the ICC’s investigations raised additional issues. Cognizant of this 
dilemma, and to minimize the risks of biases, the research followed pre-designed 
interview guides, while I regularly reflected on the data collected. Specifically, this 
approach entailed the use of interview guides as the basis for asking questions and 
verifying the credibility and appropriateness of responses. 
The comparative aspect of this research also addressed the risks of biases, as data 
analysis entailed overarching themes on the ICC’s reception in Uganda and Kenya. 
Some of the thesis arguments were also subjected to periodic review by my supervisors, 
and in some outlets where I presented some of the findings, such as a conference 
presentation in Nairobi in October 2015, and a journal submission in July 2017.  
There were also differences in conducting field work in Uganda and Kenya as a result 
of the contrasting political conflicts. Whereas Kenya’s 2007/2008 political crisis was 
widespread across the country, Uganda’s conflict was concentrated in the northern 
region and spread to neighbouring countries (the DRC, CAR and South Sudan). Thus, 
I conducted interviews in more locations on the Kenyan conflict than Uganda’s – an 
eventuality that was compounded by inability to travel to the DRC, CAR and South 
Sudan because of logistical and time constraints. The disparities in the total interviews 
conducted between the two cases did not affect data analysis, as this   thesis relied on 
multiple sources (both primary and secondary). 
18 
 
Certainly, conducting interviews in Kenya was more difficult because of the ways in 
which the ICC’s intervention had been politicized. Unlike in Uganda where the ICC 
indicted non-state actors, the Kenyan situation involved the Court’s investigation and 
prosecution of powerful state officials who were also popular amongst their domestic 
constituencies. It therefore helped that I understood local languages and nuances, which 
were useful in analyzing the Kenyan situation.  Moreover, the stronger networks that I 
had in the country enabled me to access the top political leadership, as well as the 
masses in ascertaining their interactions in the diffusion of ICJ.  Hence, the Kenyan 
challenges became part of the analysis, and not just obstacles to it. 
In sum, the recognition of my positionality as a researcher has wider implications for 
the claims made in this thesis. The arguments advanced herein are products of an 
enduring effort to achieve objectivity, while reflecting on the potential risks of my 
positionality for the overall ambitions of the thesis. I was therefore able to navigate the 
terrain of confronting biases in my research and deliver credible findings.  
The decision to conduct a comparative study of Uganda and Kenya was supported by 
the two countries’ positions as the ICC’s first state-referral and proprio motu situations, 
respectively. Further, due to their precedents on the narratives of selectivity and neo-
colonialism, they reveal contrasting but similar examples of politicization of the ICC’s 
interventions and consequential implications for TJ. The two countries are also 
common law traditions, which provides a viable basis for comparing the ICC’s 
interventions on domestic legal landscapes. Uganda and Kenya also present different 
post-conflict scenarios, with the former as a previously militarized entity and the latter 
as a highly ethnicized polity, which also makes a good case to draw comparisons.   
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Despite this thesis’ simultaneous assessment of ICJ and TJ, there are differences of 
opinion in the scholarship regarding the relationship between the two normative 
paradigms. Debates still rage on whether ICJ and TJ are substitutes to one another, 
whether they are in competition, or complement each other (Arriaza 2013, 389). A 
common thread in these contestations is that the proponents of broad conceptions of TJ 
and ICJ perceive the two as interrelated, while advocates of a narrow view denote them 
as opposing paths (ibid, 390). 
Although the aforesaid debate is beyond the scope of this thesis, it provides a more 
compelling reason to navigate the unexplored grounds of the impacts of politicized ICJ 
on the viability of TJ discourses. Taking cue from the inextricable link between ICJ 
and TJ, this thesis explores politicization of international criminal interventions and the 
impasse of TJ, whether or not the former is complementary to, or parallel to the latter. 
Organization of this thesis 
The arguments in this thesis are presented in six chapters. This introduction is followed 
by chapter 1, which assesses the normative foundations and principles of ICJ, and 
challenges to universality that open up the ICC’s interventions to the construction of 
narratives upon interventions. The chapter discerns the Court’s establishment as an 
aspiration of the international community towards the construction of a moral universe 
where atrocity crimes do not to go unpunished. Towards this end, the Court has 
attracted significant global ownership, in addition to its innovations on victim 
centeredness, international cooperation and complementarity. The ICC’s relative 
global acceptance was boosted by the UN Secretary General’s appraisal of its role in 
the TJ doctrines for transitional societies. The chapter also argues that the reality of 
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spatial hierarchies in the moral universe, where different actors and institutions possess 
varying power positions and goals, poses challenges to the universality of ICJ. In turn, 
the challenges expose the ICC’s interventions to politicization by some domestic 
political elites, as exemplified in the narratives of selectivity and neo-colonialism. 
Nevertheless, the chapter concludes that the idea of a moral universe speaks to the 
ICC’s expressivist functions – the ability to articulate expected conduct on the 
commission of mass atrocities – hence the ever relevance of the ICC. 
Chapter 2 discusses the status of affairs in Uganda’s and Kenya’s post-conflict 
scenarios in their efforts to build democratic peace. The chapter’s focus provides the 
contextual background of domestic politics, their contributions to political violence, TJ 
mechanisms, and the politics’ continuity on the ICC’s interventions. In other words, 
the ICC’s intervention is assessed together with TJ mechanisms in order to open up 
space for debates on how its politicization limited the opportunities for significant 
transformation of Uganda and Kenya. Evidently, there is still work to be done on 
“Uganda’s steady progress” from militarism and “Kenya after 2007.” This is because 
of their lingering challenges on democratization, and the negative implications of the 
narratives on the ICC’s interventions for TJ mechanisms. 
Chapter 3 explains the conditions under which the ICC’s interventions were 
politicized in Uganda and Kenya, as well as the mechanisms for this politicization. 
Overall, the chapter grapples with the quest for power, authority and legitimacy in the 
politics of post-conflict transition; within the local, and between the local and the 
international. The chapter introduces the GoU’s and the Jubilee Alliance’s 
orchestration of transactional and adversarial exchanges, which culminated in the 
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glocalization of ICJ. Consequently, it is shown that the fusion of global normative 
dispositions on ICJ and local political realities conditioned the uptake of the ICC’s 
interventions amongst actors in local, regional and international spaces. Thus, this 
chapter develops a taxonomy of politicization of the ICC’s interventions – transactional 
and adversarial exchanges about the moral universe, as exemplified in Uganda’s 
selective referral and Kenya’s neo-colonial narrative, respectively. 
Chapter 4 further explores the salience of the narratives on the ICC’s interventions. 
The chapter commences with an elaboration of domestic normative contestations over 
ICJ and proceeds to assess the role of the narratives in overcoming this phenomenon. 
Specifically, the chapter discusses the GoU’s referral of the LRA to the ICC, and the 
latter’s subsequent disempowerment in the moral universe. Similarly assessed is the 
Jubilee Alliance’s neo-colonial narrative that significantly galvanized their domestic 
support base while alienating them from the ICC and its supporters.  
Chapter 5 assesses the narratives on the ICC’s interventions as antithetical to TJ 
mechanisms. Owing to their iteration of societal divisive binaries, the narratives 
impeded efforts at building long-term peace, in addition to aggravating some of the 
limitations of national efforts to redress the past. Further revelations of the narratives’ 
antithetical credentials were their impacts beyond national borders. Whereas Uganda’s 
selective referral deciphered the idea of the universality of ICJ (to other regional 
actors), Kenya’s neo-colonial narrative renewed African protectionism to other conflict 
societies, such as Burundi and South Sudan. Collectively, the two sets of narratives had 
far reaching implications of undermining the ICC’s legacies on the African continent.  
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Chapter 6 presents the dilemmas of complementarity, as an assessment of the 
transferability of some of the ICC’s principles in local spaces. The difficulties of 
replicating complementarity accrued from complexities in conflict scenarios and the 
Court’s struggle for legitimacy and autonomy vis-à-vis local traditions in dealing with 
the past. By reinvigorating the peace versus justice debate, this chapter expounds 
domestic resistance to the Rome Statutes’ complementarity regime, as exemplified in 
Uganda’s amnesty process and the Jubilee Alliance’s pervasive peace over justice 
messaging. In a nutshell, the chapter offers a more nuanced analysis of 
complementarity debacles in Uganda and Kenya, as opposed to arguments in favour of 
deliberate impunity for alleged perpetrators of mass atrocities.  
The thesis concludes by summarising the foregoing arguments and broadly links them 
to the duality of international and domestic normative paradigms, or tensions between 
global governance and sovereignty. On the one hand, concerns on national sovereignty 
partly contributed to the ICC’s predicaments in Uganda and Kenya, as well as on the 
wider African continent. On the other hand, the Court’s normative imperatives 
significantly drive its acceptance in many quarters, including from some of its critics. 
With recent recession on Africa’s collective withdrawal from the ICC, and the absence 
of a viable regional alternative to the Court, the universality of justice portends as the 
main challenge for global justice. Ultimately, any indication or perception of the 
Court’s departure from the universality of justice will open up its interventions to the 
construction of narratives, as the Ugandan and Kenyan cases demonstrated. 
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Chapter 1 
Towards a moral universe:  The International Criminal Court’s establishment 
and emerging narratives on its interventions 
The Rome Statute which provided the legal foundations for the ICC’s establishment 
reveals some of the intentions of the international community with regards to the 
commission of mass atrocities. Notably, the Statute indicates the aspirations of 
constructing a moral universe whereby atrocities do not to go unpunished, in order to: 
contribute to their prevention, secure justice for victims and strengthen the rule of law. 
Some of the lasting impressions of these ambitions are the ICC’s permanence and 
codification of international crimes in the Rome Statute.  
In this thesis, the concept of a moral universe denotes the international community’s 
determination to set the standards of rule and behaviour on the commission of heinous 
crimes.1Notwithstanding the foregoing intentions and definition, some other 
motivations justified the ICC’s creation. 
For instance, there are suggestions that ICJ leads to retributive justice and prevents 
revenge amongst victim populations (Akhavan 2001, 7-10). It is also argued that 
discussions on human security are anchored in the ICC’s commitment to criminal 
accountability (Balasco 2013, 47). The Rome Statute also hints at the ICC’s role in 
mitigating threats to “the peace, security and well-being of the world … and shattering 
                                                          
1 This definition is partly derived from the Cambridge online dictionary. See 
http://dictionary.cambridge.org/dictionary/english/morality  
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the delicate mosaic of cultural heritages.”2 To some observers, ICJ contributes to 
national healing and reconciliation, as it serves as a neutral arbiter in societal conflicts 
(Wippman 1999, 474). However, the discussions in this thesis are limited to the idea 
of a moral universe because of its overarching themes and intentions.  
Therefore, as a vital moral agent, the ICC was imbued with relative universal 
jurisdiction for international crimes. As such, the Court can intervene in unable and/or 
unwilling situations under three trigger mechanisms: state referrals, United Nations 
Security Council (UNSC) referrals and proprio motu. The ICC’s universality is also 
enhanced by its relative acceptance by several states across the world regions. 
Critical in the ICC’s moral agency are also innovations in the Rome Statute, namely: 
victim centeredness, as well as the principles of cooperation and complementarity. 
Whereas cooperation calls for concerted efforts at combating impunity at the 
international and national levels, complementarity confers primacy of jurisdiction to 
national institutions, and provides for the ICC’s intervention as a last resort. The UN 
Secretary General also mainstreamed the ICC’s proactive role in TJ doctrines for post-
conflict societies, due to its normative imperatives.  
Despite the ICC’s centrality in the vision of a moral universe, challenges still abound 
on the universality of ICJ. In turn, the challenges open up the ICC’s interventions to 
the construction of narratives, such as Uganda’s selectivity and Kenya’s neo-
colonialism. The remainder of this chapter will demonstrate how the challenges of 
universality on ICJ are occasioned by the aggregation of the moral universe into spatial 
                                                          
2 Excerpts from the first and third recital of the Rome Statute.  
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hierarchies (international, regional and local spaces), with discrete actors and 
institutions, that possess varying power positions and goals. The specific narratives 
constructed will then be discussed in chapters 3, 4 and 5.  
The first part of this chapter elaborates the ICC’s credentials in the vision of a moral 
universe, such as its normative imperatives, global ownership and the UN Secretary 
General’s endorsement in TJ discourses. The chapter then turns to discussions of the 
challenges to universality of ICJ due to the aggregation of the moral universe into 
diverse spaces, and the opportunities they present for constructing narratives on the 
ICC’s interventions. The chapter then concludes and ponders on the threats that 
challenges to universality pose to the idea of a moral universe. Consequently, I still 
contend that the ICC’s expressivist function is significant in the idea of a moral 
universe by articulating the urgency of criminal accountability for international crimes.  
1.1. Constructing the moral universe and the International Criminal Court’s 
global ownership.  
The ICC was established in 2002, with a permanent seat at The Hague in the 
Netherlands, after the requisite ratification by 60 states. State ratification was preceded 
by the 1998 Rome Diplomatic Conference, in which some world leaders expressed the 
moral universe rhetoric on the occasion of the Statute’s adoption. 
During the conclusion of the UN diplomatic conference on the ICC’s establishment, 
the then Italian Foreign Minister, Lamberto Dini, stated that the Court would “mark 
not only a political but a moral stride forward by international society” (Dini 1998, 2). 
Moreover, Dini observed that it was “not over-optimistic” to believe in the ICC’s 
envisaged role in contributing to human security, harmonious co-existence and reduced 
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instances of mass violence (ibid, 2). According to the Chairman of the Conference’s 
Drafting Committee, Cherif Bassiouni (Egypt), the adoption of the Rome Statute would 
significantly change the world.  Bassiouni’s optimism stemmed from the belief that the 
ceremony not only signified the final step of a historical process that had commenced 
at the end of the First World War, but also growing intolerance to impunity for 
perpetrators of international crime (UN 1998b, 1).  
For his part, Philippe Kirsch, Chairman of Committee of the Whole Conference noted 
that the ICC would significantly impact on future generations (ibid, 1). Through the 
institution, Kirsch further argued, the global community had shown that “enough is 
enough” (ibid, 1). While for the then UN Secretary General, Kofi Annan, the ICC’s 
establishment “was a gift of hope to future generations, and a giant step forward in the 
march towards universal human rights and the rule of law” (ibid, 1). 
Besides the rhetoric that followed the Rome Statute’s adoption, some states took 
concrete steps to join the ICC, while others dithered. Even so, some powerful states 
that did not ratify the Rome Statute (notably Russia, the USA, China and Egypt), also 
welcomed the ICC’s establishment and its envisaged universality. 
For example, at the Sixth Committee of the UN General Assembly’s meeting on the 
ICC’s establishment, the Russian delegation argued for prioritizing practical steps 
towards the Rome Statutes’ adoption and emphasized the importance of the ICC’s 
jurisdiction for core crimes of genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes and the 
crime of aggression (CICC 1995, 1). They also expressed the ICC’s role in realizing 
the creation of a permanent ICJ institution for the first time in history (ibid, 1). In turn, 
the USA’s delegation showed their readiness to progress with efforts to establish the 
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permanent ICC, despite the practical difficulties in creating an institution of such 
complexity (Borek 1995, 7). 
 The Chinese delegation declared their acceptance of the ICC’s jurisdiction for 
international crimes and willingness to cooperate with other actors on the ICC’s 
universality (Shiqiu 1995, 4-7). The Chinese were also pleased with the inclusion of 
the principle of complementarity in the preamble of the draft Statute and its broad 
support (ibid). While recollecting the gravity of international crimes and their 
consequences on populations, the Egyptian delegation called for a speedy drafting of 
the ICC Statute and the UN General Assembly’s “clear and unequivocal position in 
favour of effective action” (Elaraby 1995, 4). 
As of July 1998, the UN revealed that 26 states across the world regions had signed the 
Rome Statute, out of which 11 were in Africa (UN, 1998). By then, the African 
signatories to the Statute were: Cameroon, Ghana, Liberia, Madagascar, Mali, 
Mauritius, Namibia, Niger, the DRC, Senegal and Zambia (ibid). In addition, Ghana, 
Sudan, South Africa and Morocco were members of the Rome Statute’s drafting 
committee (UN 2002, 69). 
Evidently, African states assumed ownership of the ICC’s process, including Kenya’s 
Vice-Presidency during the Rome Conference (Shiundu 2013a,1). As the Kenyan 
delegation argued, “there must be a strong political will on the part of state parties that 
would sign and ratify the Statute” (ibid, 1). Kenya finally signed the Statute on August 
11, 1999 (ibid), followed by ratification in May 2005 (ICC, 2017a). For Uganda, the 
then Deputy Attorney General and Minister of State for Justice and Constitutional 
affairs observed that the country’s “special relationship with the Court started at the 
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foot of the Seven Hills of Rome during the diplomatic conference in 1998,” which 
culminated in the Statutes’ ratification in 2002 when it came into force (Ruhindi 2009, 
2). 
To date, the total count of Africa’s membership in the ICC is 34 states as part of 
remedies for some of the injustice experienced on the continent (AU 2017a, 1). 
Africans’ ownership of the ICC was partly informed by an envisaged renewal and 
liberating the continent from previous atrocities, including:  the 1980s and 1990s 
violent incidence, international inaction during the Rwandan Genocide of 1994, 
injustices of apartheid in South Africa, and European colonialism (ibid).    
Outside Africa, the ICC founding treaty was welcomed as a defining moment in world 
history. For example, a pioneer ICC judge, Hans-Peter Kaul, hailed the Rome Statute 
as “the most important treaty since the adoption of the UN Charter in San Francisco in 
October 1945” (Kaul 2011, 1). Kaul also lauded the Rome Statute for its revolutionary 
codification of international crimes (genocide, crimes against humanity and war 
crimes) on voluntary consent of the global community. Accordingly, Judge Song 
(2014, 1) argued that the adoption of the Rome Statute reflected a major advancement 
towards a better world. Song also suggested that the spirit of the 1998 Rome 
Conference was comparable to that of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in 
1945 (ibid).   
Furthermore, it was argued that the 20th century experienced the worst and the best 
moments: with the former as World War I and II, and the latter as the latter as the 
creation of global law and institutions (Paris 2017, 1). In this vein, Schabas (2011, 61) 
posits that since the UN’s creation, the ICC is the most interesting and ground-breaking 
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advancement in international law. Schabas described the Rome Statute as one of the 
most complicated international treaties, which he believes is a “sophisticated web of 
highly technical provisions” that are derived from comparative criminal law and 
political provisions that encroach into concerns on state authority (ibid, 61). 
Driving the ICC’s acceptance across the globe is the Coalition for the ICC (CICC), a 
conglomerate of over 2,500 organizations operating in 150 countries (CICC, 2017). 
The organization enlists its vision as: “a more peaceful world through universal access 
to justice for victims of war crimes, crimes against humanity and genocide” (ibid, 1). 
As a CICC official revealed, the organization’s advocacy for ICJ made it possible to 
draft the Rome Statute amidst some resistance from the big powers (Interview, The 
Hague, Netherlands, 23 July 2015). 
From its secretariat in The Hague, the CICC actively monitors the ICC’s judicial 
activities and disseminates them to the wider public through internal and external 
communication tools (ibid). In so doing, the CICC provides a service that nobody else, 
including the ICC, delivers – making a huge amount of information accessible and 
understandable worldwide (ibid). 
Similarly informing the ICC’s global acceptance is the limited reach of other 
international or special and hybrid criminal tribunals. For example, the UN sanctioned 
Special Tribunal for Lebanon (STL) and the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of 
Cambodia (ECCC) are confined to specific countries and crimes (UN, 2007; ECCC, 
2014). 
Likewise, previous ad hoc tribunals, such as the International Criminal Tribunal for 
former Yugoslavia (ICTY), International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR), and 
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the Special Court for Sierra Leone (SCSL) were insufficient in responding to global 
atrocities. As Theodor Meron, former ICTY President and presiding judge of the 
Appeals Chambers of the ICTR and ICTY reveals, “the establishment of the ICC 
created a mantra that the international community was tired of ad hoc tribunals which 
are expensive, slow and selective” (Meron 2011, 142). 
In turn, the ICC was to be practically universal, more effective and less costly (ibid). 
As opposed to the ad hoc tribunals, the international community imbued the ICC with 
universal jurisdiction for international crimes. Thus, for African countries that sought 
emancipation from their past atrocities and injustices, the ICC was a significant route, 
given its envisaged universal reach.  
1.1.1. The International Criminal Court and universality 
The ICC establishes jurisdiction for heinous crimes in case of domestic lapses in 
commencing proceedings for the most responsible perpetrators. The Court’s trigger of 
jurisdiction is popularly known as the admissibility test, which is elaborated in Article 
17 of the Rome Statute. Under this provision, admissibility is premised on the ICC’s 
prima facie declaration of domestic inability and/ or unwillingness to genuinely 
commence investigations and prosecutions of the most responsible perpetrators of core 
crimes. For Megret (2017), admissibility denotes “notions that are interpreted strictly 
to cover states that are either committed to ensuring impunity or too weak to even carry 
out prosecutions.” 
Article 17 (2) of the Rome Statute expands and clarifies other considerations on 
admissibility. In determining unwillingness, the ICC shall consider whether: national 
proceedings are or were designed to shield suspects from criminal responsibility; there 
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are unjustified delays in the prosecutions; and that the proceedings are or were not 
impartial or independent. For inability, Article 17 (3) provides that the ICC considers: 
Whether, due to a total or substantial collapse or unavailability of its 
national judicial system, the State is unable to obtain the accused or the 
necessary evidence and testimony or otherwise unable to carry out its 
proceedings. 
Further lending credence to the ICC’s universal jurisdiction are its interventions that 
potentially accrue from three different mechanisms: state referrals (Art.14); UNSC 
referrals (Art.13 (b) and proprio motu or own motion provision (Arts. 13(c),15 and 51 
(1)). On these accounts, the ICC potentially establishes jurisdiction over international 
crimes whether a state is a party to the Rome Statute or not, and whether a state party 
opts to refer a situation to the Court or not. 
The availability of various intervention mechanisms opened up the ICC to several 
African member states, including those that were yet to ratify the Rome Statute. 
Moreover, pursuant to Article 12 (3) of the Statute, non-state parties might accept the 
ICC’s jurisdiction in an ad hoc basis by submitting such declarations to the Court. For 
instance, as a non-state party, Ukraine submitted such a declaration and thereby 
accepted the ICC’s jurisdiction over crimes committed on its territory from 21st 
November, 2013 to 22nd February, 2014 (ICC, 2014a). In the African context, Côte 
d’Ivoire’s ICC’s proprio motu intervention in the 2011 political crisis was made 
possible by the country’s earlier acceptance of the Court’s jurisdiction in April 2013 
and not Statute ratification (ICC, 2017a). 
32 
 
The parties to the Rome Statute coalesce under the Assembly of State Parties (ASP), 
which is the ICC’s legislative and management oversight body (ICC, 2017b). The ASP 
Bureau comprises a President, two Vice Presidents and 18 elected members for a three-
year term, with considerations on geographic balance and representation of the world’s 
legal principles (ibid). Non-state parties are allowed observer status in the ASP, though 
with no voting rights. To date, the ICC has a 1233 state membership across the world, 
which adds to its universal reach.  
Conversely, the reluctance of some major powers (the USA, Russia, China, India, 
Pakistan, Indonesia and Israel) to ratify the Rome Statute undermines the ICC’s relative 
global acquiescence. Nevertheless, some of the powers – the USA, China and Russia – 
accepted to play major roles in some of the ICC’s processes via the UNSC. Through 
Articles 13(b) and 16 of the Rome Statute, the council refers and defers situations 
respectively. Examples of the UNSC’s referrals are: the situation in Darfur, Sudan vide 
Resolution 1593 (2005) in March 2005 (ICC, 2005a), and the Libyan February 2011 
referral under Resolution 1970 (2011) (ICC, 2011a). 
Collectively, the ICC’s intolerance to impunity for heinous crimes and demonstration 
of capacity to intervene in case of domestic lapses account for its normative 
imperatives. These normative attributes also stamp the ICC’s moral authority and 
position as a Court of last resort. Further giving credence to the ICC’s normative 
imperatives are innovations in the Rome Statute – victim centeredness, cooperation and 
complementarity. With such commitments, the ICC strengthens the international 
                                                          
3 Number of state parties as of the time of writing.  
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community’s resolve in combating impunity for alleged perpetrators of mass atrocities, 
as will be discussed in the following section.  
1.2. Innovations in the Rome Statute: victim centeredness, cooperation and 
complementarity 
The Rome Statute’s innovations reinforce the ICC’s normative imperatives by not only 
articulating the global struggle against impunity for heinous crimes, but also provide 
roadmaps on how this is to be done. The Court’s victim centeredness, cooperation and 
complementarity regimes are indicative of structural relationships between the ICC and 
national judicial systems, thus prevail as some of the “most important foundations of 
the ICJ system as established by the Rome Statute” (Song 2014, 2). Upon the 
commission of atrocities, therefore, African situations were to share in the Statute’s 
innovations, if their resolutions of emancipation were to be accorded the importance 
they deserved.  
First, unlike the ad hoc tribunals, the ICC takes a more progressive approach towards 
victim centeredness, both under statutory provisions and in administrative practice. As 
a first step, the Court predicates the commencement of investigations on the interests 
of victims as articulated in Article 53 of the Statute. Additionally, Article 68 provides 
for “protection of victims and witnesses and their participation in Court proceedings.” 
Next, Article 75 espouses a reparations regime, which is expanded under Article 79 
that provides for the Trust Fund for Victims (TFV). 
To enhance victims’ participation, the ICC created the Office of Public Counsel for 
Victims (OPCV), and the Victims Participation and Reparations Section (VPRS) in 
addition to field outreach offices. In contrast, ad hoc tribunals only relied on witness 
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testimonies under the arguments that they should not be subjected to further 
victimization in the ICJ system (Megret, 2017). As the Office of the Prosecutor (OTP) 
avers, the Rome Statute empowers victims with rights to independently express their 
views and concerns during Court proceedings (ICC 2010a, 5). 
The ICC is therefore hailed as a victims’ Court, owing to the provisions on victims’ 
participation in proceedings, reparations, and legal assistance (Stover 2010, 4). The 
Court’s victim centeredness also enhances their visibility during the commission of 
atrocities (Megret, 2017). 
Before the ICC’s establishment, the UN had adopted the “Declaration of Basic 
Principles of Justice for Victims of Crime and Abuse of Power” (UN, 1985). The 
declaration pressed for the adoption of local and international frameworks of 
facilitating “the universal and effective recognition of, and respect for, the rights of 
victims of crime and of abuse of power” (ibid, 1).  
Consequently, the ICC’s victims’ consciousness was alive to growing international 
consensus on best practices when dealing with atrocity crimes. As the OTP reveals, the 
ICC has regard to the treatment of victims humanely, their dignity, respect as well as 
their “safety, physical and psychological well-being and privacy, and that of their 
families” (ICC 2009a, 2). According to Judge Song (2010, 6), the Court’s victim 
centeredness is one of the Rome Statute’s major successes because it allows for 
substantial integration of victims in the Court’s processes, even if not summoned as 
witnesses. 
Second, the Rome Statute articulates the principle of cooperation in the global war on 
impunity for atrocity crimes.  In the fourth recital of the preamble, it is affirmed that 
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the effective prosecution of international crimes “must be ensured by taking measures 
at the national level, and by enhancing international cooperation.” Within the text of 
the Statute, the principle of cooperation is propounded in part IX, on ‘international 
cooperation and judicial assistance.’  
More explicitly, Article 86 deliberates on ‘general obligation to cooperate,’ compelling 
states to “cooperate fully with the Court in its investigation and prosecution of crimes 
within the jurisdiction of the Court.” Article 87 dwells on the channels for this 
cooperation, while Article 88 mandates states to “ensure that there are procedures 
available under their national law for all of the forms of cooperation.” From Articles 
89 to 100, there are express provisions for requests to national jurisdictions with regard 
to surrendering suspects to the Court.  
Despite the obligations cooperation imposes on states, the principle emerges as a 
fundamental limitation of the ICC, just as in other international criminal tribunals 
(Peskin, 2008). As Judge Kaul (2011, 8) suggested during a key note address at 
Salzburg Law School, state cooperation is one of the most significant challenges that 
the ICC continues to face. Decrying the Court’s dependence on state cooperation, Kaul 
noted how the ICC is wholly dependent on state cooperation, thus its lack of executive 
power and major weakness (ibid, 8). In a similar vein, Judge Song registered the ICC’s 
frustrations of inadequate cooperation in the Darfur case, and the UN system’s inability 
to impose obligations on states to do so (Song 2014, 5). Narratives on the ICC’s 
interventions thrive under conditions where the institution expects cooperation from 
domestic political elites, some of whom are adversely mentioned in the commission of 
atrocities. 
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Closely linked to the cooperation regime is the principle of complementarity, which is 
expressed in the preamble and Article 1. In the preamble, it is “emphasized that the 
ICC is established to be complementary to national criminal jurisdictions.” Further, 
Article 1 states that “the Court is established … as a permanent institution … and shall 
be complementary to national criminal jurisdictions.” 
Since then, the principle of complementarity has attracted many interpretations on its 
ideational intentions and applicability. According to Triffterer (2008, 10), the ICC’s 
limitations obligate states to take a proactive role for an efficient and effective war on 
impunity. For Kleffner (2003, 87), the Court’s conferment of primacy of jurisdiction 
to national judiciaries has helped to manage sovereignty concerns. For his part, Meron 
(2011, 160-162) posits that national proceedings potentially escape the difficulties 
associated with international trials and are likely to be more accepted by victims and 
local populations. In this regard, the principle of complementarity could be interpreted 
as a ‘safety valve’ against the ICC’s shortcomings and sovereignty dilemmas it poses 
to states.  
Furthermore, the complementarity regime was associated with the Rome Statute’s role 
in accountability norm diffusion and leverages on case admissibility. In this regard, 
Meron (2011) posited that the principle of complementarity has likelihoods of a trickle-
down effect on local legal regimes. Similarly, Nouwen (2013) described the ICC’s 
envisaged catalyzing effects, which are premised on normative responsibilities 
ascribed to states, and rational choice considerations for avoiding the Court’s 
interventions with domestic reform initiatives. As Burke-White (2008, 56) rightly 
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argued, deterring the ICC’s intervention with genuine national proceedings points to 
the admissibility test in Article 17, which is a passive form of complementarity. 
Consequent to the expansive interpretations of the principle of complementarity, the 
OTP embarked on expert consultations in order to “put complementarity into practice” 
(ICC, 2003). The consultations led to deliberations that complementarity might be 
informed by two guiding principles: partnership and vigilance (ibid, 3). Whereas 
partnership denotes a positive and constructive relationships between the ICC and 
concerned states, vigilance points to the Court’s due diligence in carrying out its duties 
and ensuring that national proceedings are genuinely conducted (ibid). 
Afterwards, the OTP adopted ‘positive complementarity,’ (which is not mentioned 
anywhere in the Rome Statute), as symbolic of a “mutually reinforcing international 
justice system” (ICC 2006, 5). According to the OTP, a “positive complementarity” 
would mean encouraging genuine national proceedings, while relying on national and 
international networks under a system of international cooperation (ibid, 5). As a core 
principle of the OTP’s 2006-2009 prosecutorial strategy, positive complementarity was 
envisaged to maximize the Court’s impacts (ibid, 4).  
At its eighth session in New York in 2010, the ASP deliberated on the concept of 
positive complementarity while evaluating the Kampala Review Conference 
proceedings, and mechanisms of strengthening the ICC system (ASP, 2010). 
Thereafter, the ASP agreed to promote exchanges between the ICC’s member states 
and other relevant stakeholders (UN organizations, international organizations, donor 
agencies, academic institutions and CSOs) in strengthening the capacity of national 
jurisdictions (ibid, 3). Also, the ASP made reference to pledges and future works on 
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complementarity (ibid). This was in addition to explicit pledges on helping with the 
ICC implementing legislation, building national capacities in order to enable them 
investigate and prosecute atrocity crimes, as well as other capacity building 
frameworks (ibid, 4).  
After the ASP’s support and endorsement, the OTP promulgated ‘positive 
complementarity’ as a proactive policy of cooperation aimed at promoting national 
proceedings for international crimes (ICC 2010b, 5). Similarly included in the 
principles’ role was the sharing of information with national institutions on request; 
exchanges on expertise and trainings with experts and lawyers from situation countries; 
cooperating with international bodies and liaising with development organizations to 
promote accountability (ibid, 5).  
Despite ‘positive complementarity’s’ prospects in closing impunity gaps, it is not 
immune to cooperation dilemmas, just like its passive variant. This is an indication of 
the practical difficulties in the transferability of some of the ICC’s innovations to local 
realms. This reality negates Judge Song’s (2014, 3) convictions of how 
complementarity propels the war on impunity at two levels concurrently: building local 
capacities and affirming global institutions. 
Yet still, the ICC’s struggle against impunity for serious crimes, together with its 
innovations of complementarity, victim centeredness and cooperation endear it to 
wider acceptance, including in the UN system. The ICC has a special relationship with 
the UN, which was formalized in a ‘Negotiated Relationship Agreement’ in October 
2004 (UN, 2004a). In the agreement, the UN acknowledged the Court’s significance in 
dealing with serious crimes, which also threaten the peace, security and well-being of 
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the world (ibid). More importantly, the UN Secretary General appraised the ICC’s role 
in the TJ doctrines that are prescribed for societies emerging from authoritarianism or 
conflict.  
1.3. Mainstreaming the International Criminal Court’s role in transitional 
justice discourses 
Over time, TJ has emerged alongside ICJ as remedial actions for transitional societies 
in their efforts to overcome past abuses that accrue from democratic and rule of law 
deficits. Subsequently, many UN Secretary General’s notes and policy documents 
prescribe and endorse TJ doctrines in order to deal with the past, and build more 
peaceful polities (UN, 2004b; UN, 2010). More importantly, the Secretary General 
mainstreams the ICC’s proactive role in TJ mechanisms owing to its normative 
imperatives (ibid). 
Doctrinally, the “Report of the UN Secretary General on the rule of law and transitional 
justice in conflict and post-conflict societies” premises the normative foundations of 
TJ on the UN Charter, together with the four pillars of contemporary international legal 
system (UN 2004b, 5). The pillars consist of: international human rights law, 
international humanitarian law, international criminal law, and international refugee 
law (ibid). Moreover, the report contends that the pillars are indicative of universal 
norms that are agreed on under the UN’s leadership (ibid, 5).  
Further, the report asserts that TJ norms have been produced, accepted and 
accommodated by “the full range of legal systems of Member States, whether based in 
common law, civil law, Islamic law, or other legal tradition” (ibid, 5). Therefore, the 
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norms’ legitimacy cannot be contested on the rationale of legal imperialism, and they 
define the normative foundations of the UN’s activities (ibid, 5).  
Second, the “Guidance note of the Secretary-General on the UN’s approaches to 
transitional justice” explicitly outlines the components of the TJ doctrine and its 
execution. In the note, TJ has been defined by the UN (2010, 3) as “the full range of 
processes and mechanisms associated with a society’s attempt to come to terms with a 
legacy of large-scale past abuses, in order to ensure accountability, serve justice and 
achieve reconciliation.” The note further elaborates that TJ consists of “both judicial 
and non-judicial processes and mechanisms, including prosecution initiatives, truth-
seeking, reparations programmes, institutional reform or an appropriate combination 
thereof” (ibid,3). 
Intuitively, the various ‘tools’ outlined by the global body represent the evolution of 
justice sought. On the one hand, there is an emphasis on punitive justice and 
accountability for atrocities committed, and restorative and reparative justice on the 
other hand. This dichotomy obtains from the recognition of victim centeredness while 
redressing the past; thus, a need for restoration and reparation. The other consideration 
is a need for focusing on alleged perpetrators, hence the utility of retribution. Besides, 
victims often articulate the mixed goals of TJ by favouring all approaches (Lambourne, 
2009). The UN (2004b, 1) also provides a cautionary note and recommends a 
comprehensive justice sector and attention to complementary roles between the various 
components of TJ.  
Furthermore, the UN Secretary-General argues that due to their integrated and 
interdependent qualities, TJ mechanisms “can contribute to achieving the broader 
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objectives of prevention of further conflict, peacebuilding and reconciliation” (UN 
2010, 3). The Secretary- General also revealed the intentions of TJ as strengthening the 
rule of law at national and international levels, with the aim of contributing to lasting 
peace (ibid). 
From the UN Secretary-General’s clarifications, it has been argued that the TJ 
discourse is embedded in and premised on the liberal peace thesis. In the frontline of 
advancing this view is Paris (2004, 5), who predicts that the perception that advancing 
liberalization in post-conflict societies would lead to favourable conditions to lasting 
peace is the “unstated but widely accepted theory of conflict management.” This 
follows from the underlying hypothesis of the liberal peace paradigm that liberal 
democracies do not go to war with each other and have less propensity for internal 
violent conflict (Doyle, 2012). The liberal peace theory suggests that the more liberal 
democratic polities there are, the more the international order is likely to be stable and 
peaceful (Howard, 2001). The liberal thesis builds on Kant’s ‘To Perpetual Peace’–the 
foundation of international liberal thought (Paris, 2006). 
While the UN Secretary-General’s note welcomes the active role of national 
institutions in liberal peacebuilding, it is also acknowledged that domestic criminal 
trials might be undermined by inability/unwillingness (UN 2010, 14). Given this 
reality, the Secretary-General contends that the international community has a critical 
role in dealing with alleged perpetrators of mass atrocities (ibid). 
As such, the Secretary-General’s note reveals that the ICC provides renewed hope in 
confronting impunity for international crimes, because previous experiments of ad hoc 
tribunals had little domestic impacts in judicial administration (UN 2010, 2.). More so, 
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the Secretary-General made specific reference to the Rome Statute’s complementarity 
regime, noting that it uniquely enhances the ICC’s ability to promote the development 
of local capacities in the prosecution of alleged perpetrators of international crimes 
(UN 2010, 8) 
Similarly, in the Secretary- General’s “Report on the rule of law and transitional justice 
in conflict and post-conflict societies,” reference is made to the ICC as representing the 
international community’s aspirations in combating impunity. Herein, it is deliberated 
that the ICC is: undeniably the most important recent advancement in the global 
community’s struggle to promote the rule of law, and its impacts are already felt by 
sending messages to potential perpetrators and catalyzing domestic legislation for 
international crimes (UN 2004b, 16). 
In summary, the ICC’s relative universality, together with its normative imperatives 
affirm the international community’s commitment in combating impunity. This is in 
addition to further commitments from the UN-Secretary General who positions the 
Court in a broader discourse on TJ. Nonetheless, challenges still abound on the 
universality of ICJ, owing to the reality of spatial hierarchies where diverse actors and 
institutions possess different power positions and goals on ICJ. In turn, the 
impediments to universality expose the ICC’s interventions to the construction of 
narratives, such as its accusations of selectivity and neo-colonialism in Uganda and 
Kenya, respectively.   
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1.4. Challenges to the International Criminal Court’s universality in local, 
regional and international spaces. 
The ICC interacts with an array of actors and institutions in international, local and 
regional spaces during its processes that range from initiation of investigations to actual 
trials. However, the disparities in power positions and goals on ICJ within the spatial 
hierarchies undermine the ICC’s normative imperatives and expose it to politicization. 
More specifically, contradictions in the international system, solidarity in the regional 
space, and normative contestations in local spaces challenge the ICC’s vantage position 
as a Court of last resort in the global war on impunity for international crimes. 
In assessing the international system, specific reference is made to the roles of the 
UNSC and individual member states in the ICJ regime.  Discussions on regional 
solidarity focus on the ICC’s reception amongst collective actors, such as the AU and 
the European Union (EU). The local space also attends to collective action with regard 
to the ICC’s interventions amongst political elites, affected communities, victims, 
religious groups and other interest groups, albeit under competing ideological and 
power positions.   
1.4.1. Contradictions in the international system 
The powerful role of the UNSC in the ICJ regime stems from Chapter VII of the UN 
Charter on maintaining international peace and security. Recognizing this duty, the 
drafters of the Rome Statute conferred significant authority to the UNSC –  in the ICC’s 
referral and deferral regimes. Notwithstanding the UNSC’s leadership roles in the ICJ 
regime, the institution and some of its member states demonstrate apparent 
contradictions between their actions and responsibilities as ascribed in the Statute. 
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Whereas some UNSC members have committed global atrocities with impunity, some 
have reportedly shielded their allies from the ICC’s reach, failed to ratify the Rome 
Statute, or publicly condemned the Court. Indeed, Meernik (2013, 179) rightly 
reminded us that practically, the international community is best understood as actors 
with contradictory goals, rather than a unitary actor with clear interests. In turn, the 
inconsistencies in the UNSC undermine its institutional leadership on ICJ, with knock 
on effects on providing incentives for the narratives on the ICC’s interventions to 
flourish in local and regional realms.  
Contemporary accounts of global atrocities cannot escape mentioning some of the 
UNSC members.  As a fact, all the Permanent 5 (P-5) members of the UNSC but China 
have participated in deadly conflicts, and consequently committed crimes that fall 
within the ICC’s jurisdiction. These include the 2001 Afghanistan conflict which 
involved the active participation of the USA, United Kingdom (UK) and France, the 
USA and UK war in Iraq (2003), and Russia’s wars in Georgia (2008), Ukraine (2014) 
and Syria (2015). 
Despite their apparent roles in the commission of atrocities, non-council ICC member 
states are beyond the ICC’s reach since they would veto any resolutions on the Court’s 
intervention. Also, only two UNSC P-5 members – UK and France – have ratified the 
Rome Statute. Whereas the USA and Russia withdrew their signatures after 
apprehensions on the ICC’s reach, China has not made any steps to join the Court. 
Nevertheless, any of the P-5 can veto council resolutions, including on the ICC 
referrals. 
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Further, Russia, China and the USA are on record for using their veto to protect their 
allies from the ICC’s jurisdiction (Plessis, 2013). To this end, Israel has benefited from 
the USA’s veto, while Syria has China’s and Russia’s protection. Conversely, the 
council members unanimously agreed to refer situations in Libya and Sudan to the ICC, 
which stoked flames of an African bias and the Court’s use by world powers (Plessis, 
2013). Additionally, the council resolutions on the referrals excluded the ICC’s 
jurisdiction on foreign nationals (international actors) to ostensibly shield them from 
justice (Bosco, 2014a). 
Besides the USA and Russia’s reluctance to join the ICC, some of their senior officials 
publicly condemned and delegitimized the Court despite their earlier acceptance of its 
utility. While announcing the withdrawal of Russia’s signature from the ICC in 2016, 
the Foreign Ministry declared that the Court is inefficient, dispenses one-sided justice 
and failed to meet the expectations of the international community (Bowcott and 
Walker 2016, 1). 
The statement on Russia’s withdrawal from the ICC followed the Court’s publication 
of a report that denoted the country’s annexation of Crimea as an occupation (ibid). 
Most probably, Russia’s U-turn also stemmed from a possible ICC intervention in 
Syria, where the country was accused of committing war crimes (ibid). As a result, 
Russia declared its intentions of not cooperating with the ICC or ratifying the Statute 
in the near future (ibid). Towards this end, a Russian official recalled their earlier 
support for the ICC and belief in its contribution to stability, which would be alternated 
with a change in attitude (ibid, 1).  
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Similarly, some senior officials in the USA administration continued to undermine the 
ICC in public platforms. For example, a former official in the Bush administration, 
Jendayi Frazer, noted in 2013 that “the ICC indeed has fallen far from the high ideals 
of global justice and accountability that inspired its creation” (Frazer 2013, 1). 
According to another official, the ICC is an irredeemably defective institution, the OTP 
is unaccountable, and it would be used to instigate politicized trials for American 
citizens (CNN 2000,1).  
Moreover, due to the probability of the ICC’s intervention in Afghanistan where some 
American soldiers committed atrocities, the USA’s former point man on global justice, 
Stephen Rapp, reaffirmed their initial policy that limited the Court’s jurisdiction to 
member states (Bosco 2014b, 1). The apparent contradiction in Rapp’s argument was 
that the USA found wisdom in (1) the UNSC’s referral of Sudan and Libya to the ICC, 
equally non-member states, and (2) demanding compliance with the ICC from third 
countries, such as Kenya, Uganda and Sudan (Joselow, 2013; Associated Press, 2016; 
Lubis, 2016)  
The USA’s opposition to the ICC began during the Clinton era, when the country failed 
to secure immunity for its citizens who were liable for criminal prosecutions 
(Washburn 1999, 13). During a UN General Assembly meeting on the ICC’s 
establishment, the USA’s delegation suggested that the deliberations were acts in 
futility, and academic perspectives which did not take into account political realities 
(Borek 1995, 3). Consequently, the Clinton administration declared its objections to 
the Rome Statute, and indicated its unwillingness to submit it to the Senate for “advice 
and consent to ratification” (Arieff et.al. 2011, 3). Subsequently, in 2002, during the 
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successor Bush Administration, the USA notified the UN of its intentions of not joining 
the ICC (ibid).  
To fence off the ICC from establishing jurisdiction amongst Americans, the Bush 
government passed the ‘American Service Members Protection Act of 2002’ (ASPA), 
popularly known as ‘The Hague Invasion Act.’ The Act prohibited the country’s 
cooperation with the ICC, and also provided for the USA’s invasion of the Court in the 
event of a citizen’s apprehension. In addition, the Act restricted the USA’s participation 
in peace-keeping missions around the world, unless immunity was guaranteed for its 
soldiers. As the CICC (2002, 1) observed, the passage of the ASPA “entrenched the 
USA’s offensive” against the ICC at the national level.  
Besides, the USA promoted and signed Bilateral Immunity Agreements (BIA) with 
other countries, albeit with diplomatic carrots and sticks. In so doing, the USA traded 
financial aid and military assistance with prohibition of third countries from turning 
American citizens to the ICC (Human Rights Watch, 2003). The USA’s current policy 
of informational and diplomatic assistance to the ICC on a case by case basis (Arieff 
et.al., 2011) also negates the Rome Statute’s aspirations of universalizing justice. This 
is in addition to the USA’s suggestions that Palestine’s decision to join the ICC was 
counterproductive for peace (Department of State, 2015; 2016) in light of its support 
for Israel in the protracted conflict.  
In summary, the inherent contradictions in the international system reduce the costs of 
non-compliance with the ICC and expose it to malleability in local and regional spaces. 
More specifically, inconsistencies in principle and practice within the UNSC feed into 
perceptions of subordination to global powers amongst less powerful actors, which 
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gives them incentives to resist the ICC’s intervention. In other words, the 
contradictions potentially inspire collective action amongst affected local and regional 
actors, and assertions of their relative power and sovereignty vis.a.vis. powerful global 
players.  
To illustrate, Kenya’s neo-colonial narrative had undertones of the ICC’s focus on 
weak states, but not the powerful might of global powers who similarly committed 
international crimes that deserved the Court’s attention. In a similar vein, the AU’s 
solidarity against the ICC was partly informed by the UNSC’s decisions to refer 
African situations to the Court, and its focus in Africa, but not equally deserving cases 
in other regions. Giving credence to such local and regional perspectives on the ICC is 
the fact that Africa is under represented in the council as “over-represented members 
bargain and haggle over their interests at the expense of its mandate” (Republic of 
Kenya 2014, 2).  
Pursuant to the contradictions in the UNSC, aspersions have been cast on its 
institutional leadership and relationship with the ICC. For example, the South African 
Chief Justice, Mogoeng Mogoeng argued that it seems hypocritical that some UNSC 
members find inspiration to refer African situations to the ICC, yet they are reluctant 
to join it (Kuteesa 2017,1). Thus, Mogoeng posed, “If you believe that an institution is 
good, you have to lead by example; sign up so that when you violate you can also be 
taken there” (ibid, 1). According to Evenson (2016, 1), the UNSC’s paralysis has 
rendered it unable to address human rights crises in many parts of the world, such as in 
Syria and South Sudan. 
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More specifically, the contradictions lower the USA’s moral standing as a proponent 
of international norms that demands state compliance within its domestic spheres of 
influence. This is particularly problematic given that, as a P-5, the USA can refer other 
state parties to the ICC, but it is itself protected. As such, any efforts by the USA to 
demand compliance with the ICC amongst situation countries raise suspicions on the 
country’s intentions. For example, a Sudanese official asked the Americans to join the 
ICC or shut up, when the USA demanded for the arrest of al-Bashir (Lubis, 2016). 
Similarly, President Hage Geingob of Namibia chided the USA to ratify the Rome 
Statute as a precondition for his country to remain in the ICC, at a time mass African 
collective withdrawal from the Court was gaining momentum (Milhench, 2016). For a 
Ugandan government official, the USA is the least qualified to ask for democratic 
governance due to its projection of raw power globally (Semakula 2016, 1). 
Turning to the local, domestic (political) translations of ICJ is predictable, owing to the 
focus on political elites as suspects or government officials whose cooperation is 
demanded or pursued. Therefore, the political elites’ leverages on state cooperation, 
together with their influence in local contested sovereignties inform their relative 
power vis-à-vis the ICC’s.    
1.4.2. Local spaces as contested sovereignties 
Traditionally, sovereignty entails the government’s authority over all actors, 
institutions and resources under its territorial control. The concept emerged from the 
1648 treaty of Westphalia which ended 30 years of war in Europe, and later evolved to 
define the modern state. As Axtman (2004, 4) opines, the treaty asserted the state’s 
power over various interest groups, as well as the states’ control of the population. 
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More so, the Westphalian state model entailed formal rights of the state’s autonomy 
and legitimacy in the international system, with abilities to interact with other states 
and sign international treaties (Slaughter 2004, 284).  
Given that sovereignty delineates the domestic arena from the international, state 
governance aims to create a careful combination of people, space, and resources under 
conditions of territorial constraints (ibid, 260). In addition, national spaces are 
fragmented into transnational or sub-national forms, which provide contexts for 
enduring “mutual alienation and inter-spatial violence” (Heathershow and Lamberch 
2008, 11). 
With the increasing internationalization of decision making and the visibility of 
transnational actors, the idea of sovereignty is under constant threat. Indeed, in 
contemporary international relations, the Westphalian sovereignty model is under 
tension from ineffectiveness and interference challenges (Slaughter 2004, 284). 
Whereas the first set of challenges emerge from international political and economic 
interdependence, the second accrues from collective action in case of threats to 
international peace and security, and the diffusion of the human rights regime (ibid). 
As a result of the receding role of the state in national affairs and international relations, 
there is an increasing shift towards internationalism, which in turn grapples with 
sovereignty concerns. As such, an ICC official attributes some of the institution’s 
challenges to “a retreat into inward looking political/philosophical considerations, fears 
in sovereignty and more demands to national interests, which are not easy sails for 
political elites” (Interview, The Hague, Netherlands, 22 July 2015). 
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From Strang’s (1996, 2) conception of the state as an autonomous actor in continuous 
exchange and competition with other states, I suggest that varying actors within the 
state are in constant altercations with other organized groups under minimal restraints. 
This links to the idea of “the disaggregated nation-state,” whereby distinct segments 
are motivated by their own interests, but in conflict with sovereignty itself, and with 
other forces within the nation (Fonte 2011, 2).  
Upon interventions, the ICC is likely to confront a wide spectrum of actors and 
institutions with a continuum of ideological orientations. Some of the ICC’s critical 
constituencies are: political elites, victims, government officials, affected communities, 
governance and human rights activists and other interested parties. Depending on their 
uptake of the ICC’s interventions and ideational orientations, the various actors and 
institutions broadly fit into either its promoters or opponents (Boesenecker and 
Vinjamuri, 2011). 
Given their positionality as the accused or state officials (or a combination of both) 
whose cooperation is required for effective prosecutions, political elites have emerged 
as critical actors for ICJ. As a result, their uptake of ICJ can either result in co-option 
or resistance of individuals and other groups (Heathershow and Lambach 2008, 11). In 
short, political elites’ domestic influences on ideological orientations extend to the 
ICC’s interventions.  
The ICC’s dependence on political actors for cooperation and the Court’s interventions 
in protracted conflicts submerges it at the very heart of domestic political struggles. As 
Kaul (2011, 9) had predicted, the ICC would be predisposed to the extreme binaries of 
vicious power politics and commitment to law and human rights. As such, the ICC is 
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not immune to either (mis)appropriation or subversion by political actors in domestic 
spaces. Whereas forms of misuse include the utility of the state-referral regime to fight 
political or military opponents, elements of subversion can entail counter-accusations, 
such as construction of neo-colonial narratives on the Court’s interventions. 
For instance, the ICC has been accused of selectivity by some victim groups and 
affected communities in Uganda, the DRC and Côte d’Ivoire, in their quest for the 
universality of justice. In Uganda, the ICC’s focus on the LRA’s atrocities after the 
government’s referral resulted in perceptions of one-sided and politicized 
investigations and prosecutions (Clarke 2008, 42). Dominant discourses in northern 
Uganda and amongst the political opposition in Kampala was that the ICC emerged as 
Museveni’s political instrument (ibid, 42). 
Similar accusations followed the DRC’s referrals of Thomas Lubanga, Germain 
Katanga and Ngudjolo Chui to the ICC. The same scenario unfolded in Côte d’Ivoire, 
where President Alassane Ouattara cooperated with the Court in pressing charges on 
his rival’s camp – Gbagbo – while insulating his side from close scrutiny (see for 
example, Knoops and Zwart, 2013). Altogether, the cases were reminiscent of the 
Nuremberg trials in which victors’ justice was the reigning orthodoxy, as opposed to 
the universality of justice, when Allied forces (the USA, Russia, UK and France) 
conducted one sided trials against the Nazi regime after World War II (Earl, 2009). 
The ICC was also regularly accused by some affected political elites of fostering neo-
colonial intentions in Africa. The neo-colonial narrative was predominant in the 
UNSC’s referral of Libya and Sudan to the ICC, and the Court’s proprio motu 
intervention in Kenya’s 2007/2008 PEV. More interestingly, in the Kenyan situation, 
53 
 
two of the ICC’s accused – Kenyatta and Ruto – employed a calculated mix of 
cooperation and normative challenges to the ICC’s intervention under the neo-colonial 
interpretations. 
Despite the neo-colonial narrative’s prominence in framing Kenya/Africa – ICC 
relations, it was contested by some African states, notably Botswana (Clottey, 2013), 
and some local governance and human rights activists (KPTJ, 2015). Yet still, the 
narrative gained traction both nationally and regionally. This was due to the ICC’s 
exclusive focus in Africa, the West’s visible support for the Court financially, 
logistically and in policy positions abroad, and Africa’s history of western domination 
through colonialism and slavery (Hoile, 2014).  
In contrast, some have argued that statistically speaking, the rate of atrocities 
committed in Africa would make it a natural focus for the ICC after all (Maluwa et al. 
2013, 2; Plessis, 2013,2). Although this argument is an effective counterpoint to the 
neo-colonial narrative, I disagree with its factual foundations. Whereas the commission 
of atrocities on the African continent cannot be downplayed, the suggestion that Africa 
is the natural choice for the ICC subsumes practical challenges on the universality of 
ICJ, which extend beyond the continent.  
Besides, recent studies and developments reveal the global spread of conflicts and 
commission of atrocities, hence the reach of ICJ should not be exclusive to the 
continent. As Straus (2008) rightly argues, large scale politically instigated conflicts in 
Sub-Saharan Africa are on the decline, and data sets relieve the region from the tag of 
‘the most war endemic’ in duration and intensity.  Instead, empirical evidence points 
to Asia as the most conflict prevalent. 
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Furthermore, the repercussions of recent Syrian, Israeli/Palestinian and Yemen 
conflicts have been catastrophic and more intense than some of Africa’s conflicts that 
attracted the ICC’s prompt interventions. For example, a UNSC (2016, 2) report reveals 
that as of 2015, Syria’s protracted conflict had caused the death of more than 250,000 
people and thousands of children. The report also documented Yemen’s protracted 
conflict that led to the conscription of children in combat, as well as the death of many 
thousands of others (ibid, 2). Similarly, Smeulers et al. (2015) used compelling data to 
rank Iraq, Afghanistan, Nepal, Myanmar and Pakistan among the worst situations for 
the commission of international crimes, with no motion from the ICC. 
However, in November 2017, the OTP requested Pre-Trial Chamber III for 
authorization to investigate the crimes committed in Afghanistan pursuant to Article 
15 of the Rome Statute (ICC, 2017). Prior to these proactive steps, Amnesty 
International regretted the OTP’s indecisiveness in commencing investigations in 
Afghanistan, 14 years after the conflict, and over 10 years after public pronouncements 
of the preliminary examination in 2007 (Sacco, 2017). 
Conversely, for Côte d’Ivoire, a comparable process did not last for more than a year, 
while for Afghanistan, it was not until 2013 that the OTP reached the apparent 
conclusion on the Taliban’s, Afghan forces’, and the USA’s commission of atrocities 
(ibid, 1). Additionally, the former ICC prosecutor’s blog advising the USA on 
modalities of avoiding the Court’s jurisdiction over criminal allegations in Afghanistan 
manifested impunity for such crimes and questioned the OTP’s commitment to victims’ 
justice (ibid).   
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The ICC’s inability to act in other situations, coupled with its prompt responses to some 
African scenarios, opened it to allegations of an African bias or conflations with neo-
colonial intentions. A plausible explanation for the Court’s focus on the continent was 
its attempts at institutional legitimation, and the availability of unable/unwilling 
situations in Africa that were generally receptive of its jurisdiction. 
On the contrary, in other potential situations, such as Israel/Palestine, Afghanistan and 
Iraq, the ICC was “cautious and restrained” to avoid entanglements with global powers 
involved in some of the conflicts (Bosco, 2014a). In other situations, such as Kashmir, 
Syria and Yemen, the Court’s jurisdiction was yet to be accepted, hence interventions 
were only possible under the UNSC’s deferral regime. 
Nevertheless, the ICC’s strategic focus in Africa provided potential entry points for the 
calculus of domestic political elites that is premised on pragmatic rather than idealistic 
intentions. This follows a pattern that is consistent with elite–level politics across the 
globe. In addition, domestic political manoeuvres benefitted from collective actions 
that are exhibited in regional platforms. 
1.4.3. The regional ‘solidarity’ space 
Given their roles as intermediaries between the international and the local, regional 
institutions have impacts on the diffusion of ICJ. In this regard, regional institutions 
constitute elite solidarity groups that either facilitate or resist global governance 
because of their collective approaches to world affairs (Heathershow and Lambach 
2008, 13). According to Borzel and Hullen (2015, 3), regional institutions owe their 
importance to mediating agency between nation-states and global institutions. Within 
the UN system, regional bodies perform complementary roles in global governance via 
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cooperation frameworks in Chapter VIII of the UN Charter, and many other resolutions 
of the General Assembly and UNSC (UN, 1999). 
For its part, the ICC lists the regional location of its member states as: Africa, Asia-
Pacific, Eastern Europe, Western Europe, Latin America and the Caribbean (ICC, 
2015a). As of 2015, Africa represented the largest block by ratification, with 34 
members, followed by Latin America (27), Western Europe and others (25), Asia 
Pacific (19) and finally Eastern Europe (18) (ibid). 
Apart from the EU, other regional institutions are not enthusiastic about the global 
ownership of the ICC. This is partly because they do not share, as a matter of principle, 
the “consolidation of the rule of law and respect for human rights” that the EU members 
enumerate as their justification for their staunch support for the ICC (EU 2008, 1). The 
EU promotes the ICC’s universality by supporting the CICC in its campaign for the 
Rome Statute’s ratification and advancing the human rights agenda (EU, 2008). 
The regional body also makes assenting to the ICC a prerequisite for non-member 
countries in Eastern Europe to be accepted into the Union (Subotic, 2009). The EU is 
also the largest regional financial contributor to the ICC, in addition to its political and 
financial support for the ICTR, ICTY, SCSL, STL and the ECCC (EU, 2008). 
Moreover, the EU was the first regional body to sign a cooperation agreement with the 
ICC in 2006 (ibid, 20). 
Conversely, the AU has emerged as a refuge to some political elites who are 
apprehensive on the reach of ICJ. As such, some of the continent’s leaders with wanting 
human rights records have resorted to the AU for protection, proclaimed Pan-
Africanism to contest the dividends of ICJ, or pronounced African indifference to the 
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ICC. For example, Paul Kagume of Rwanda, who has a record of suppressing dissent 
and human rights violations in the country (Himbara, 2016; Human Rights Watch, 
2017a), often speaks against the ICC as an affront on Africa’s dignity and sovereignty 
(see for example, Ngarambe 2013, 1). 
In one of his attacks on the ICC, Kagame argued that the Court is openly biased against 
Africa and “serves only to humiliate Africans and their leaders” (ibid, 1). Perhaps, 
Kagame’s sentiments obtained from his previous experiences with the ICTR. As 
Louise Arbour, the former ICTR chief prosecutor, reveals, the tribunal was constantly 
undermined by Rwanda’s hostility, hence its inability to prosecute credible cases (Zilio 
and York 2016, 1). Arbour lamented how the government would “turn on and off the 
co-operative tap at will,” depending on their interests in the court processes (ibid, 1). 
Likewise, the former Gambian President, Yahya Jammeh, lashed out at the ICC when 
announcing the country’s intentions to withdraw from the Court in 2016. For Jammeh, 
the ICC’s acronyms denoted: “International Caucasian Court for the persecution and 
humiliation of people of colour, especially Africans” (cited in Abdouli, 2016). Jammeh 
criticized the ICC against a backdrop of his autocratic rule that was characterized by 
repressions, executions, intolerance, tortures and forced disappearances (Barry, 2016). 
Similarly, with a poor human rights record at home, Libya’s Gaddafi spoke of the ICC 
as Western efforts at recolonization and acts of “First World terrorism” (cited in BBC 
2009, 1).  
It was therefore not surprising that some of the ICC’s accused, such as Bashir in Sudan 
and Kenyatta and Ruto in Kenya retreated to the AU to bolster their battles with the 
Court. Also, apprehensive of the ICC’s reach, Uganda’s President, Yoweri Museveni, 
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joined in the promotion of Africa’s resentment to the Court. In one of the public 
incidences whereby Museveni rebuked the ICC, he recalled his initial support of the 
Court, but also the increasing use of the institution by external actors to effect regime 
change in Africa against leaders that they do not prefer (cited in Siringi and Ongiri 
2013, 1). 
After collective decisions by many African heads of states, the AU declared regional 
solidarity on some of the cases facing African leaders, such as in Sudan and Kenya. In 
so doing, the AU reminded member states about “an imperative need for all of them to 
ensure that they adhere and articulate commonly agreed positions in line with their 
obligations under the AU’s Constitutive Act” (see for example AU 2014, 2). The 
Constitutive Act recalls Africa’s anti-colonal struggles that were tied with political 
freedom, economic emancipation, and human dignity. Moreover, the Act established 
the AU with objectives to, inter alia, consolidate African solidarity and unity, and 
protect the independence and integrity of member states. 
Consequently, the AU passed decisions binding African states on non-cooperation with 
the ICC to ostensibly protect and safeguard the continent’s peace, stability, dignity and 
sovereignty (AU 2014, 1; AU 2009, 3). The collective decisions resulted in competing 
obligations between African states vis-à-vis the AU and the ICC. Besides, the decisions 
positioned the AU as the most visible regional intermediary in undermining the ICC. 
The AU also filed amicus briefings in some of its cases of interests, notably the Kenyan 
ones (ICC, 2015).  
Moreover, the AU mulled with the idea of creating a criminal chamber within the 
African Court of Justice and Human Rights (ACJHR), as an alternative to the ICC’s 
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encroachment in the continent. As Murungu (2011) rightly argued, Articles 1 and 17 
of the Rome Statute do not envisage conferring complementarity to regional courts, but 
to national ones. Additionally, the African Court suffers from financial constraints and 
inadequate political will (The East African, 2015), as these are supposed to be availed 
by some criminally culpable political actors or leaders who are disingenuous with ICJ. 
Perhaps, the AU’s collective actions against the ICC allude to a Kenyan academic’s 
interpretation that many African sates “joined the ICC as a show of public international 
relations” (Interview, Nairobi, Kenya, 26 August 2015). More worryingly, the 
collective actions present impetus to domestic political elites with the motives of 
undermining the ICC in their realms.  
1.5. Conclusion: not yet a moral universe? 
The ICC’s establishment with universal jurisdiction for mass atrocities was a 
significant step towards the international community’s aspirations of constructing a 
moral universe, in which impunity for mass atrocities is not tolerated. However, the 
aggregation of this moral universe into spatial hierarchies (international, regional and 
local spaces), with discrete actors and institutions that have different goals and power 
positions on ICJ poses a fundamental threat to universality. 
Consequently, the challenges expose the Court’s interventions to domestic political 
manoeuvres and the emergence of narratives. Such was the case with the ICC’s 
accusations of selectivity in Uganda, the DRC and Côte d’Ivoire, and the neo-colonial 
connotations in Sudan, Libya and Kenya.   
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Notwithstanding the challenges to the universality of ICJ, the idea of a moral universe 
speaks to the ICC’s expressivist function, which points to a more realistic account of 
what the ICC can achieve. According to Stahn (2012, 279-280) expressivism signifies 
the ICC’s role in the diffusion of accountability norms, generating discourses and 
warning would be perpetrators on the possibility of their prosecutions. Similarly, 
Rosenberg (2012) argues that ICJ contributes to the proliferation of norms that abhor 
atrocities as well as expressivism exhibited in prosecutorial discretions.  
As such, the ICC’s interventions in Uganda and Kenya articulated the agency of ending 
impunity for mass atrocities and generated local-international exchanges on the utility 
of the Court’s interventions. To a large extent, politicization of the ICC’s interventions 
obfuscated its contributions to the countries’ transition from violence to peace. 
The next chapters focus on why and how the ICC’s responses to Uganda’s northern 
conflict and Kenya’s 2007/2008 were politicized, and ensuing ramifications for 
contemporaneous TJ discourses. However, these accounts are preceded by discussions 
of Uganda’s and Kenya’s efforts at transitions from political violence with a plethora 
of TJ initiatives, and the ICC’s interventions.  
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Chapter 2 
After political violence: a status of affairs in Uganda and Kenya 
The Ugandan and Kenyan authorities utilized TJ discourses as well as the ICC in their 
articulated efforts to transition from violence towards more sustainable peace. Whereas 
Uganda’s transition involved addressing militarism which led to the northern conflict 
between the GoU and the LRA, Kenya was attending to the 2007/2008 PEV that was 
occasioned by long-standing politicization of ethnicity.  
Despite the general desire to establish long-term peace in the two countries, some of 
the TJ mechanisms were inadequately implemented due to conflict complexities and 
operationalization challenges. Even so, TJ significantly altered the two countries’ 
fragilities, and their absence would probably occasion worse case scenarios. Indeed, 
Uganda’s “steady progress” from militarism and “Kenya after 2007” witnessed 
considerable institutional re-engineering and attention to efforts to victims’ plights. 
Adding to the TJ mechanisms was the ICC’s intervention and its associated 
expressivism functions. 
This chapter discusses the status of affairs in Uganda’s and Kenya’s transition(s) to 
more sustainable peace in order to provide the contextual backgrounds for domestic 
politics, their continuation with the ICC’s interventions, and subsequent implications 
on TJ discourses. In other words, this chapter sets the grounds for further discussions 
on: why/how the Court’s interventions were not immune to politicization in local 
spaces, and the consequence thereof on peace-building.  
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This chapter is divided into four parts. The first part discusses the nature and salience 
of political violence in Uganda and Kenya, and their effects on entrenching societal 
divisions, human rights violations and democratic backsliding. The second part 
deliberates on the ICC’s contributions to Uganda’s and Kenya’s peace-building efforts, 
including its expressivism functions and filling domestic capacity gaps in prosecuting 
alleged perpetrators of mass atrocities. The third part discusses the ICC’s contemporary 
TJ mechanisms which extended beyond the Court’s retribution to building more 
democratic politics and attending to victims’ immediate needs. The chapter then 
concludes by summarizing the aforementioned arguments and problematizing 
politicization of the ICC’s interventions as symbolized in the narratives (selectivity and 
neo-colonialism), why they flourish, and their implications for TJ discourses. 
Generally, these sections provide background information for a better comprehension 
of arguments that follow in the next chapters of this thesis.   
2.1. State fragility and political violence 
Since attaining independence from western imperialism, many African states, 
especially sub-Sahara, have experienced political violence that undermines their 
stability and populations’ well-being. The long list of sub-Sahara African states with 
violent political episodes since the ICC’s establishment in 2002 include: Angola, the 
DRC, CAR, Chad, Togo, Benin, Nigeria, Niger, Uganda, Kenya, Côte d’Ivoire, South 
Sudan, Sudan, Togo, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Comoros, Djibouti, Mali, Mozambique, 
Burkina Faso, Sierra Leone, Burundi, Somalia, Uganda and Gabon (Marshall, 2006; 
African Development Bank, 2008; Loua and Zounmenou, 2011; Annan, 2014). As the 
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African Development Bank (2008, ix) sums, there are ongoing conflicts in several 
African states, many face the threat of violence, while others are recovering. 
From an institutionalist perspective, some of the conflict triggers on the African 
continent include the respective countries’ social dynamics and inadequate democratic 
institutions to mitigate them. Accordingly, the African Development Bank (2008, xv) 
illustrates that Africa’s violence obtains from colonial legacies and democratic deficits 
within states. Elbadawi and Sambanis (2000, 2) opine that the prevalence of wars in 
Africa is attributable to a lack of democratic institutions that can manage group 
dynamics and their associated challenges. 
Africa’s predicaments date to the decolonization era that is known for few systems of 
democratic rule and politics of ethnic exclusion. In this vein, Marshall (2006, 2-3) 
argues that sub-Sahara Africa is a fragile regional sub-system that mainly faces ethnic, 
communal and revolutionary wars.  Moreover, in many sub-Sahara African countries, 
political violence remains a common occurrence in electoral systems, including where 
multiparty elections arbitrate political contestations (Fjelde and Hoglund 2014, 297). 
Therefore, in many African contexts, violence amplifies the underlying societal 
pressures, and weakens the institutional mechanisms for their management. This results 
in “a fragility trap that it is very difficult to escape” (African Development Bank 2008, 
8). For instance, Uganda and Kenya did not evade Africa’s fragility trap, which 
culminated in the former’s militarism and the latter’s elections-related ethnic violence. 
For the most part of Uganda’s post-independence history, militarism dominated its 
political processes. This led to substantial democratic decline, long-standing instability 
and severe human rights violations. During its 20 years of militarism, Uganda was best 
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known as the only country in East and Central Africa for having had nine presidents 
since attaining independence (Mayega 2016, 1).  
Similarly, Kenya’s political system has been far from democratic. This condition is 
exacerbated by politicization of ethnicity that has been institutionalized for mobilizing 
popular support, since independence in 1963. Apart from the 1982 failed coup attempt 
(Mutunga, 2012), the country has followed a different trajectory from Uganda’s 
militarism – namely, elections related violence as witnessed in 1992, 1997, 2002 and 
2007 (Oyugi, 2000; Human Rights Watch, 2002; Republic of Kenya, 1999; Republic 
of Kenya, 2008). Although the 2002 elections violence was much lower in scale, it also 
accounted for Kenya’s enduring violence, which challenges popular perceptions of the 
country as “an anchor state and oasis of stability” in a turbulent neighbourhood 
(Mabera 2016, 367).    
2.1.1. Uganda’s militarism and emergence of the northern conflict 
Uganda attained independence from British colonialism with a fairly representative 
system of governance as outlined in the 1962 constitution. The constitution established 
a legislative assembly consisting of elected representatives, and democratic systems of 
assuming office. However, the country’s stability was short-lived, as militarism 
emerged as an important mode of regulating political succession and modalities of 
controlling the general population. 
Accounting for Uganda’s militarism were: the Milton Obote regime of 1962 to 1971, 
which suspended the constitution and amplified the army’s profile in politics; the Idi 
Amin coup of 1971 and perfection of military authoritarianism; and the overthrow of 
Amin in 1979 by rebel groups (Karugire, 2003; Adhola, 2012; Refugee Law Project, 
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2014). After ousting Amin in 1979, the coup architects, who coalesced under the 
Uganda National Liberation Army (UNLA), reverted Uganda to several civilian 
administrations that laid the foundation for a return of civilian rule (ibid). 
Consequently, elections were scheduled for 1980 as part of restoring the country’s 
democratic process. Organized by the Military Commission (MC), the 1980 elections 
drew the participation of Obote’s United People’s Congress (UPC) party, Museveni’s 
Uganda’s Patriotic Movement (UPM), Paul Ssemogerere’s Democratic Party (DP) and 
Mayanja Nkangi’s Conservative Party (CP) (Daily Monitor, 2012; Mugabe, 2016; 
Kalyegira, 2016). After the final tally of the elections results, the MC declared Obote 
the winner of the presidential race, in addition to UPC’s majority in the National 
Assembly. 
The elections results were however contested by some of the presidential candidates, 
with allegations of fraud and irregularities. As Kalyegira (2016, 1) contends, the 
disputed 1980 election provided incentives for some political and military groups to 
rebel against the regime.  There were also arguments of how the election marked a 
critical turning point in Uganda’s political history: planned to revert democratic rule, it 
was undermined by widespread irregularities and resulted to a catastrophic civil war 
(Daily Monitor 2012, 1). 
Museveni’s guerrilla warfare posed the most significant threat and opposition to 
Obote’s second reign.  Museveni had made it clear during the 1980 election campaigns 
for UPM that he would go to the bush in the event there was rigging (Museveni, 1993). 
Fighting under the NRA/M, Museveni and his soldiers launched their operations from 
66 
 
the Luweero triangle, a stretch north of Kampala, from which they fought the 
government’s UNLA (Musisi, 2013).  
As a result of the war, many people were killed, and thousands were forcefully 
displaced, in addition to other forms of human rights violations. As of 1984, Human 
Rights Watch (1999) documented approximately 100,000 to 200,000 civilian deaths in 
the Luweero triangle. Moreover, a survivor recollected how “the two groups killed 
people indifferently in large numbers and used different methods” (cited in Musisi 
2013, 1). Some survivors also provided accounts of the government’s “butchering of 
every human living thing they came across, looting and torching property” (ibid, 1). 
Additionally, the rebels recruited child soldiers, enforced disappearances of perceived 
government supporters and killed civilians for their cattle, property and food gardens 
(ibid). As one victim stated, for the rebels, their “signature killing method consisted of 
blindfolding people, stripping them naked, and then hacking them one by one to death 
using axes and spears, among others” (ibid, 1).  
Before the NRA/M succeeded in overthrowing the government, a military junta, led by 
General Tito Okello Lutwa, ousted Obote in July 1985 (Kakembo and Ogwang, 2012). 
Equally, the Lutwa regime was deposed by the NRM in January 1986 before 
establishing its foothold in the country (ibid). Similarly, the NRM had to contend with 
military opposition from several rebel groups, which operated from the west and north 
of the country. 
Form the west, the NRM fought Uganda National Rescue Front (UNRF), UNRF II, 
West Nile Bank Front (WNBF) and Allied Democratic Forces (ADF) (Amnesty 
Commission, 2013). Thereafter, the UNRF and UNRF II agreed to peace settlements 
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with the NRM in 1986 and 2002 respectively, while the WNBF suffered military 
defeats in 1997 (ibid, 6-7). For its part, the ADF retreated to Eastern DRC in 1995 due 
to military offensives from government forces (Cullen 2017, 121). 
On the northern front, the NRA/M battled former UNLA soldiers who withdrew to the 
region and Sudan to form Uganda’s People’s Democratic Army (UPDA) (Refugee Law 
Project, 2014). Given the UPDA’s concentration in Acholiland, the NRA/M’s counter 
offensives were focused in the region, which led to antagonisms between the regime 
and the local populations, and the latter’s distance from the GoU. 
Whereas some UPDA soldiers agreed to a peace settlement in June 1988 and joined 
the NRM regime, others opted for an emerging peasant rebellion – Alice Lakwena’s 
Holy Spirit Mobile Forces (HSMF) (Refugee Law Project, 2014). After Lakwena’s 
defeat in 1987, the HSMF was led by Lakwena’s father, Severino Lukoya, who 
surrendered to the government in 1989 (Ocungi and Ayug, 2017). Subsequently, 
Joseph Kony, initially a member of the HSMF and Lakwena’s relative, took over the 
reins of the northern rebellion under the LRA (Refugee Law Project, 2004). 
Collectively, the northern insurgencies were fuelled by the NRM’s atrocities, and fears 
of national marginalization (ibid, 4). As a member of the Acholi community noted, the 
war transformed from its initial rebellion of former UNLA forces to include revenge 
attacks against the general population (Interview, Kampala, Uganda, 27 January 2016). 
A study by Human Rights and Peace Center (HURIPEC) and Liu Institute for Global 
Affairs (LIGA) (2003, 43) opines that the regime’s pursuit of former UNLA soldiers 
was conflated with attacks on civilians in the Acholi region. After Museveni’s 
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consolidation of his rule over the country, the NRA morphed into Uganda People’s 
Defence Forces (UPDF).   
Lasting for over two decades, the northern conflict led to an enduring humanitarian 
crisis, which was manifested in thousands of child abductions, mutilation of victims, 
forced displacements of populations and sexual and gender-based violence (SGBV). In 
many occasions, the LRA abducted children, whom they used as soldiers, porters and 
sex slaves (Cakaj, 2016). They also mutilated some of their victims by cutting their 
lips, noses, ears, hands and breasts as a form of retribution for their alleged support for 
the government (Cakaj, 2016; Storr, 2014).  
In 2004, Jan Egeland, as the UN’s under-secretary general for humanitarian affairs and 
emergency relief, described the conflict as “the biggest neglected humanitarian 
emergency in the world … and a moral outrage” (cited in The Guardian, 2004). Egeland 
illustrated that the conflict was unique in the world, as there was nowhere else where 
80 percent of the rebel fighters were children, and 90 percent of the population had 
been forcefully displaced from their homes (ibid). As Human Rights Watch (2005, 2) 
documented, the war led to the displacement of more than 1.9 million people, who were 
confined in camps from which they were vulnerable to attacks and abuses by the UPDF 
and the LRA.  
Besides the ensuing atrocities, the northern conflict exacerbated societal divisions 
along the traditional north-south dichotomies, which predated colonialism. Sentiments 
of the north-south divide were common references to the northern conflict and its 
predecessor – the NRM and UNLA war of 1981 to 1986. In retrospect, British 
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colonialism had built on pre-colonial differences between the southern (Bantu) and 
northern (Nilotic) regions, as part of its divide and rule policy.  
Under colonialism, southern regions (Buganda, Ankole and Busoga) were designated 
for growing cash crops and as administration centres, whereas northern districts of 
Acholi, Madi, Padhola, Teso and Langi were labour reserves and recruitment centres 
for army, police and prison jobs (Refugee Law Project, 2014). As a result, the north 
emerged as underdeveloped in relation to the south, but with an over-representation in 
the army. In this vein, militarism evolved amidst ethnic nationalism and regionalism, 
which exacerbated Uganda’s artificial creation (Karugire 2003, 49). 
With ethno-regional divisions as conflict fault lines, the NRM emerged as a southern 
dominated group, albeit with strong anti-northern sentiments. Some southern elites 
were opposed to the north’s domination of the country’s army and by extension, 
politics. Since attaining independence, Uganda had been led by Obote, Amin and 
Okello (all northerners), to the chagrin of some southern elites. As HURIPEC and 
LIGA (2003, 11) revealed, the NRA/M leadership believed that ‘northern’ domination 
of the country’s politics was not tenable and had to be stopped. For example, in one of 
Museveni’s public addresses in 1985, he argued that northerners dominated leadership 
positions since independence in 1962, as southerners played peripheral roles (ibid, 34). 
Likewise, a Baganda researcher who followed Uganda’s political developments 
observed that Museveni used the Bantu identity to maximize on the perceived north-
south divide as legitimation for his rebel group (Interview, Kampala, Uganda, 25 
January 2016). Specifically, his strategies included: enlisting university graduates, 
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gimmicks of restoring the Baganda Kingdom, and forging alliances with some Baganda 
rebel groups (ibid).  
In line with the conflict’s appeal to the north-south dichotomy, there were celebrations 
amongst some Bantus after the NRA/M’s rise to power in 1986. More concretely, there 
was a great relief and feeling amongst the southern Bantu tribes that it was the 
commencement “of sanity and return to innocence for Uganda” (Kalyegira 2011, 1). 
Furthermore, Baganda kadongo kamu folk singers praised the NRA’s victory, with 
clear messages that it was northerners, and not the national army, that were defeated 
(ibid).  
Besides, the NRM’s post-revolutionary legitimacy strategies incorporated the 
instrumental use of the material remains of the Luweero triangle. By designating the 
Luweero skulls and bones as the official accounts of Uganda’s war history, the NRM 
distinguished previous northern regimes as perpetrators of the atrocities, and the regime 
as peace agents (Bernard, 2017). 
Utilized after the 1986 coup and in subsequent elections, the strategy consolidated the 
regime’s legitimacy, especially in the south, and alienated northerners. As such, the 
Luweero tragedy emerged as the NRM’s platform for delegitimizing political 
opponents by fostering ethno-xenophobia and fostering its legitimacy in equal measure 
(Adyanga 2015, 390). Specifically, northerners were framed  as enemies of the rest of 
Ugandans, in addition to the killing of many Acholi in Buganda (HURIPEC and LIGA 
2003, 32). An Acholi elder recalled that northerners were collectively accused for the 
Luweero killings, making life generally unbearable for them (Interview, Gulu, Uganda, 
22 March, 2016). Similarly, a northern based human rights activist revealed that 
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victims in Luweero triangle still remember what they went through, blame northern 
soldiers and are still bitter against people in the north (Interview, Gulu, Uganda, 30 
March, 2016).  
Beyond national boundaries, the northern conflict attracted the participation of Sudan 
and the USA, which reduced the incentives for mediation. Sudan joined the war on the 
LRA’s side as retaliation for Museveni’s support for the Sudan People’s Liberation 
Army (SPLA) that was fighting for autonomy from Khartoum (HURIPEC and LIGA, 
2003). For its part, the USA sided with Museveni after his conflation of the insurgency 
with terrorism, at the time of 9/11 when the USA intensified war on terror (ibid). 
Thereafter, the GoU intensified military offensives against the LRA under ‘Operation 
Iron Fist’ in 2002 and ‘Operation Lighting Thunder’ in 2008. In turn, the LRA 
increased attacks in Acholiland, Teso, Madi and Lan’gi regions, and in parts of South 
Sudan, Eastern DRC and CAR (Cakaj, 2016). After intense local and international 
lobbying, the GoU and the LRA agreed to mediation in Juba, South Sudan, between 
2006 to 2008. 
However, the peace talks finally collapsed in December 2008 after Kony failed to 
appear at the final signing ceremony (Hendrickson and Tumutegyereize 2012, 5). As a 
result, the LRA proceeded to CAR, South Sudan and Eastern DRC, from which they 
continued committing atrocities on civilian populations (Human Rights Watch, 2009; 
Amnesty International, 2011). Conversely, northern Uganda remained relatively 
peaceful as the rebels scaled down their operations in the country. As Uganda was 
emerging from several years of military conflicts, Kenya was reeling under 
politicization of ethnicity, which laid the ground for the 2007/2008 PEV.  
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2.1.2. Politicization of ethnicity and Kenya’s 2007/2008 political crisis 
The 2007/2008 PEV was reportedly the worst incidence of political violence in 
Kenya’s post-independent history because of its threat to the country’s existence as a 
unitary state. Building from the closely contested presidential elections of 2007, the 
PEV obtained from the polarized political environment that the incumbent’s Party of 
National Unity (PNU), and the opposition’s Orange Democratic Movement (ODM) 
party had orchestrated. Accordingly, the African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM) 
had revealed that Kenya demonstrated triggers of civil strife, namely: ethnic schisms, 
polarized political discourses, widening inequality and poverty levels and entrenched 
corruption (NEPAD 2006, 14).  
Following the Electoral Commission of Kenya’s (ECK) announcement of Kibaki’s 
controversial win, some sporadic violence erupted in the opposition’s strongholds. The 
forms of violence intensified and evolved after Odinga and his ODM party rejected 
Kibaki’s win, citing irregularities in the tallying process (Mugonyi, 2007; Daily Nation, 
2013a). The ODM party resorted to the streets, citing their lack of faith in the 
judiciary’s ability to act as a neutral arbiter, and the perception that the institution was 
filled by Kibaki loyalists (Dagne 2011, 9).  
As the violence escalated, the country’s delicate mosaic of fragmented ethnic 
nationalities was at the risk of obliteration. Fought along ethno-regional patterns which 
accounted for voting behaviour, the PEV exposed Kenya’s façade of alignment to 
democratic ideals, as opposed to the reality of a dysfunctional state (Interview, human 
rights activist, Nairobi, Kenya, 9 October 2015). Many PNU supporters from the 
Kikuyu and other Mt. Kenya communities (Embu and Meru) were targeted in ODM’s 
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strongholds in the Rift Valley, Nyanza, Western, Nairobi and Coast (Kanyinga, 2011). 
In a similar vein, perceived ODM supporters from the Luo, Kisii, Luhyia and Kalenjin 
communities, were attacked in PNU strongholds in Central, Rift Valley and Nairobi 
(ibid). As further indications of the deep ethnic resentments that the PEV ignited, there 
were remote considerations for Odinga’s swearing in, or even the country’s division 
along the 2007 voting patterns.  
The Commission of Inquiry into the PEV (CIPEV) revealed that almost half of the 
violence was perpetrated by state security forces, besides the participation of a Kikuyu 
dominated Mungiki militia that took part in revenge attacks (Republic of Kenya, 2008).  
Additionally, the Kenya National Commission on Human Rights (KNCHR) 
documented the violence and illustrated its widespread nature, alleged perpetrators and 
incidents of human rights violations. The KNCHR (2008, 7-9) revealed that the PEV 
affected nearly 136 constituencies in six of the eight former provinces; involved 
organized attacks and counter attacks; resulted in over 1,162 deaths, destruction of 
property and commission of international crimes. According to the government 
estimates, nearly 663,921 people were displaced from their homes, and approximately 
350,000 people sought refuge in temporary camps, while the rest were integrated in 
local communities (Lynch 2009, 604).  
Instructively, the 2007/2008 PEV was to be understood in the context of prolonged 
land rights conflicts, recurrent violence and persistent impunity and economic 
inequalities (OHCHR 2007, 5). These underlying issues were exacerbated and 
triggered by “the use of socially salient ethnic identities for political mobilization” or 
politicization of ethnicity (Weber and Flesken 2016, 2). In short, the post-2007 political 
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environment obtained from the party formations of PNU and ODM that were coalitions 
of “convenience and commitment,” that had failed to address ethnic divisions despite 
their incorporation of diverse communities (Elischer, 2008).  
During the 2007 elections campaigns, both PNU and ODM utilized strong political 
rhetoric in mobilizing their supporters. A former ODM chief strategist revealed that 
they coined the slogan “One against 41,” to ostensibly rally popular support and 
alienate the Kikuyu from the rest of Kenyans (Miguna 2012, 171). As the strategist 
further noted, their game plan was to spread hate against the Kikuyu and pose the 
question whether the electorate were comfortable with another Kikuyu presidency after 
Kenyatta and Kibaki (ibid, 172). Additionally, a former ODM official disclosed that 
there were war cries in their political rallies, with some politicians openly declaring 
war against perceived enemies –  the Kikuyu (Interview, Kisumu, Kenya, 5 November 
2015). Likewise, part of PNU’s strategies included verbal attacks on ODM’s leaders 
that were premised on ethnic prejudices (International Crisis Group 2008, 5). 
As a result of the incitements, violence erupted in some parts of the country even before 
the elections. For example, in the Rift Valley, confrontations between different ethnic 
groups led to over 200 deaths and approximately 70,000 displacements (Human Rights 
Watch 2008, 19). Given the polarized political environment, weak institutional 
infrastructure, and Kenya’s association of social mobility with political power, the 
2007/2008 PEV was predictable. Hence, as Mueller (2008, 2002) rightly argued, the 
election was anchored on the politics of ethnic exclusion, as well as competition over 
access to state power and subsequent control of resources. 
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Revealing an enduring conflict, the 2007/2008 political violence followed similar 
patterns of ethnic violence in Kenya’s political moments: the general elections of 1992, 
1997 and 2002, and the 2005 constitutional referendum. Although the 2002 election is 
often proclaimed as peaceful, there were instances of violence during party primaries, 
and in the build up to the general election (Astill, 2002; BBC, 2002). Towards the 
elections, there were reports of violent parliamentary by elections in 2001; police 
crackdowns on government critics; gang attacks on opposition rallies and sporadic 
violence between the government and opposition supporters (Human Rights Watch 
2002, 6). 
Besides, numerous efforts at fostering a national identity have been unable to overcome 
Kenya’s durable ethnic conflicts (Hornsby 2011, 2). Whereas the conflicts originate 
from elite survival tactics, state excesses, poverty and land rights, resort to violence 
follows its own form (ibid, 2). Likewise, the eviction of some communties and ensuing 
emergence of an Internally Displaced Person (IDP) identity manifests the persistent 
conflict that links to politics of representation and historical narratives (Mwakimako 
and Gona 2011, 25). Similarly embedded in Kenya’s endemic conflicts are articulations 
of grievances and conflict legitimation by antagonistic parties (ibid, 25). Moreover, as 
Lynch (2011, 2) rightly posits, Kenya’s politics of ethnicity promotes notions of inter-
communal differences and competition, which can evolve into violence under 
conditions of anger, elite inspiration, and inadequate institutional checks. 
Perhaps, the longevity of Kenya’s ethnic violence is attributable to the foundation of 
the state as established by the Kenya Africa National Union (KANU), that ruled the 
country for an uninterrupted period of 39 years after independence. Over this duration, 
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KANU established an authoritarian and neo-patrimonial state; which exhibited 
suppression of political pluralism, personal rule, ethnic exclusion and repression of 
freedoms (Hornsby and Throup, 1992; Brown, 2001). 
Succeeding Jomo Kenyatta after his death in 1978, Daniel arap Moi perfected the ills 
of his predecessor’s rule, under the slogan Nyayoism, or following footsteps. Following 
in, and deepening Kenyatta’s footsteps, Moi perfected the use of clientelism, patronage 
and ethnic favouritism in public life (Ajulu 2002, 263; Branch and Cheeseman, 2008). 
Although Moi expanded patronage to several regional elites for national support, the 
bulk of his attention was on his Kalenjin community (Ajulu, 2002). Partly illustrating 
the neo-patrimonial state that Kenyatta built and Moi perfected, Kenyatta resettled the 
poor Kikuyu in the former white settlements that were historically owned by the 
Kalenjin and Maasai (Lonsdale 2008, 1). For his part, Moi satisfied his Kalenjin 
community by creating for them an ethnic elite, from which some of them had access 
to patronage (ibid). 
Confronted with popular demands for political pluralism in the early 1990s, the Moi 
regime opted for violence against civil society activists, vocal clergy, and opposition 
politicians. With the repeal of section 2 (a)4 of the constitution and subsequent 
multiparty elections in 1992, some KANU elites from the Rift Valley instigated 
violence in the region as a political strategy to disenfranchise perceived opposition 
supporters and consolidate Moi’s support (Republic of Kenya 1999, 49; Human Rights 
                                                          
4 Section 2(a) of the constitution had outlawed multiparty politics. It was repealed 
after domestic and international pressure on the KANU regime.  
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Watch 2002, 5). Under the guise of majimboism (regionalism), the KANU elites 
promoted ethnic exclusion and stigmatization, whose climax was the eviction of, and 
attacks on the Kikuyu, Luo, Luhyia and Kisii communities in the Rift Valley (Ajulu, 
2002). The violence was also strategically used by the KANU elites to discredit 
multiparty politics as a divisive political system (Republic of Kenya, 1999). 
Similar incidences of ethnic violence occurred during the 1997 elections in the Rift 
Valley and some parts of the coast (ibid). Despite the formation of a judicial 
commission of inquiry into the tribal clashes (ibid), no formal prosecutions followed, 
due to institutionalized impunity for the KANU politicians who sustained and benefited 
from the system.  
Notwithstanding the incidents of violence in 2002, the election was generally hailed as 
Kenya’s revolutionary moment. A nationwide elite consensus – National Rainbow 
Coalition (NARC) – that campaigned on a platform of institutional reforms, 
fundamental change and providing redress to historical injustice, ended Moi’s 24-year 
misrule. NARC was led by Mwai Kibaki, who assumed the presidency after forming a 
government.  
In spite of NARC’s impressive performance towards economic growth and government 
effectiveness, Kenya’s ethnic and institutional problems lingered on (Hornsby, 2011). 
NARC’s numerous promises were subsumed by a strong pull towards status quo 
(Oucho (2008, 8). Soon after assuming power, president Kibaki abandoned plans to 
provide redress to historical injustices, propounded Kikuyu hegemony in political and 
economic realms, and introduced an unpopular draft constitution during the 2005 
constitutional referendum (Barkan, 2007). Additionally, the referendum campaigns 
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were characterized by divisive ethnic mobilization and hate speech, which outshone 
the constitutional review process (KNCHR 2006, 37). 
Significantly, the post-referendum period witnessed the fragmentation of the NARC, 
especially after Kibaki dismissed Raila Odinga and other leaders who campaigned 
against the constitution from the cabinet. Hence, for the most part of Kibaki’s rule, 
there were increasing demands for power sharing, as ethnic tensions over economic 
resources resurfaced (Hornsby 2011, 14). Subsequently, the dissatisfied Luo, Kalenjin, 
Luhyia, Kisii and coastal communities and their leaders coalesced in ODM that 
successfully campaigned against the draft constitution. 
Towards the 2007 elections, ODM was transformed into a political party under 
Odinga’s (Luo) leadership. Other prominent figures in ODM included: Musalia 
Mudavadi (Luhyia), William Ruto (Kalenjin), Joseph Nyagah (Embu), Najib Balala 
(coast) and Charity Ngilu (Kamba). Thus, ODM emerged as a “broad anti-Kikuyu 
alliance” which rendered a ‘high-stakes’ election (Branch and Cheeseman 2008, 18). 
For their part, the Kikuyu elites formed PNU as Kibaki’s new re-election vehicle. 
Additionally, the KANU chairman, Uhuru Kenyatta, dropped his presidential 
ambitions and joined Kibaki’s campaign in solidarity with his co-ethnics.  
A 41-day mediation process, under the auspices of the AU and Eminent African 
Personalities, restored relative peace and stability in February 2008. Led by Kofi Anan, 
with the participation of PNU and ODM representatives, the Kenya National Dialogue 
and Reconciliation (KNDR) process culminated in the ‘Agreement on the principles of 
partnership of the coalition government’ (Kaye and Lindenmayer, 2008). According to 
the text of the agreement, “neither side could realistically govern the country without 
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the other,” which prompted the necessity of a power sharing government (Republic of 
Kenya 2008a, 1). 
The government and the opposition finally agreed to the National Accord and 
Reconciliation Act (2008) that gave effects to a transitional PNU/ODM coalition 
government. The Act established the position of Prime Minister (Odinga), two deputies 
(Kenyatta and Mudavadi) and provisions for sharing cabinet portfolios amongst the 
coalition partners. Kibaki retained the Presidency. 
Moreover, the transitional government committed to a raft of reforms, comprising: 
constitutional, institutional and legal reform; land reform; addressing poverty, inequity 
and regional imbalances; unemployment, particularly among the youth; and 
consolidation of national cohesion and unity (Republic of Kenya, 2008b). The various 
reform platforms envisaged the establishment of a Truth, Justice and Reconciliation 
Commission (TJRC), and a number of other commissions of inquiry.  
Besides the inclusion of various TJ mechanisms in Kenya’s and Uganda’s transitions 
from conflict to peace, ICJ was also in the recipes of domestic authorities, given 
structural challenges in commencing criminal accountability for atrocities. Taken 
together, the ICC’s interventions and TJ discourses steered the two countries towards 
democratic consolidation, victims’ centeredness and national healing and 
reconciliation.   
2.2. Domestic imports of international criminal justice 
For the Ugandan and Kenyan people, the ICC’s establishment in 2002 was timely. This 
was due to the potential of, and the eventual outbreak of violent conflicts, as well as 
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the subsequent demands for criminal accountability by some victims and affected 
communities. Indeed, the ICC was envisaged to decipher domestic conundrums on 
holding alleged perpetrators of mass atrocities, with the long-term aim of guaranteeing 
non-repetition. 
During Uganda’s northern conflict, some victims and affected communities supported 
criminal prosecution of alleged perpetrators of the atrocities they suffered. According 
to survey results, 76 percent of directly and indirectly affected victims in the north 
supported criminal accountability (Pham et.al 2005, 26). Probed further on who was to 
be held accountable for the violence, 37 percent of the victims opted for the LRA 
leadership, 29 percent preferred the LRA in general, 16 percent believed that the GoU 
was to be held accountable, and 7 percent selected the military (ibid). 
However, there were disparities in calls for justice between the Acholi and their Lan’gi 
and Teso neighbours. Whereas the Acholi had a prominent role in the conflict due to 
their significant proportion of both victims and perpetrators, and proximity to the LRA, 
the Lan’gi and the Teso had low affinities to the rebel claims of waging rebellion. 
Therefore, “respondents from non-Acholi districts were three times more likely to 
believe someone should be held accountable than the Acholi districts” (ibid, 26). In 
this regard, support for criminal trials stood at 44 percent in Gulu (Acholi), 61 percent 
in Kitgum (Acholi), 88 percent in Lira (Lan’gi) and 68 percent in Soroti (Teso) (ibid). 
Similarly, in Kenya, there was considerable support for criminal accountability in the 
immediate aftermath of the 2007/2008 PEV. This obtained from the fresh memories of 
the violence, its historical recurrence and a need for non-repetition. Accordingly, the 
KNDR monitoring survey revealed that Kenyans generally supported the prosecution 
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of alleged perpetrators of the PEV (South Consulting 2010, 6). Specifically, the 
national average in support for criminal justice stood at 57 percent, with Central 
(Kikuyu) recording 55 percent, Nairobi (cosmopolitan) 75 percent, Kisumu (Luo) 46 
percent, Eldoret (Kalenjin) 48 percent and victims, 75 percent (ibid, 42).  
Despite the demands for criminal justice in both Uganda and Kenya, there was little 
motion in national institutions towards this end. In contrast, many TJ mechanisms were 
unfolding in both countries, such as: constitutional writing, institutional reforms, truth 
telling, traditional justice, reparations and reintegration. 
In Uganda, prospects for prosecuting alleged perpetrators of the northern conflict were 
undermined by an old tradition of amnesty as a conflict management framework. In 
this regard, Afako (2002, 67) argues that Uganda deployed de facto and de jure 
amnesties to groups which were engaged in rebellion (ibid, 65). For example, the 
Amnesty Statute of 1987 encouraged cessation of insurgencies and was generally 
targeted at Ugandans in exile who feared prosecution at home (ibid). The 1987 amnesty 
law excluded crimes of genocide, murder, kidnapping and rape, which were considered 
heinous. Similarly, the Amnesty Act of 1998 outlawed certain offences, and it was 
succeeded with the Amnesty Act of 2000. 
For its part, the Amnesty Act of 2000 was predicated on comprehensive exoneration, 
out of concerns that any threats of prosecutions would jeopardize peaceful resolutions 
to the northern conflict (Afako 2002, 66). In support of the amnesty law of 2000, the 
GoU claimed that it was, “an effort to draw upon community values of reconciliation 
in the service of conflict resolution” (Republic of Uganda 2013a, 31). The GoU also 
argued that amnesty was part of African values, which ought to be supported “at the 
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international plane” by Africans, both collectively and at the individual level (ibid, 31). 
As such, the GoU argued that the promotion of amnesty and African norms would 
inform the development of international law, and accord them authority (ibid, 31). 
Departing from Uganda’s dialectic of whether to succumb to international norms and 
abandon amnesty, Kenya was battling institutionalized impunity for the power elite, 
who are critical actors in violent episodes (Anderson, 2002; Waweru, 2008). More 
significantly, domestic voices on criminal justice were under threat from pro-impunity 
attitudes that are commonly expressed in phrases such as ‘forgiving,’ ‘forgetting’ and 
‘moving on’ (see for example Musila 2014, 257).  
It is however important to note that despite Kenya’s impunity, some low-level suspects 
faced justice in local courts and were eventually convicted. For example, Human Rights 
Watch (2011a, 39) provides an account of some cases which were investigated and 
prosecuted at the High Court of Kenya. Even so, the organization decried poor quality 
of investigations, incompetence on the part of prosecutors, corruption, and police 
reluctance to try their colleagues (ibid, 5). Many suspects who were in police custody 
also benefited from earlier calls for amnesty by a section of the political elites from 
ODM (Daily Nation, 2008).  
Kenya’s impunity gap was further widened by the political leaderships’ failure to 
follow through the recommendations of the CIPEV or the Waki commission.5 The 
CIPEV was created in early 2008 by the coalition government to conduct investigations 
                                                          
5 The CIPEV became popularly known as Waki commission, from the name of its 
chairman, Judge Philip Waki.  
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into alleged roles and responsibilities of various actors and institutions into the 
violence, and recommend appropriate actions (Republic of Kenya 2008c, vii). 
As a result, the CIPEV found evidence of 1,133 deaths, 3, 561 injuries and destruction 
of 117, 261 and 491 private and government properties, respectively (ibid, 346). It also 
revealed instances of sexual violence, in the form of ethnically driven gang and 
individual rapes, and female and male genital mutilation (ibid, 348). Moreover, the 
CIPEV established that the police used excessive force, and engaged in criminal 
behaviour, such as murder, gang rape and looting (ibid, 396). 
The commission went further to recommended the establishment of the Special 
Tribunal for Kenya, in order to commence criminal proceedings against some of the 
most responsible perpetrators of the violence (ibid, 472). For compliance with this 
recommendation, the commission suggested the ICC’s intervention in the event of 
domestic inability/unwillingness. It also recommended: fast-tacking the International 
Crimes Bill of 2008; utilization of the Witness Protection Act of 2008; enactment of 
the Freedom of Information Bill; suspension of public officials charged with criminal 
offences related to the violence, and their excusal from holding public office upon 
conviction (ibid, 476).  
Notwithstanding the commission’s recommendations, there was inadequate political 
will towards criminal accountability. As Musila (2009, 450) observed, the PNU and 
ODM transitional government “wavered on its position over time.” More so, 
Kenyatta’s and Ruto’s allies thwarted efforts to establish the tribunal in the National 
Assembly with the slogan ‘don’t be vague, go to The Hague.’ As Brown and Sriram 
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(2012, 225) rightly argued, their public support for either the tribunal or the ICC 
changed over time, and support for one shifted when the other seemed to be a reality.   
In view of Uganda’s inability to prosecute alleged perpetrators of the northern conflict, 
the ICC’s role was considered. This commenced with the GoU’s referral of the LRA 
to the ICC in January 2004, and the OTP’s subsequent investigations from July that 
year (ICC, 2004a). As a result, the OTP found evidence of war crimes, including: 
attacks on civilian populations, murder, rape, enslavement of children and inhumane 
treatment of victims (ibid). The OTP’s charge sheet also had crimes against humanity, 
namely: slavery, rape, and other inhumane acts (ibid). 
Subsequently, in October 2005, the ICC’s Pre-Trial Chamber Judges issued warrants 
of arrest against five LRA senior commanders: Joseph Kony, Dominic Ong’wen, Okot 
Odhiambo, Vincent Otti and Ras Lukwiya (ICC, 2005b). As of today, Ong’wen 
continues to face trials at the ICC after his surrender in CAR in January 2015, while 
the rest of the suspects are deceased, apart from Kony who is still on the run (Burke, 
2016). 
For Kenya’s indecisiveness on trials for the 2007/2008 PEV, the OTP submitted a 
request to Pre-Trial Chamber II for authorization to open investigations in November 
2009 (ICC, 2009b). In its application, the OTP relied on selected public reports, the 
CIPEV, as well as local and international NGOs (ibid). The Prosecutor received 30 
communications from several groups and individuals on the nature of crimes within 
the Court’s jurisdiction (ibid). According to the OTP, the PEV amounted to 
international crimes, such as: “elements of brutality, burning victims alive, attacking 
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places sheltering IDPs, beheadings, and using pangas and machetes to hack people to 
death” (ICC 2017c,1). 
In March, 2010, the OTP’s request was granted, after which six individuals or the 
‘Ocampo Six,’6 were named as the most responsible perpetrators, in December that 
year. The list of suspects comprised an equal number of individuals from PNU and 
ODM parties. From the PNU side were: Kenyatta (deputy prime minister and minister 
for finance), Francis Muthaura (head of civil service) and Mohammed Hussein Ali 
(police commissioner). The ODM suspects included: Ruto (minister for education), 
Henry Kosgey (minister for industrialization) and radio journalist Joshua arap Sang 
(ICC, 2010). Besides their government positions, Kenyatta was an important politician 
amongst the Kikuyu,7 whereas Ruto and Kosgey were senior Kalenjin politicians.8 
By intervening in Uganda and Kenya, the ICC overcame local difficulties in 
investigating and prosecuting perpetrators of serious atrocities. In so doing, the Court’s 
entry in to the two countries intensified the debates on, and a need for criminal 
accountability for the conflicts. Of great significance were the possibilities of domestic 
                                                          
6 The six suspects became famously known as ‘Ocampo Six’ after the media’s 
reference.  
7 As the son of Kenya’s founding president, chairman of KANU and potential 
presidential candidate.  
8 This obtained from Ruto’s membership in ODM’s pentagon (highest decision-
making organ in 2007), and Kosgey’s position as ODM’s national chairman. 
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transfers of the ICC’s normative imperatives; such as complementarity, victim 
centeredness and international cooperation. Indeed, the Court’s expressivist function 
added to other local conflict resolution frameworks and TJ initiatives.  
To more optimistic commentators, the ICC’s involvement in Uganda and Kenya 
directly contributed towards peace. For example, in Uganda, it has been argued that the 
Court’s indictments of five senior LRA commanders pushed them to peace talks at Juba 
(Dareshori and Evenson 2010, 2; Meron, 2011). These claims are however contested, 
as the GoU’s military offensives against the LRA could also account for their consent 
to negotiations. Some observers argue that the LRA’s decision to participate in the 
peace talks was a tactical manoeuvre to strategize, given their weak position at the time 
(Interview, human rights activist, Kampala, Uganda, 3 February 2016). During the 
LRA’s engagement in the talks, they “had been very weak, lost many people after the 
Iron Fist, lacked arms and medicine, and were internally disorganized” (ibid). 
Perhaps, what is clear is that the ICC’s intervention in the Ugandan situation expressed 
the international community’s consensus on criminal accountability, as well as 
domestic signals to would be perpetrators that they stand chances of accounting for 
their crimes. Additionally, the trials met some of the victims’ demands for criminal 
accountability, going by the survey results in which most victims singled out the LRA 
for retribution. Moreover, Louis Moreno Ocampo, the then ICC prosecutor, argued that 
his motivation for intervening in the conflict was guided in part by the victims’ interests 
and local efforts towards justice (ICC 2005c, 4-5).  
In Kenya, the ICC’s intervention was partly credited for contributing to the relative 
peace that was witnessed in the 2013 general elections. For example, a human rights 
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activist observed that despite the ICC’s limitations, it somehow scared some political 
elites who would have instigated violence (Interview, Nairobi, Kenya, 2 March 2016).  
Similarly, a peace activist in the Rift Valley narrated how, the relative peace in the 
elections benefited from the ICC system, because of internal fears that some agencies 
could be collecting evidence of perpetrators (Interview, Eldoret, Kenya, 3 November 
2015). 
Likewise, Ocampo claimed credit for the relatively peaceful elections, arguing that the 
ICC’s course of action was a ‘game changer’ (Luce, 2013). Ocampo’s arguments were 
reiterated by Anton Steyberg from the OTP, who noted that the ICC’s focus, together 
with other factors, were deterrence in the elections (cited in Daily Nation 2017, 1; 
Musau, 2017). 
There were also arguments that the ICC’s intervention in Kenya was a significant step 
in departing from Kenya’s impunity, to more appreciations of the rule of law. In this 
vein, a former senior government official suggested that the appearance of prominent 
Kenyans for trials, “sent an important message to everyone in Kenya – the rich, poor, 
powerful or powerless alike – that crime does not pay” (Miguna 2012, 406). He also 
argued that the ICC trials showed that nobody is immune to accountability, and that 
justice is not limited by time constraints (ibid, 406). For his part, a human rights activist 
argued that the ICC was a manifestation of impunity check and a safeguard for the rule 
of law that many generations of Kenyan leaders had failed to deliver to the country 
(Wainaina 2016, 1). 
Nevertheless, the aforementioned claims are contested due to the difficulties in 
inferring causality, and disagreements on the ICC’s deterrence effect (Furman, 2013; 
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Snyder and Vinjamuri, 2015). The outcome of the Kenyan cases (politicization, 
premature termination and a mistrial) also challenged some of the positive attributes 
on the ICC’s intervention. 
Evidently, the ICC’s entry in Kenya shaped domestic debates on accountability for 
mass atrocities. In so doing, the Court presented more feasible possibilities of holding 
alleged perpetrators of violence to account; as opposed to the country’s guarantees of 
impunity for the power elites, and the mantras of ‘forgetting,’ ‘forgiving’ and ‘moving 
on’. Moreover, as Ocampo revealed, the Kenyan precedent would send a signal to more 
than 15 African states that were to hold elections in the next one and a half years that 
commission of international crimes would invite the ICC’s response (Kanina 2010,1). 
Collectively, the ICC’s interventions in Uganda and Kenya added to the contributions 
of domestic TJ mechanisms towards more sustainable peace. Essentially, TJ discourses 
which went beyond criminal accountability, and provided avenues for deepening 
democracy, addressing victims’ needs and fostering reconciliation.   
2.3. From conflict to democratic peace? 
The ICC’s interventions in Uganda and Kenya built upon domestic successes with TJ 
mechanisms, which significantly altered the conflict scenarios. For example, the two 
countries adopted new constitutions with more democratic guarantees; reformed their 
institutions, such as the judiciary; attended to victims’ plights with reparations and 
reintegration; and attempted truth-telling initiatives. 
Besides, the countries adopted other forms of departing from the past. These included 
Uganda’s memorialization projects, ad hoc monetary compensations, some 
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resettlements, as well as development, recovery and peace efforts in the north 
(Hopwood, 2011; Republic of Uganda, 2013). In Kenya, many local and international 
organizations embarked on a plethora of peace-building activities amongst communties 
that were affected by the 2007/2008 PEV (Interview, peace activist, Nairobi, Kenya, 
27 October 2017). 
In spite of the transformation potential of TJ mechanisms, domestic authorities 
departed from their full implementation, due to a confluence of factors. These 
comprised the complexities of the conflicts, financial and logistical challenges, official 
complicity in some forms of the violence, and complacency after war termination. In 
this regard, Mihr (2017, 115) rightly argued that the outcome of TJ mechanisms 
significantly depends on the aims and agendas of actors, as well as their application by   
social institutions and political elites.   
More importantly, conflict complexities rendered TJ a difficult endeavour to undertake 
in both countries. To illustrate, the longevity and evolution of Uganda’s northern 
conflict led to new dynamics, namely: construction of narratives and counter narratives, 
involvement of international actors, and conscription of child soldiers. In this vein, 
Woodward (2007, 164) concludes that war alters societies, interests and the economy, 
notwithstanding its justification along political differences or behavioural patterns. 
For Kenya, the 2007/2008 PEV was interconnected with historical land injustices in 
the Rift Valley, and long-standing questions of belonging amongst the Kikuyu and 
Kalenjin communities. In addition, the country’s institutional reforms were conducted 
in an environment of state capture by political elites, some of whom continued to hold 
powerful positions and preferred the status quo (Akech 2010, 8). For instance, Osse 
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(2014, 910) highlights how police reforms were “a slow process of “muddling through” 
and controlled by the executive. 
Notwithstanding the complexities, Uganda’s and Kenya’s TJ trajectories unfolded, 
with the promises of a better future for the citizenry. The absence of reform initiatives 
would have probably worsened the conflict scenarios and contributed to new waves of 
political violence. Hence, the reforms were disincentives for political violence, as they 
opened up more space for public participation in governance, addressed regional 
inequalities, and articulated the protection of fundamental human rights. 
2.3.1. Uganda’s progress from militarism 
Efforts to overcome Uganda’s militarism were envisaged in the NRM’s ‘Ten-Point’ 
programme, and the ‘Agreement on reconciliation and accountability between the GoU 
and the LRA’ (Republic of Uganda, 1986; 2007). Promulgated after the 1986 coup, the 
‘Ten-Point’ programme called for “a political roadmap to inform the basis for a 
nationwide coalition of political and social forces to usher in a new and better future 
for the long-suffering people of Uganda” (Republic of Uganda 1986, 1). In the 
programme, the NRM outlined its vision for Uganda, including, inter alia: promoting 
democracy as a real emancipation of the people; consolidating national unity and 
eradicating sectarianism; eliminating corruption and abuse of power, and cooperating 
with other African states in defending democracy and human rights (ibid, 4-13).  
As a first step of deepening democracy in Uganda, the NRM regime introduced 
decentralization as the country’s system of governance. The system was developed 
from earlier versions of Resistance Councils (RCs), which the NRM had developed in 
its areas of influence during war time (Mugabi, 2004). According to the NRM, the RC 
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was a radical democratic concept, given its participatory, popular and bottom-up 
approach, as opposed representative and elitist parliamentary system (Ddungu 1993, 
366). Over time, the development of RCs in the country gradually transformed the 
highly centralized Uganda into a decentralized state, given power transfer from the 
centre to the peripheries (Mugabi 2004, 1).  
Granted, the new system of governance bridged regional disparities that the 
independent 1962 constitution propounded by allotting some autonomy to southern 
regions and relegating the north to district statuses. Progressively, decentralization was 
promoted throughout Uganda and later on entrenched in the new constitution of 1995.  
In the new constitution, Article 176 on ‘Local Government System’ provided for the 
establishment of districts as units of lower local governance and administrative 
functions. Article 176 also established the system of local government under 
democratically elected councils through universal adult suffrage. Thereafter, the Local 
Government Act of 1997 was enacted to consolidate the gains of decentralization. The 
Act was intended to align the local governments law with the constitution in order to 
operationalize decentralization of power and functions. The Act also sought to give 
effect to decentralization at all levels, in order to deepen democracy and promote 
financial and political establishment of local units.   
Remarkably, the new constitution of 1995 was adopted and promulgated after national 
consultations and participatory processes. As Justice Ben Odoki, the chairman of the 
constitutional review commission documented, they embarked on countrywide civic 
education programmes to increase public awareness and debate about the process and 
the constitution itself (Odoki 2005, 47). In line with the NRM’s demands for people’s 
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participation, the commission conducted seminars in all the 800 sub-counties, and with 
special interest groups comprising women, youth, workers, security organs, civil 
servants and professional organizations (ibid, 48). The draft constitution was finally 
submitted to the Constituent Assembly (CA) for debate and adoption (ibid).  
The new constitution committed Ugandans to democratic principles of freedom, 
equality and social justice, as well as peace, unity and progress.9 It also set the country’s 
political objectives on democratic pedestals, such as the empowerment and promotion 
of active citizen participation in their own governance, and citizen access to leadership 
at all levels. Besides, the constitution expanded Uganda’s human rights regime in an 
expansive Bill of Rights.10 For enforcement purposes, the constitution provided for the 
establishment of the Uganda Human Rights Commission (UHRC), that has since been 
active in championing the human rights agenda.  
Further steps in the NRM’s consolidation of peace was the promotion of an endogenous 
political philosophy – the broad base or movement political system. In this worldview, 
political pluralism was outlawed because it was believed to promote sectarian interests, 
which partly contributed to the country’s instability (Museveni 1992, 1). According to 
one of the movement’s supporters, the NRM represented “an enlightened leadership 
and army,” that contributed to Uganda’s political stability (Bakunzi, 1992). In contrast, 
                                                          
9 Preamble of the Constitution.  
10 Chapter 4 of the Constitution.  
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political parties were believed to be ideologically deficient, thus their role in people’s 
divisions (ibid). 
For critics, the broad base was a clever manoeuvre to curtail political competition, or 
at best, an affront on democracy. Some of the movement’s opponents described it as 
“a de facto one-party system, and a queer political organization which does not fit in 
the universally accepted democratic order” (Mucunguzi 2000, 1). To some, the system 
was a manifestation of the NRM’s true intentions of “imprisonment in a monolith 
system” (Nabudere 2000, 1). 
There were also suggestions that the broad base was a “clever illusion of one party 
system” (Interview, lecturer, Kampala, Uganda 29 January 2016). As such, the NRM’s 
initial intentions of democratic governance were undermined by the trappings of 
power, which emboldened Museveni to stay put (ibid). Weighing in on the movement 
controversy, Mamdani (1991, 1) claimed that although the system was successful in 
establishing a credible government with a solid base, many problems emerged with 
efforts to consolidate it as a constitutional provision. 
In order to settle the question of Uganda’s preferred political system, a constitutional 
referendum was conducted in 2000. Consequently, the majority of the electorate 
rejected pluralism (African Elections Database, 2017). Yet still, the regime embarked 
on political reforms after the 2001 elections (Makara et.al, 2007), after which the 2005 
referendum resulted in the majority’s preference for pluralism (Africa Elections 
Database, 2017). As a result, old political parties (such as DP and UPC) were revived, 
while new ones, including the Forum for Democratic Change (FDC) and People’s 
Democratic Party (PDP), emerged. 
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Since then, Uganda has conducted regular multiparty elections in 2006, 2011 and 2016. 
Nevertheless, there are regular accusations of uneven playing fields between the regime 
and the opposition, as well as reports of widespread electoral malpractices (Makara, 
2010; Onyango, 2012; Lynch, 2016).  
Despite Uganda’s significant institutional reforms and democratization, the truth-
telling processes was inadequately attended to. To a large extent, the Commission of 
Inquiry into Violations of Human Rights (CIVHR) that was formed in January 1986 to 
was undermined by lack of political will. Although the CIVHR conducted public 
hearings, with some broadcast on national television and radio stations, its findings 
were never publicized (US Institute of Peace, 2016).  
Moreover, with regards to the northern conflict, the GoU has only accommodated TJ 
initiatives that respond to the LRA’s alleged atrocities. This follows a systematic 
pattern of the regime’s determination to depoliticize the northern conflict and 
consequently, deprive the LRA of any legitimate claims to insurgency. Thus, recent TJ 
mechanisms, such as traditional justice, reintegration and criminal accountability, are 
endorsed by the GoU in as much as they are responses to the LRA atrocities and their 
positionality as ends to war termination, rather than to atrocities also committed by the 
GoU. 
However selective the mechanisms have been, they partly provided redress to some of 
the harm suffered by victims and contributed towards some form of truth-telling and 
healing. For example, amnesty and traditional justice were useful in persuading 
combatants to abandon rebellion and reintegrate into society. Furthermore, traditional 
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justice has provisions for truth-telling and paying some form of compensation to victim 
communities (Interview, Acholi elders, Gulu, Uganda, 21-30 March 2016). 
Cognisant of selectivity in recent TJ mechanisms, Ugandan authorities have mulled 
with the idea of a comprehensive TJ policy. As a first step, the Justice, Law and Order 
Sector (JLOS) spearheaded a study in 2008, which sought to “collect baseline data on 
TJ and what it means for Uganda” (Republic of Uganda 2009, iv). As a result, several 
draft policies were developed, and a final document is pending cabinet approval 
(Interview, government official, Kampala, Uganda 4 February 2016). According to the 
drafters of the final TJ draft policy, it is “a first of its kind in Africa and the World at 
large … and provides a holistic intervention to achieving lasting peace” (Republic of 
Uganda 2013b, 3). 
The policy is derived from the Juba Peace process and is entrenched in one of the 
visions in Uganda’s National Development Plan – “a peaceful and stable Uganda” 
(ibid). The draft policy has great promise in contributing towards Uganda’s 
transformation because of its combination of various justice mechanisms and adoption 
of a victim centred approach. The question that remains is whether it will survive 
political storms and proceed to full implementation. 
2.3.2. Kenya after 2007 
The cornerstone of Kenya’s transition from the 2007/2008 political crisis was the 
writing and promulgation of a new constitution in 2010. The constitution established 
frameworks for addressing the country’s conflict triggers of ethnic exclusion, regional 
inequality and institutional failures. Towards this end, the constitution provided for the 
creation of constitutional commissions on the national police, the judiciary, land, 
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revenue division and allocation, gender issues and elections management. 
Consequently, vetting processes ensued on the commissions’ creation and the dismissal 
of some senior officials from public office (International Centre for Policy and 
Conflict, 2010; Osse, 2014). As already stated, the vetting processes failed in many 
instances due to resistance from proponents of status quo. 
Moreover, through an Act of parliament, the National Cohesion and Integration 
Commission (NCIC) was created to consolidate Kenya’s unity and provide checks on 
ethnic discrimination. (NCIC Act, 2008). However, at best, the NCIC is known to have 
failed in curbing hate speech and countering ethnic divisions (Makabila, 2014). 
Significantly, the new constitution of 2010 introduced a two-tier system of governance; 
national and county governments, which formalized Kenyans’ desire for devolution 
over the years. The first schedule of the constitution provided for 47 county 
governments with elected Governors and Members of County Assembly (MCA), and 
appointed County Executive Committees (Articles 176 – 179). 
The new constitution also established a Senate with elected representatives from each 
of the 47 counties. As part of Kenya’s bicameral parliament, the Senate has express 
provisions on advancing the interest of the counties and protecting devolution. In 
Article 96 of the constitution, the roles of the Senate are enlisted as: representing 
counties and promoting their interests, legislation on matters affecting counties, 
revenue allocation and division to counties, and exercising oversight over county 
government revenues.  
Through devolution, Kenya sought to diffuse ethnic tensions that are associated with 
real and imagined perceptions of ethnic exclusions from the central government. In this 
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regard, Article 176 of the new constitution expounded the objects of devolution as: 
promoting national unity in diversity; protecting the interests of the minority groups 
and the marginalized regions; deepening democracy and accountability; fostering 
separation of powers; advancing equity in resource allocation; promoting self-
governance and transfer of state organs and functions. 
Owing to its transformational potential, the devolved system of governance was 
welcomed in many quarters. For example, the World Bank (2012, v) noted how 
devolution is a cornerstone of the new constitution and provides frameworks for 
addressing regional inequalities. Since its introduction, Kenya’s devolution has eluded 
the tragedy of recentralization as occurred in other regional contexts, such as the DRC. 
This was due to the emergence of county governors who have showed their willingness 
and ability to protect their own positions as a result of political competitions and local-
level pressures to defend devolved units (Cheeseman et.al 2016, 2). Despite the positive 
attributes of decentralization, the new constitution was unable to address Kenya’s 
ethnic competition and impunity, which continue to prevail in everyday political 
processes. 
The limitations of the 2010 constitution’s transformational potential were exacerbated 
by the largely unsuccessful truth-telling process. Through an Act of parliament, the 
TJRC was formed in 2008 to investigate instances of human rights abuses that occurred 
from the post-independence era up to February 2008. In so doing, the commission was 
envisaged to promote Kenya’s national healing and reconciliation (TJRC Act of 2008).  
Nonetheless, throughout its entire lifespan, the TJRC was embroiled in many 
challenges that ranged from: procedural, financial, legitimacy, operational and legacy 
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problems. Notably, the TJRC’s credibility was dented by its chairman’s (Bethwel 
Kiplagat) accusations of committing human rights violations during the Moi era 
(Kisiangani, 2013). In light of these challenges, the political class established a 
defective commission, which they hoped to eventually fail due to their disinterest in a 
successful truth-telling process (Lanegran 2015, 66). 
More importantly, the TJRC’s hearings were characterized by a disengaged public. In 
other words, the commission’s hearings attracted limited media interest and public 
debate, as well as small audiences and insufficient awareness (Lynch 2014b, 181). As 
a result, the disengaged public undermined the prospects for a “transformative 
interaction between performers and an audience(s),” which could possibly create a 
sense of new beginning and result in catharsis, as the South African precedent 
envisioned (ibid, 181) 
Despite its challenges, the TJRC finalized and submitted its report to President 
Kenyatta soon after his inauguration in 2013, with recommendations on: criminal 
prosecutions, public apologies, reparations and memorialization. To date, the President 
has only issued a blanket public apology in parliament and promised to establish a 
Kshs. 10 Billion reparations fund (Republic of Kenya, 2015). 
The government’s inaction on the TJRC report is attributed to a lack of political will to 
implement its recommendations. For instance, the Attorney General proposed 
amendments to the TJRC Act, which replaced the provision for an express 
implementation of the report with parliament’s nod (TJRC (Amendment) Act 2013). 
Additionally, an MP exposed lack of political will in implementing the TJRC report by 
observing that “we do not know whether the report is telling the truth, or whether it is 
99 
 
driving justice or whether it is recommending reconciliation to this country” (cited in 
Shiundu 2013b, 1). Further, the MP suggested that the report ought to be amended for 
the country’s benefit (ibid, 1).  
Turning to the plight of more visible victims of the 2007/2008 PEV, the government 
focused on resettlement programmes for the IDPs in the Rift Valley. The initiatives 
were however faulted for ignoring less visible victims, such as integrated IDPs, victims 
of police brutality and SGBV. The governments’ focus on a section of the IDPs 
reinforced stereotypes of ethnic favouritism and exclusion and widened divisions 
within the victim community (KPTJ 2013, 10). Occasionally, the excluded victim 
categories demonstrated against state neglect in resettlement programmes (Gitonga, 
2017; Wanyama, 2017). Some of the victims petitioned national courts to compel the 
government to compensate them, and the cases are still ongoing (Interview, human 
rights activist, Nairobi, Kenya, 20 August 2015).  
2.4. Conclusion 
Together with the ICC’s interventions, Uganda’s and Kenya’s reform initiatives 
significantly contributed towards their transformation from conflict to relatively 
peaceful scenarios. First, the ICC was instrumental in overcoming domestic 
conundrums in prosecuting alleged perpetrators of Uganda’s northern conflict and 
Kenya’s 2007/2008 PEV. Second, TJ mechanisms contributed towards the countries’ 
democratic consolidation and providing redress to some of the victims’ immediate 
needs. 
Museveni described Uganda’s transition from militarism as ‘steady progress’ during 
the 2016 elections campaign. The slogan was informed by the country’s relative 
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political stability, economic growth and development of institutions as contrasted with 
yester years of political turbulence, economic decline and degradation of state 
institutions (NRM, 2016). Hence, for Museveni, the NRM’s steps were remarkable, 
and were to be appreciated as the building blocks to Uganda’s success (ibid, 6). 
Notwithstanding the ‘steady progress,’ there are still many questions regarding the 
competitiveness of Uganda’s politics, which expose the country to risks of a return to 
violence. Recent media reports on the opposition’s suppression and elections 
malpractices are indications of a country that has a long way to go in terms of 
democratic consolidation. Museveni’s longevity in power has created impressions of 
an incumbency that has no intentions of losing elections or power transfer (Lynch, 
2016). In other words, Museveni and his NRM party manifest “permanent fixtures” in 
Uganda’s political power, an idea that is commonly referred to as pakalast (Wilkins 
2017, 621). 
Also, as a Ugandan professor observed, Museveni is believed to have “never left the 
bush,” as he uses threats of violence whenever the electioneering periods beckon 
(Interview, Kampala, Uganda, 29 January 2016). For instance, in the 2016 elections, 
the NRM warned of a possible military coup in the event the party lost the elections 
(Wafula, 2015). Given the tensions in Uganda’s democratization, some wonder 
whether the country enjoys positive or negative peace (Odoi 2016, 1; Bwiire, 2017).  
Similarly, ‘Kenya after 2007’ was remarkably different from the past where conflict 
mitigating factors such as the ICC, devolution and new institutions were non-existent. 
In this regard, and contrary to predictions of violence (Human Rights Watch 2013, 1), 
the 2013 elections were relatively peaceful, apart from a few pockets of protests and 
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violence in some opposition strongholds (Awuor, 2013; Momanyi, 2013). Whereas 
many would explain the relatively peaceful outcome of the elections on many Kenyans’ 
desires to maintain peace (Long et.al 2013, 152), there was a substantial contribution 
of TJ discourses to this end. Indeed, and as Cheeseman et.al (2014, 4) argued, partial 
reforms legitimized the political system and electoral processes. Kenya’s political 
problems still linger because of the inadequate implementation of some of the TJ 
mechanisms. This reality is exacerbated by the deep culture of impunity amongst the 
power elite and their determination to undermine democratic institutions. 
Democratic deficits in both countries were aggravated by politicization of the ICC’s 
interventions, which subsumed the Court’s imports on consolidating peace. It is 
therefore imperative to ascertain the conditions under which the ICC’s interventions in 
Uganda and Kenya were politicized, with detrimental effects on peace-building 
processes.  
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Chapter 3 
Politicization of the International Criminal Court’s interventions as exchanges 
about the moral universe 
Why and how is an ostensibly international legal response to heinous crimes 
susceptible to (mis)appropriation and subversion by domestic political elites? As a 
response to this critical question, this chapter analyzes actor and institutional exchanges 
about the moral universe, as well as the diffusion of the global norm of ICJ from 
international to local and regional spaces. Discerning the prominent role of domestic 
political elites in the uptake of ICJ, this chapter pays attention to how the GoU and 
Kenya’s Jubilee Alliance translated the ICC’s intervention in their respective realms. 
More specifically, this chapter discusses how the GoU and the Jubilee Alliance 
orchestrated transactional and adversarial exchanges on their ICC’s interventions, 
which culminated in politicization. 
By discussing politicization of the ICC’s interventions in Uganda and Kenya as 
exchanges about the moral universe, this chapter illustrates how political elites’ 
decisions on ICJ produce a complex web of relationships amongst diverse actors in 
spatial hierarchies. This culminates in the construction of glocal spaces – blends of 
local and global perspectives on ICJ. 
Consequently, glocalization of ICJ produces exchanges amongst various actors and 
institutions about the moral universe that condition the uptake of the ICC’s 
interventions in international, local and regional spaces. Further, the exchanges commit 
targeted constituencies to either cooperation or non-cooperation with the Court’s 
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intervention, hence its susceptibility to (mis)appropriation or subversion by domestic 
political elites. 
To illustrate, Uganda’s transactional exchanges were anchored in the selective referral 
of the LRA to the ICC, and the GoU’s reciprocal cooperation on the Court’s selection 
bias and the insurgent’s prosecution. More so, there were considerations for non-
compliance on cooperation, in the event of the universality of justice or alternatives to 
the ICC in the LRA’s annihilation. Notwithstanding their transactional intentions, the 
Ugandan authorities ‘locked in’ international cooperation in arresting and prosecuting 
the LRA. This was because of the cases’ demonstration of the aspirations of the 
international community in constructing a moral universe whereby atrocities do not to 
go unpunished.  
For Kenya, the Jubilee Alliance’s adversarial exchanges with the neo-colonial narrative 
articulated local autonomy from the international sphere, as well as regional solidarity 
and non-cooperation with the ICC. By turning to the local, the Alliance invented spaces 
under which they challenged the Court’s normative imperatives and moral authority. 
On courting regional solidarity, the Jubilee Alliance spoke to claims of Africa’s 
peripheral location in the global political economy. This gave new relevance to African 
protectionism, as exemplified in the AU’s collective non–cooperation decisions on the 
Kenyan and Sudanese ICC cases.  
Broadly speaking, the concept of glocalization of ICJ points to the quest for power, 
authority and legitimacy, in the politics of post conflict transition; within the local, and 
between the local and the international. The concept also leads to the development of 
a taxonomy of politicization of the ICC’s interventions – transactional and adversarial 
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exchanges. Moreover, the notion of glocalization demonstrates the salience of the 
ICC’s selectivity and neo-colonial narratives, and their emergence as critical challenges 
to the Court’s normative imperatives. In sum, the Ugandan and Kenyan precedents 
allude to contextual normative adaptations, with overarching effects amongst diverse 
actor and institutional categories in the ICJ enterprise.  
The chapter starts with discussions on domestic (political) translations of the ICC’s 
interventions by political elites and their motivations in doing so. It highlights the 
GoU’s intentions of using the ICC for domestic political struggles or the LRA’s 
annihilation, and the Jubilee Alliance’s aims in battling the Court’s indictments. The 
chapter then turns to the idea of glocalization and discerns the concept’s origins and 
applicability in ICJ. Afterwards, the chapter analyzes the GoU’s transactional 
exchanges, their predilections with selection bias with state cooperation, as well as 
international cooperation in the LRA’s arrest and prosecution. The chapter then moves 
on to the Jubilee Alliance’s adversarial exchanges, their emphasis on local autonomy 
from the international sphere, and shifts towards regional solidarity and non-
cooperation with the ICC. It then concludes with a brief summary of the 
aforementioned arguments, and acknowledgment of the reality of contested 
sovereignties that occasioned domestic normative contestations over ICJ. These 
concerns set out follow up arguments on the salience of the narratives in shaping the 
course of the ICC’s reception in domestic spaces as discussed in chapter 4.  
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3.1. Domestic (political) translations of the International Criminal Court’s 
interventions 
As players in domestic political processes which culminated in violence that the ICC 
sought to respond to, the GoU and the Jubilee Alliance took prominent roles in 
diffusing the Court’s intervention in their respective situations. In turn, domestic 
political translations informed a great part of Uganda’s and Kenya’s uptake of ICJ. 
Political elites’ dominant roles in shaping the course of ICJ is aptly qualified in 
Subotic’s (2009) theory of Politics of hijacked justice. Subotic posits that the diffusion 
of international norms in domestic spaces is inextricably linked to politics (ibid). As 
Subotic rightly argues, political elites strategically appropriate and use international 
norms, thus embedding them in everyday political struggles (ibid, 29). The ICC’s 
diffusion in Uganda’s and Kenya’s political marketplaces also followed 
Zimmermann’s (2015, 9) logic of consciously or unconsciously connecting 
international norms to various frames of interpretations and probable collective action. 
Seemingly, the GoU’s and the Jubilee Alliance’s actions partly departed from the ICC’s 
missions of justice in their realms. In contrast, they also predicated their translations of 
ICJ on assessments of a threat versus opportunity matrix, with a similar strand of claims 
to political legitimacy and authority.  
For the GoU, the ICC’s ability to galvanize international cooperation in arresting and 
prosecuting suspects was construed as an opportunity to confront the resilient LRA. As 
a human rights activist narrated, with the ICC, “people saw the emergence of a 
powerful Court, and that the international community would come and arrest the LRA” 
(Interview, Kampala, Uganda, 3 February 2016). Indeed, the timing of the ICC’s 
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establishment in 2002 coincided with the regime’s efforts to thrash the rebellion at a 
time the northern conflict was at its peak. Hence, the Ugandan authorities orchestrated 
transactional exchanges on ICJ as demonstrated in the 2004 selective referral of the 
LRA to the ICC, as opposed to an open referral.   
Conversely, Kenyatta and Ruto opted for adversarial exchanges with the ICC because 
their indictments posed both existential threats and significant obstacles to their 
political ambitions. The possibilities of their convictions and languishing in jail, 
together with the shame of accusations for committing international crimes, were 
incentives for them to orchestrate various forms of adversarial exchanges. The climax 
of these exchanges was the neo-colonial narrative, and the Jubilee Alliance’s successful 
election into power in the March 2013 elections.  
As of the time of their ICC indictments, Kenyatta and Ruto harboured presidential 
ambitions in the forthcoming elections, which were buoyed by their respective political 
capital. The two were serving as senior government officials, in addition to their rich 
voting blocs of the Kikuyu and Kalenjin communities, that are the largest and third 
largest, respectively (Republic of Kenya, 2010). 
Besides Kenyatta’s vantage position as the son of Kenya’s founding president, Jomo 
Kenyatta, a section of the Kikuyu political and business class had endorsed him to take 
over from Kibaki, who had exhausted his two-term constitutional limit (Gekara and 
Mathenge, 2010). For his part, Ruto’s political fortunes obtained from the 2007 
elections where he emerged as the most prominent Kalenjin politician, in addition to 
his mobilization of considerable votes against the 2010 constitution (Lynch 2014a, 96). 
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Ruto was also endorsed by the Kalenjin community as their preferred presidential 
candidate in the upcoming elections (Komen and Koech, 2012). 
Therefore, for Uhuruto (as they became popularly known), the ICC’s indictments 
presented a symmetry: political baggage and capital in equal proportions. With regards 
to the former, accusations for committing international crimes and killing each other’s 
supporters undermined their credibility for leadership. Whereas Ruto was associated 
with targeted attacks against the Kikuyu in the Rift Valley, Kenyatta was accused of 
organizing and financing revenge attacks in Nakuru and Naivasha in central Rift 
Valley. 
On the flipside, Kenyatta and Ruto’s indictments presented viable opportunities for 
their collaboration in fighting common enemies –  the ICC and its domestic proponents. 
Commenting on the binary position Uhuruto faced, Wolfe (2015, 163) opines that 
despite their initial considerations of the ICC as a fatal liability, it portended as a crucial 
asset. According to Wolfe, the ICC’s positionality as a “sword of Damocles” ironically 
emerged as a critical ingredient for electoral victory (ibid, 165). 
Accordingly, for Uhuruto, an electoral success in 2013 was a strategy in battling the 
ICC by using state authority to undermine the cases or opening the opportunities for 
not attending Court proceedings if the former scenario failed (Mueller 2014, 26). In 
their calculus against the ICC were a combination of efforts, namely: case termination 
or deferral, the OTP’s accusations of witness intimidation and interference, fighting 
human rights activists who actively supported the Court, and public vituperation of the 
ICC as a performance of injustice, a kangaroo Court, and a neo-colonial institution. 
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The GoU’s and the Jubilee Alliance’s political translations of the ICC’s interventions 
extended beyond individual convictions, and subsequently helped influence collective 
perceptions on the cases in the spatial hierarchies. In other words, the political elites’ 
decisions on the ICC incrementally gained traction amongst targeted constituencies in 
local, regional and international spaces.  
First, the GoU’s selective referral significantly shaped the course of the Court’s 
investigative steps, and the international communities’ successive involvement with 
actors to the northern conflict (Nouwen and Werner, 2010). Whereas the ICC’s path in 
Uganda could be attributed to the insurgent’s relative disengagement from its processes 
and the government’s positionality as legitimate state authority, the selective referral 
was salient in shaping the Court’s investigative and prosecutorial ventures.  
Second, the Jubilee Alliance’s neo-colonial narrative, together with other factors, 
shaped the decisions of voters in ‘electing the alliance of the accused.’ The narrative 
was continuously articulated during the course of the ‘Ocampo Six’ trials and 
effectively utilized by the Jubilee Alliance during the 2013 elections campaigns. 
Accordingly, Lynch (2014a) rightly attributes the Jubilee Alliance’s electoral success 
to their peace messaging, elite level bargains, reframing the ICC story as a performance 
of injustice and neo-colonialism, and casting their opponents as agents of continuity. 
As Lynch concludes, the Jubilee Alliance used an array of analytical and performative 
strategies under which they reframed predominant narratives that built on, and helped 
shape, domestic understandings of justice, injustice, threats and opportunities (ibid).  
Taken together, narrations of the ICC’s selectivity and neo-colonialism negated the 
notion of international cooperation in combating impunity for international crimes. 
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Conversely, the narratives produced glocal spaces under which state actors 
reconfigured cooperation with the ICC, given their relative power positions vis.a.vis 
the global institution. Thus, glocalization opened up the ICC’s interventions to either 
(mis)appropriation or subversion in domestic spheres.  
3.2. Exchanges and glocalization of international criminal justice 
The discussions of adversarial and transactional exchanges on the ICC’s interventions 
in Uganda and Kenya build on sociological theory of glocalization as ‘the new norm.’ 
For example, Ritzer (2003, 193) posits that glocalization, and comparable concepts 
such as hybridity, is central to how contemporary globalization scholars reflect on 
transnational processes.  
As a starting point, the word glocal is coined by combining global and local 
(Roudemtof 2016a, 1).  Thus, the concept of glocalization has emerged as analytically 
autonomous from globalization, and it should not to be interpreted as glocalism (ibid, 
1). Whereas globalization infers increased interactions across the world (Robertson 
1992, 6), glocalism denotes championing the glocal’s advantaged position over other 
concepts (Roudemtof 2016a, 1). On the contrary, glocalization allows for a “foundation 
to designate a process possessing analytical autonomy vis-a`-vis other related 
concepts” (Roudemtof 2016b, 397). 
For a working definition, Ritzer denotes glocalization as “the interpenetration of the 
global and the local, resulting in unique outcomes in different geographic areas” (2003, 
193). For Roudemtof (2016b, 403), glocalization is “the refraction of globalization 
through the local; resulting in glocality – a blend of the local and the global.” In other 
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words, glocalization systematically produces variations which are constitutive of the 
glocal (ibid, 399).  
Amongst the advantages of glocalization are its emphasis on heterogeneity, which 
considers the power of all global forces in cultural, institutional and economic spheres 
(Ritzer, 2003). In addition, glocalization permits reflections on change across spatial 
spaces without the outcome of total integration (Roudemtof (2016b,401). In this regard, 
the concept of glocalization is useful in the analysis of local-global relationships, as it 
vests power amongst all actors and institutions, as opposed to one-sided relations (ibid, 
401). In short, under glocalization, power relations entail the possibilities of resisting 
globalization (ibid, 401).  
Therefore, the concept of glocalization is definitive of the ICJ movement that involves 
diverse actors and institutions in the moral universe, albeit with diverse power positions 
and convictions. Glocalization thus enables an analysis of power relations in the 
diffusion of ICJ across temporal and spatial terms. Perhaps, in the global norm of ICJ, 
the concept of ‘trials of cooperation’ or ‘virtual trials’ provides the best reference to 
power relations amongst diverse actors and institutions. As Peskin (2009, 660) 
persuasively posited, the idea of ‘trials of cooperation’ can elucidate the nature of 
power struggles outside the courtroom between tribunals and state authorities or actors.   
As other international criminal tribunals, the ICC lacks executive power and a police 
force of its own, which relegates its powers to relying on shaming and soft power to 
persuade state cooperation. For example, during his address to the UN General 
Assembly (UNGA) in 2014, former ICC president, Judge Song (2014, 6), stressed the 
Court’s dependence on cooperation, stating that “the Rome Statute is only as strong as 
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states make it.” Similarly, in her address to the UNGA in October 2017, Song’s 
successor, Judge Silvia Fernández de Gurmendi, noted that none of the Court’s 
activities are possible without the cooperation of states (Gurmendi 2017, 4). 
In contrast to the ICC’s persuasions on cooperation, state actors act on a balance of 
their commitment risks and noncompliance risks: apprehensions around the reach of 
ICJ, and appreciation of international norms. Potentially, these delicate scenarios lead 
to trials of cooperation or virtual trials. An ICC official revealed this dilemma by 
expounding how, given the ICC’s dependence on mature state responsibility, it is 
constrained if political elites orchestrate non-cooperation and there is an absence of UN 
pressure (Interview, The Hague, Netherlands, 22 July 2015). As the official further 
concluded, the “ICC depends on states living to their international responsibilities, an 
equivalence of expecting politicians to prioritize the rule of law as opposed to their 
interests” (ibid).  
Even so, the ICC’s moral standing and shame afflicted on individuals upon indictments 
or non-compliance compels state actors to attempt cooperation. This perhaps explains 
the GoU’s cooperation with the ICC on the LRA trials; long after the country’s 
leadership embarked on public vituperation of the Court to wade off the possibilities 
of the universality of justice.  
Equally, Kenyatta and Ruto complied with Court summonses and attended pre-trials 
and trial briefings at The Hague; despite their orchestration of adversarial exchanges. 
They only skipped the Court’s sessions after seeking approvals and the 2013 
amendments to the rules of evidence and procedure (ICC, 2013). Furthermore, 
Kenyatta premised his compliance with the Court summonses as an avenue for 
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absolving himself from blame and defending Kenya from pre-judgements (PSCU 2013, 
1). Kenyatta also argued that his and Ruto’s voluntary appearance for trials when 
summoned obtained from their belief in the rule of law and international justice (Daily 
Nation, 2015). 
According to a former senior government adviser, Kenyatta pursued the compliance 
strategy even after his election, despite the options of al-Bashir’s open defiance strategy 
(Kagwanja, 2014). According to the former government adviser, a defiance option 
would potentially expose Kenyatta to an arrest warrant and subsequent condemnation 
as a fugitive President, and Kenya’s international isolation as well as economic 
sanctions (ibid,1). 
Notwithstanding their efforts at compliance, the GoU’s and the Jubilee Alliance’s 
translations of the ICC’s interventions were compounded by many other non-
compliance strategies. These comprised Museveni’s decisions to join Africa’s calls for 
withdrawal from the ICC (Makana, 2014), invitation of Sudan’s Bashir to Uganda for 
his 2016 inauguration, failing to arrest him, and lashing at the Court as a “bunch of 
useless people” (see for example Mukiibi et.al., 2016). 
Consequently, the OTP condemned Uganda for non-compliance, and referred the 
matter to ICC’s Pre- Trial Chamber II. In a July 2016 ruling, the Court found that 
“pursuant to article 87(7) of the Statute, Uganda had failed to comply with the request 
for arrest and surrender of al-Bashir and decided that non-compliance be referred to the 
ASP and the UNSC” (ICC 2016, 9). 
Likewise, Uhuruto engaged in many affronts on the ICC despite pledging compliance. 
At the local level, their allies in the National Assembly passed three motions to repeal 
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the International Crimes Act and withdraw Kenya from the ICC (Rugene, 2010; Smith, 
2013; Mathenge, 2016). Their PNU allies in the coalition government also embarked 
on shuttle diplomacy to African states, the UNSC, and Western countries to push for 
deferral of the Kenyan ICC cases, and alternative domestic trials (Standard, 2013). 
Having found no evidence that the Kenyan cases threatened international peace and 
security, the UNSC suggested the country’s options of challenging case admissibility 
under Article 19 of the Rome Statute (UNSC, 2011). Accordingly, the Kenyan 
government challenged admissibility, based on judicial and constitutional reforms, and 
anticipated prosecution of some of the alleged perpetrators of the 2007/2008 PEV (ICC, 
2011). Nonetheless, Pre-trial Chamber II dismissed the admissibility case, as well as 
an appeal in June 2011 (ICC, 2011). 
Some of Uhuruto’s allies claimed that the ICC charges were fixed and based on a witch 
hunt and on compromised witnesses (Citizen TV, 2015). Kenyatta and Ruto also fought 
prominent human rights activists who supported the Court’s processes. Notably was 
the idea of an ‘evil’ civil society in the run-up to the 2013 election,11 and threats to 
change laws regulating the funding of CSOs after the election (FIDH/KHRC, 2016). 
In the Kenyatta and Ruto cases, the OTP often complained about witness intimidation 
and interference, as well as non-cooperation in turning over crucial evidence. In one of 
her statements on the Kenyan cases, Fatou Bensouda decried the state’s failure to 
cooperate with the Court in order to execute her mandate (ICC, 2014b1). Further, 
                                                          
11 Many governance and human rights activist interviewed expressed these 
sentiments.  
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Bensouda identified some of the challenges her office faced as: systematic misleading 
media reports about the Kenya cases; concerted efforts to intimidate and harass 
witnesses, and many instances of exposing some witnesses (ICC 2014b, 1). 
Additionally, Kenya’s defiance continued after the country’s referral to the ASP for 
non-cooperation in September 2016 (ICC, 2016). For example, the then Foreign Affairs 
Minister, Amina Mohammed, declared that Kenya would not accept to be dictated on 
by the ICC that it helped establish (Namunane, 2016). Mohammed went further to state 
that the Court should listen to Kenya in order to enhance its credibility, besides 
pledging to use the ASP to pursue the country’s case (ibid).  
Apart from Uganda’s selectivity and Kenya’s neo-colonial narratives, other deflections 
on the ICC’s interventions in the two countries were more localized and engaged less 
with the Court’s normative imperatives. In turn, the narratives directly confronted the 
ICC’s power position, in addition to reaching a wider audience across the spatial 
hierarchies. So, the narratives accounted for global-local exchanges on the ICC’s 
interventions in Uganda and Kenya, as well as subsequent glocalization of ICJ. 
Hence, the concept of glocalization is adaptable to the GoU’s selectivity and the Jubilee 
Alliance’s neo-colonial narratives, as demonstrations of actor and institutional 
interactions and construction of a complex web of relationships, which result in 
glocality. Therefore, due to glocalization, the exchanges about the moral universe 
committed intended actors to either cooperation or non-cooperation with the ICC, 
which exposed it to the risks of politicization in local spaces.  
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3.3. Transactional exchanges in the Ugandan situation 
Contrary to the concerns of the Rome Statute’s drafters on sovereignty dilemmas, 
Uganda gifted the ICC with its first situation, after triggering Article 14 on the “referral 
by a state party.” As the Court’s first referral by a state party, the country’s decision 
was hailed by an ICC official as “evidence of its faith in the institution” (Gyezaho 2013, 
1). In some quarters, the referral was received as a step in the right direction in the 
global war on impunity for mass atrocities (see for example, Human Rights Watch, 
2004). 
However, many observers argued that by accepting the referral, the ICC was used by 
the GoU to settle domestic political scores (Branch 2007; Peskin, 2009). Moreover, the 
referral attracted sentiments of “a classic free-rider problem or moral hazard,” and the 
ICC’s facilitation of states to abandon their legal responsibilities (Burke-White 2008, 
62). Even so, the GoU’s actions were intentional and targeted at achieving specific 
outcomes. The referral produced a classical example of political translations of 
international norms and their instrumental use in domestic elite level political 
settlements. 
By strategically referring their military/political opponents to the ICC, the GoU 
achieved two critical outcomes: (1) depoliticizing the LRA’s insurgency through 
formalizing the group’s identities as war criminals, and (2) gaining international 
legitimacy as supporters of ICJ. Nevertheless, the two simultaneous results came at a 
cost of selection bias in cooperation. More worryingly, the latter was subject to 
withdrawal in case of the universality of justice or alternatives to the ICC in 
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annihilating the LRA. Yet still, the GoU’s transactional intentions galvanized 
international cooperation in arresting and prosecuting the LRA. 
3.3.1. Options for selection bias and reciprocal cooperation 
Despite the Rome Statute’s conferment of universality of jurisdiction to the ICC, it 
delegates relative power to state authorities, particularly in the self-referral regime. As 
such, the referral provision empowers domestic authorities to shape the contours of 
ICJ. Specifically, Article 14 on “referral of a situation by a state party” calls upon states 
to “specify the relevant circumstances and be accompanied by such supporting 
documentation as is available to the state referring the situation.” However, the 
empowered domestic actors might not necessarily share good faith intentions as the 
ICC’s within their realms.  
Taking notice of their relative power in the Rome Statute, Ugandan authorities opted 
for a selective referral, and not an open one. This signalled their transactional intentions 
with the ICC’s intervention. The most overt demonstration of such motives was the 
joint announcement of the referral at a London press conference by the then ICC 
Prosecutor, Ocampo, and Uganda’s President – Museveni (ICC, 2004b). According to 
a Ugandan human rights activist, the nature of the referral spoke to “politics of the ICC, 
ingenuine quest for justice and the Court’s acceptance of compromise on its part” 
(Interview, Gulu, Uganda, 30 March 2016). More succinctly, Uganda’s former Prime 
Minister, Apolo Nsibambi, articulated the GoU’s transactional intentions by conflating 
the ICC’s trials with military offensives in their collective strategies in defeating the 
LRA (Musoke, 2006). 
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Following the GoU’s script, the ICC’s subsequent investigative steps focused on the 
LRA, despite calls for the universality of justice. Initially, the referral was designated 
as “Situation concerning the LRA,” which negated Ocampo’s assertions of interpreting 
the scope of the referral consistently with the principles of the Rome Statute, and 
analyzing the crimes by whomever committed them (ICC 2004c, 4). 
As further evidence of their transactional intentions, the Ugandan authorities partly 
ceded their primary responsibility in the Statute to the ICC. For example, in the referral 
note, Uganda’s Solicitor General (SG) argued that “they had not conducted and did not 
intend to conduct national proceedings … so that the cases may be dealt with by the 
ICC instead” (ICC 2009, 20). The SG further suggested that despite the wide 
recognition of Uganda’s judiciary for its impartiality and effectiveness, they construed 
the ICC as the most suitable platform for investigating and prosecuting the most 
responsible perpetrators of international crimes committed in the country (ibid, 20). 
Notwithstanding these apparent transactional objectives, the selective referral was 
persuasive, including to the ICC’s judges. The referral pointed to Uganda’s admission 
of inability/unwillingness to prosecute international crimes that were committed within 
its borders. Thus, in the Court’s “Decision on case admissibility,” Pre-Trial chamber II 
cited the Solicitor General’s declarations, observing how, “in the view of Uganda, these 
conditions entailed that none of the conditions of Article 17(1) of the Rome Statute 
applied, and consequently, that such cases were admissible before the ICC” (ICC 2009, 
20).  
In addition, Museveni declared the GoU’s cooperation with the ICC to visiting German 
President, Horst Kohler, in 2008. While assuring Kohler of Uganda’s cooperation, 
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Museveni refuted claims that the LRA cases were obstacles to peace in northern 
Uganda (Wasike 2008, 1). This was against the backdrop of complaints in the north 
that the ICC’s pursuit of the LRA was counterproductive for peace efforts. As 
Museveni retorted, the demurs on the ICC’s interventions were promoted by the LRA 
sympathizers, and that the ICC is a complementary judicial system (ibid). Turning to 
Kohler, Museveni noted that “the ICC is against impunity so am I and I hope so are 
you” (ibid).  
More concretely, after Dominic Ong’wen’s surrender in CAR in 2015, the GoU 
promised full cooperation with the ICC, and asserted their intentions not to save the 
suspect from his predicaments. In this vein, the Attorney General (AG) denied reports 
of the government’s plans to appoint Ong’wen’s defence team and refuted any chances 
of granting him amnesty (Republic of Uganda, 2015a). Further, the AG stated that the 
decision to try Ong’wen at the ICC was convenient and a consensus by all states in 
which Ong’wen allegedly committed atrocities (ibid, 1). 
Moreover, the AG ruled out any chances of amnesty and Acholi traditional justice for 
Ong’wen, on the premise that only non-ICC indictees can be pardoned (ibid). 
According to the AG, amnesty’s constitutionality was still under review in the Supreme 
Court, and it could not stop Ong’wen’s ICC trial (ibid). In addition, the AG observed 
that amnesty could only be invoked after “after Ong’wen’s prosecution in a court of 
law (ibid, 1). 
Conversely, the AG hinted at the government’s intentions to fully cooperate with the 
ICC in Ong’wen’s investigation and prosecution (ibid, 1). According to the AG, the 
prosecution of the LRA’s atrocities was important for Uganda’s progress and 
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subjugation of international crimes (ibid, 1). For his part, Museveni assured Bensouda 
that despite their differences, “they were on the same side” (Republic of Uganda, 
2015b). Additionally, he instructed the AG, SG and the DPP to avail the ICC all 
evidence and pursue cooperation (ibid). In turn, Bensouda welcomed the GoU’s 
cooperation, and appreciated access to senior government officials, including: the DPP, 
SG, ministers, and the parliamentary caucus for northern Uganda and Soroti, as well as 
scenes of LRA atrocities (ibid).  
It could as well be argued that the OTP’s steps in commencing investigations on the 
LRA side was pragmatic, and an efficient strategy in case progression. In view of this 
strategy, the OTP’s initial focus on the LRA would possibly be followed up by closing 
in on the GoU’s side much later on. As a Deputy ICC Prosecutor observed at a CICC 
event, the OTP’s actions could be likened to choosing between “action and paralysis” 
or “pragmatism and ideals,” and that pragmatism ought not to be disparaged (cited in 
Kersten 2013, 1). 
Granted, the OTP’s pragmatic intentions had to carefully navigate the GoU’s strategic 
interests in the referral, which were not necessarily justice concerns. According to a 
former senior NRM official, the state-referral provided latitudes for the authorities to 
be listened to, and their strategic interest was that “Kony was the bad boy, and the state 
are good guys” (Interview, Kampala, Uganda, 16 December 2016). The official further 
revealed that “the government actors could be easily implicated, and hence could not 
accuse themselves by referring an open situation” (ibid). Moreover, the former NRM 
official revealed that the ICC’s precedents could also close on Museveni because of his 
longevity in power, and the possibilities of making mistakes during this time (ibid). 
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This prompted the logic of stopping the ICC ‘monster’ which can encroach on anybody 
(ibid). 
In diminishing the possibilities of the ICC’s universality of justice, Museveni embarked 
on public attacks on the Court from 2013, which he conveniently conflated with Pan 
Africanism. On this note, a Ugandan professor claimed that the ICC is Museveni’s 
friend when it confronts his enemies, but he quickly remembers his African roots when 
it comes to the possibilities of his investigations (Interview, Kampala, Uganda, 13 
January 2016). Towards this end, he suggested, Museveni’s actions befit “an 
inconsistent opportunistic approach to the ICC” (ibid). 
Museveni’s affronts on the ICC also included contemplations on withdrawing the 
GoU’s cooperation altogether, when the LRA’s indictments posed as obstacles to the 
conclusion of the Juba peace talks between 2006 and 2008. A human rights activist 
who participated in the Juba mediation recalled how “Museveni announced publicly 
that he would give Kony amnesty to return and reintegrate” (Interview, Kampala, 
Uganda, 03 February 2016.). Amnesty was to be extended to other senior LRA 
commanders as an incentive for their positive responses during the peace talks. (New 
Vision, 2006). 
Furthermore, Museveni revealed that once amnesty was granted, Uganda would not 
succumb to the international community’s pressure and reverse its decision (ibid). If 
challenged, he claimed, Uganda would make their case at the AU Peace and Security 
Council (ibid). Museveni premised the amnesty alternative on the fact that it was the 
GoU that had requested the ICC’s intervention in the first place (McGreal 2008, 1). 
This argument was reinforced by his assertions that Ugandans had agreed to traditional 
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justice for the LRA, “which is more compensatory than a retributive system” (ibid, 1). 
Consequently, the Ugandan president considered challenging the cases’ admissibility 
by instituting domestic alternatives to the ICC or writing to the UNSC for case deferral 
(Wierda and Otim, 2011). 
Conversely, some international observers contested Museveni’s intentions of 
challenging case admissibility. For instance, Meron (2011, 160) argued that there are 
no provisions for withdrawing a referral in the Rome Statute, and that Museveni’s 
actions could undermine the ICC’s legitimacy and effectiveness as a court of law. 
Meron suggested that the ICC should subject Uganda to an admissibility challenge to 
the highest possible scrutiny (ibid, 161). In so doing, the Court would prevent the risks 
of using the complementarity regime to shield suspected war criminals from real 
accountability. The ICC would also gain its respect as a court of law and evade the 
risks of perceptions of manipulations by Ugandan authorities (ibid, 163). Moreover, 
Meron emphasized that the “interest of justice” standard should be depoliticized, and 
the OTP and judges must adhere to the rule of law and the intentions of the Rome 
Statute in their judgements at all times (ibid, 166).  
3.3.2. ‘Locking in’ international cooperation 
Besides the options for selection bias with state cooperation and vice versa, Ugandan 
authorities also envisaged to galvanize international assistance in apprehending the 
LRA with the referral. On the referral note, the GoU argued that their action was 
motivated by domestic inability to arrest the LRA due to the rebels’ operations from 
South Sudan, which was beyond their judicial reach (ICC 2009, 19). In this regard, 
Nouwen and Werner (2010, 949) rightly posited that the referral was intended to “rally 
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international assistance for the arrest of their military opponents.” This would make the 
ICC succeed “where the GoU had failed.” 
Further evidence that the referral appealed to international assistance in arresting the 
LRA was its conception as a military strategy. It was conceived by the Ministry of 
Defence, with later incorporation of the Ministry of Justice as the lead agency in 
subsequent communications with the ICC (Nouwen, 2013; Nouwen and Werner, 
2010). Additionally, the then Defence Minister, Amama Mbabazi, was at the forefront 
of addressing the National Assembly with regards to the referral (ibid). In one of his 
addresses to parliament, Mbabazi alluded to Uganda’s appeal for international 
assistance, thus: 
How does ICC operate? ... They have the office of the prosecutor; they 
carry out investigations and actually the international community supports 
them. So, should Kony be indicted, and should he be indicted before we 
capture him, who will look for him in order to compel him to appear before 
this committee? It is not Uganda; if they ask us we shall lend a hand, but 
actually it will be international forces (Mbabazi, 2009, cited in Nouwen 
and Werner 2010, 949). 
Despite its transactional nature, the GoU’s selective referral ‘locked in’ the 
international community in a cooperation regime for effective prosecution of the LRA. 
Although selective, the trials were indicative of the ICC’s expressivist function and 
testimony to the aspirations of the international community in constructing a moral 
universe. In this regard, Akhavan (2001, 8) posits that instances of accountability, even 
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if limited and selective, significantly alter the culture of impunity that includes political 
acceptance of rights abuses. 
After the GoU’s referral, the OTP called for international cooperation with Ugandan 
authorities in the pursuit and arrest of the LRA. Ocampo asserted that “a key issue will 
be locating and arresting the LRA leadership, which need the active cooperation of 
states and international institutions in complementing Uganda’s efforts” (ICC 2004b, 
1). 
Subsequently, the EU, as staunch supporters of the ICC, supported the arrest warrans 
and renewed their calls for the prosecution of genocide, crimes against humanity and 
war crimes (EU 2008, 24). The EU also linked the arrest of the LRA leadership to the 
Court’s credibility and replaced criticisms of the GoU’s abuses and failure to address 
the northern humanitarian situation with renewed support (Nouwen and Werner 2010, 
950). 
Also, the calls for international cooperation motivated the motion of other agencies, as 
revealed in the UK House of Lord’s debate on 26th March 2012 (House of Lords, 
2012). When responding to concrete steps the UK was taking on the LRA, the Lord 
Howell of Guildford, and Minister of State, Foreign and Commonwealth Office, 
revealed that the UK, “continued to work with international partners to bring the LRA 
to justice and led on the LRA at the UNSC” (ibid, 1). Besides, the UK “secured the 
council’s presidential statement of November 2011, which tasked the UN to deliver a 
coherent, co-ordinated and results-focused regional strategy to combat the LRA” (ibid, 
1). The Lord Howell of Guildford also acknowledged “that the UK was working 
alongside the UN, AU, EU and the ICC to bring Kony to justice” (ibid). 
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A clear indication of international cooperation was the coordinated efforts by several 
states in Dominic Ong’wen’s transfer to the ICC in 2015. The GoU shows how 
“Ong’wen’s surrender to the Seleka rebels in CAR and subsequent transfer to The 
Hague involved various actors namely: CAR, the USA military, the AU regional 
taskforce and the UPDF” (Republic of Uganda 2015a, 1). According to the Ugandan 
authorities, “the multi-faceted effort to appropriately handle the surrender of Ong’wen 
conferred to it international clout, that requires that the perpetrator be tried by the ICC, 
in which all the actors would have confidence” (ibid, 1). Interestingly, even non-ICC 
members states – the USA and Sudan – cooperated with the GoU and the ICC with 
regard to the LRA. Whereas the USA cooperated in Ong’wen’s transfer to The Hague, 
Sudan signed an agreement on cooperation with the ICC regarding the LRA case 
(Nouwen, 2013). 
Following Ong’wen’s transfer to The Hague, the ICC’s prosecutor appreciated 
international cooperation that the (selective) referral had attracted, and renewed calls 
for more cooperation in arresting other fugitives of justice. Moreover, Bensouda 
posited that Ong’wen’s transfer to the Court’s custody, “sends a firm and unequivocal 
message that no matter how long it will take, the OTP will not stop until the perpetrators 
of the most serious crimes … are prosecuted and face justice for their heinous crimes” 
(ICC 2015b, 1). The OTP “was grateful for the persistent efforts of the GoU, CAR, the 
UPDF, the AU Regional Task Force, and generally, all who had helped realize this 
significant development” (ibid, 1). In addition, Bensouda called on the renewal of 
international efforts in arresting Joseph Kony in order to secure justice for many 
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victims of his alleged atrocities that largely remained unpunished for several years 
(ibid, 1). 
Evidently, the GoU’s intentions with the ICC’s intervention were transactional. This 
was demonstrated in the nature of the referral, reciprocal cooperation with selection 
bias, and options to withdraw cooperation in the event of the universality of justice or 
alternatives to the ICC in ending the northern conflict. Nevertheless, the transactional 
intentions invited international cooperation in the LRA’s arrests and prosecution. 
Unlike their Ugandan counterparts, Kenyatta and Ruto were directly affected by the 
ICC’s intervention in Kenya’s 2007/2008 PEV. Thus, Uhuruto’s circumstances 
motivated their adversarial exchanges with the neo-colonial narrative, which gained 
traction in national and regional spaces, and international recognition.    
3.4. Adversarial exchanges in the Kenyan situation 
The Jubilee Alliance’s adversarial exchanges on the ICC’s intervention in Kenya was 
a culmination of Kenyatta and Ruto’s endeavours to evade criminal accountability for 
the 2007/2008 PEV. Under these intentions, the two political elites were determined to 
reverse the country to the status quo, where Kenyans ‘forgot’ and ‘moved on,’ as was 
publicly the case with the election-related violence in 1991, 1992, 1997, 2002 and 
2005.  
Nevertheless, Kenyatta and Ruto had to contend with the relative force of the ICC, 
whose entry into the country altered local power dynamics and the nature of the 
country’s post-conflict transition. Consequently, the contrasting paradigms – of 
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Uhuruto’s determination at self-preservation, and the ICC’s confrontations with 
impunity for international crimes – set the two parties on a collision path. 
With the neo-colonial narrative, however, Kenyatta, Ruto and their allies in the Jubilee 
Alliance posed significant challenge to the ICC’s moral authority and placement of 
international law at the centre of conflict resolution. Using the narrative, the political 
elites set the ICC against collective communal, national and regional interests, which 
asserted their relative power vis. a. vis the Court’s. As a result, the narrative pronounced 
local autonomy from the international realm; besides courting regional solidarity and 
non-cooperation with the ICC. On regional solidarity, the narrative spoke to claims of 
Africa’s peripheral location in the global political economy, which called for African 
protectionism and non–cooperation on Kenyatta and Ruto’s cases.  
3.4.1. Departing from the international to the local 
By translating the ICC’s intervention as neo-colonial, Kenyatta and Ruto departed from 
internationalism, and instead shifted to local agency in addressing the 2007/2008 
violations. The reinterpretation of the ICC as ‘foreign’ or ‘Western,’ as opposed to an 
ICJ mechanism that was agreed on by several states, found resonance with a significant 
majority of Uhuruto’s core support base. In turn, the neo-colonial translations negated 
Kenya’s ownership of the Court despite the country’s critical role in its formation. 
Admittedly, Kenya played an active role in the formulation of the Rome Statute at the 
UN’s Diplomatic Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment of an ICC in 
1998. As already revealed in Chapter 1, Kenya was among the states which assumed 
the vice-presidency position at the Rome Conference that was attended by many 
government officials and diplomats (Shiundu, 2013a). Besides, the Kenyan delegation 
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registered their willingness to agree with the majority decisions, regardless of their 
reservations on the proposed OTP’s prosecutorial discretions (ibid, 1). Kenya’s fears 
were informed by envisaged pressures that might be exerted on the OTP to act or not 
to act, to the detriment of requirements for the office’s independence (ibid).  
Setting aside Kenya’s ownership of the ICC, Kenyatta and Ruto regularly conflated the 
Court’s intervention with neo-colonial intentions.  In this vein, they invented spaces 
under which they challenged the Court’s normative imperatives and moral authority. 
Emphasizing local agency in providing redress to the 2007/2008 PEV for which they 
were accused, they articulated the everyday political economy of the Kikuyu and 
Kalenjin communities, which they juxtaposed with propositions for inter-communal 
dialogues and overcoming collective community threats, notably the ICC and its 
domestic supporters. 
Conversely, the ICC was at a disadvantaged power position in responding to elastic 
local dynamics. This obtained from the Court’s: (1) adherence to legality as stipulated 
in the Statute, (2) relative distance from sub-national and national spaces, (3) and the 
incapacity of the outreach office to respond to adept political actors. In the end, the 
Jubilee Alliance’s departure from internationalism to the local provided avenues for 
maximizing their power (vis-à-vis the ICC’s) where it resided – in national and sub-
national spaces. 
Indeed, and as it has already been argued, the local focus naturally contrasts 
internationalism, given its promotion of the distinction between the ‘inside’ and the 
‘outside’ in competition for political authority and legitimacy (Stahn 2015, 246). 
Turning to the local also comes with the benefits of appropriating domestic 
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experiences, narratives, empathy and perspectives of international action, and utilizing 
them to assess institutional legitimacy (ibid, 48). In this vein, the ICC is susceptible to 
some of the predicaments that other liberal and emancipatory projects encounter in 
their activities in local realms (ibid, 50). 
Discernibly, the Jubilee Alliance’s vantage power position against the ICC obtained 
from a clash of paradigms: delocalization versus localization. Whereas the ICC de-
localized the 2007/2008 PEV as serious atrocities that were to be prosecuted under 
international law, the Jubilee Alliance localized the events as socio-political issues that 
were best addressed by the directly affected parties. In other words, the ICC’s labels of 
crimes against humanity that Kenyatta and Ruto were accused of contradicted local 
explanations of the PEV under the lenses of everyday societal tensions afflicting the 
concerned parties.  
Within the localization lens, the Jubilee Alliance challenged the ICC’s 
individualization of guilt by apportioning blame to Kenyatta and Ruto. The Alliance 
wondered why the Court did not indict Kibaki and Odinga – the frontrunners of the 
2007 presidential race and protagonists of the violence. As Lynch (2014, 105) revealed, 
there were questions on the ICC’s focus on Kenyatta and Ruto as the most responsible 
perpetrators, given that they did not contest for the presidency in 2007. In turn, the 
Jubilee Alliance argued that by not targeting leaders from other communities (Luo and 
Luhyia), the ICC was against collective Kikuyu and Kalenjin interests, and conflated 
the omissions with plots to undermine Odinga’s political opponents.  
Turning to the utility of their alliance, Kenyatta and Ruto positioned themselves as 
uniquely placed to bridge the social tensions amongst antagonistic Kikuyu and Kalenjin 
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communities, which culminated in the 2007/2008 PEV. Significantly, their suggestions 
found resonance to a significant number of their co-ethnics. Thus, they sold a 
compelling story of how their unity presented an opportunity for peace and 
reconciliation (Waweru 2012, 1). The Jubilee Alliance’s peace message was expressed 
across several platforms, namely: political/prayer rallies, TV talk shows, vernacular 
radio stations, and informal networks across many sub-national spaces. 
For instance, during an April 2011 prayer rally ahead of Kenyatta’s and Ruto’s visits 
to The Hague, they said that they promised to consolidate their unity in advocating for 
peace in the in the Rift Valley (Ngirachu and Musembi 2011, 1). Speaking at the rally, 
Kenyatta declared his belief in the unfolding unity that would be instrumental in 
reaching out to others and develop the country (ibid, 1). For his part, Ruto 
acknowledged that Kenya has several challenges which needed to be addressed in order 
to deter fighting in the future (ibid). Another speaker at the rally regretted that peace 
would be elusive in the country in case Kenyatta and Ruto would be shipped to a 
foreign land (ibid, 1). 
Joining Kenyatta and Ruto’s peace caravan were prominent politicians and some 
religious leaders from their respective communities. For instance, a Kalenjin MP 
praised the Jubilee Alliance for contributing toward peace, while his Kikuyu 
counterpart argued that the masses would welcome their leaders’ unity pact (Sigei 
2011, 1). Likewise, an influential Catholic Bishop noted that “the politicians would 
speed up the cohesion they had been building” (ibid, 1). Although the Bishop 
acknowledged the fluidity of peace in the Rift Valley, he was confident in non-
repetition of the violence with Kenyatta’s and Ruto’s decision to work together (ibid, 
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1). A Kikuyu clergy also noted how, “there was a very good chance for peace … the 
alliance was going a long way to cement good neighbourliness among the villagers 
from the two communities” (ibid, 1). 
Closely linked to the religious leaders’ association with the Jubilee Alliance’s peace 
messages was a neo-Pentecostal discourse, which the former reinforced, and the latter 
tapped into. A Rift Valley based peace activist who doubles up as a religious leader 
revealed that they endorsed the Jubilee Alliance’s resort to God’s intervention for the 
peaceful co-existence of previously antagonistic communties (Interview, Nakuru, 
Kenya, 02 November 2015). According to him, it was a window of opportunity to 
address societal mistrusts, in addition to serving as evidence of the utility of religious 
interventions in difficult times (ibid). From this viewpoint, discrediting the ICC’s 
prayer rallies was not a necessity if they were at the forefront of bringing together 
warring communities (ibid). Building on the neo-Pentecostal or born-again discourse, 
the Alliance propagated narratives in which Kenya was under redemption of past 
transgressions, being born again, which also manifested Kenyans’ wishes to overcome 
the tragedy of the 2007/2008 events (Deacon 2015, 200). 
Given the Jubilee Alliance’s proclamations of restoring relations between the Kikuyu 
and Kalenjin, its failure was associated with conflict risks.  Towards the 2013 elections, 
there were apprehensions that in case the collapse of the Alliance would reinvigorate 
the narratives of differences between the communties, and lead to new waves of 
violence (Lynch 2014a, 100). As a result, the majority of the Kikuyu and Kalenjin were 
determined to make the Jubilee Alliance hold, which included electing Kenyatta and 
Ruto into office despite their ongoing ICC cases. 
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Therefore, a common thread among the majority Kikuyu and Kalenjin was the 
suggestion that since they had opted for peace and reconciliation, they should be left 
alone to ‘forget’ and ‘move on.’ In this vein, a Kikuyu youth narrated how the 
community had ‘forgotten,’ desired peace and were bearing with impunity because 
they wanted the Alliance to stand (Interview, Kiambu, Kenya, 30 November 2015). 
For a Kalenjin politician, “the communities came together because they easily forgave, 
listened to elders, accepted and moved on” (Interview, Nairobi, Kenya, 15 October 
2015). 
To a significant number of the Kikuyu and Kalenjin, the ICC’s continued prosecutions 
of Kenyatta and Ruto was counter-productive for peace.  In this strand of narrative, 
there were arguments that the Court’s prosecutions threatened the ideals of the new 
constitution, and the country’s territorial integrity and stability. For instance, a Jubilee 
Alliance supporter proclaimed how the ICC posed a greater threat to the country’s 
sovereignty and peace that than “the horrifying trinity of the Al-Shabaab terrorists, the 
cattle rustlers of the north Rift and poisonous second-generation brews” (Kagwanja 
2015a, 1) 
Perhaps, finding a silver lining after Kenyatta and Ruto’s electoral success despite their 
ICC predicaments, Ocampo took notice of their utility of peace messages. During an 
interview with Radio Netherlands, Ocampo talked of Uhuruto’s alliance as a 
representation of their communities’ reconciliation processes (Ocampo, 2014). 
Ocampo also lamented at the silence of the Jubilee Alliance’s foremost rivals in the 
elections on the PEV or the ICC (ibid). According to Ocampo, Kenyatta and Ruto were 
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elected in 2013 due to their unrivalled address to very pertinent issues for Kenyans 
(ibid).  
With the Jubilee Alliance’s intensification of the logic that the ICC trials were at the 
behest of external interests and their domestic sympathizers, they solidified their 
domestic local bases. Thus, for the majority of their supporters, the neo-colonial 
narrative deflected the ICC’s retribution as a remedial action for the 2007/2008 PEV. 
Besides, the AU and other individual African countries were also supportive of the 
Jubilee Alliance’s neo-colonial connotations of the ICC.  
3.4.2. ‘Bringing Africa in’ 
In addition to its domestic consequences, the neo-colonial narrative courted the AU’s 
and some individual African leaders’ solidarity with the Kenyan ICC cases. In so doing, 
the narrative Africanized Kenyatta and Ruto’s predicaments, thus elevating their battles 
with the Court to the regional platform. 
Explaining their turn to Africanization, a Jubilee Alliance activist argued that “the ICC 
is a big giant which they could not confront on their own and hence the need to get the 
help of African leaders” (Interview, Nairobi, Kenya, 25 September 2015). ‘Bringing 
Africa in’ was also informed by the little success of the worldwide shuttle diplomacy 
on the cases’ deferral, which went hand-in-hand with an increased focus on African 
allies where more progress was made. 
With imminent trials at The Hague, Kenyatta influenced the convening of an 
Extraordinary Session of the Assembly of the AU in October 2013. At the session, 
Kenyatta invoked the Pan-African spirit of solidarity, before proceeding to conflate the 
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ICC’s forays on the continent with neo-colonialism (PSCU, 2013). In a passionate and 
emotive speech, Kenyatta talked about African renaissance, and the Court’s intrusion 
in the continent at the instruction of former colonial powers (ibid).  Kenyatta lamented 
at the ICC’s focus on African cases despite the commission of international crimes in 
other regional spaces (ibid, 4). Imploring African solidarity on his and Ruto’s ICC 
cases, Kenyatta noted that:  
Kenya looks to her friends in time of need. We come to you to vindicate 
our independence and sovereignty … This is the forum for us to unite and 
categorically vindicate our sovereignty ... I have utmost confidence that 
this Assembly’s voice will be clear to the entire world. (PSCU 2013, 4) 
Consequently, the neo-colonial accusations compelled African solidarity on the 
Kenyan cases, as they reinvigorated claims of the continent’s peripheral location in the 
global political economy. Collective action was therefore envisaged to provide the 
impetus to African protectionism, and assertions of the continent’s relative power in 
the global order. 
Earlier on, Kwame Nkrumah, an AU founding member, and former Ghanaian 
president, had cautioned Africans about the dangers of neo-colonialism. Hence, the 
connotation of the ICC with neo-colonialism brought to the fore Nkrumah’s (1965, 1) 
description of neo-colonialism as “the last stage of imperialism, and perhaps its most 
dangerous stage.” According to Nkrumah, neo-colonialism is underpinned by 
theoretical assumptions of states’ independence and “outward trappings of 
international sovereignty;” as well as outside economic and political directions (ibid, 
1). In this light, the ICC’s reintroduction of neo-colonialism would negate Africans’ 
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statuses as independent, and increased feelings of human indignity that pervaded the 
colonial era. 
In perspective, the neo-colonial narrative proclaimed an anti-ICC logic, with 
undertones of the Court’s manipulation by the West and distance from Africa. The 
narrative befitted the belief that the ICC was embedded in geo-political contests for 
hegemony as manifested in the West’s imposition of its justice on others (Kagwanja 
2015b, 144-145). Seen from this angle, the ICC was to be understood as a “toy of 
declining imperial powers” and an instrument of advancing Western hegemony (PSCU 
2013, 3-4).  
Furthermore, African criticisms of the ICC conceived the continent as a site for 
experimenting with Western neo-liberalism. Undeniably, it is only in Africa where the 
ICC has intervened under all its three trigger mechanisms, despite the evidence of other 
global conflicts. As Mutua (2016, 49) opines, the ICC’s focus in Africa fed into 
perceptions of the continent’s depiction as “a tabula rasa or a blank slate on which” to 
inscribe Western logic and institutional models (Mutua 2016, 49). Similarly, Kenyatta 
decried how the Court’s focus alluded to Africa as a “third-rate territory of second-
class peoples,” and Africans as “a project, or experiment of outsiders” (PSCU 2013, 
4). 
Echoing Kenyatta’s sentiments, the then Kenya’s Ambassador to the UN, Macharia 
Kamau, warned of the dangers of drawing binaries between perceived owners and 
proponents of the ICC, and subjects to which the Court was created (Kamau 2016, 3). 
Additionally, a senior government official took reference of Judge Kaul’s dissenting 
opinion on the Kenyan cases to question the ICC’s motion in the country, unlike other 
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countries with more gravity (Interview, Nairobi, Kenya, 21 November 2015). 
Likewise, a Kenyatta supporter questioned “Ocampo’s enthusiasm and zeal to malice 
Kenya as an example, which only exhibited his sectarian interests” (Matsanga 2012, 
1). The Kenyan cases were also attributed to judicial activism, in the OTP’s 
determination to use the country for institutional legitimation (Kagwanja 2015b, 151). 
Regionally, there were arguments of how the Kenyan cases were indicative of global 
imperialism in a broader game of embarrassing African political leaders, as their 
resources are exploited (Yeebo 2012, 1). So, in salvaging Africa’s sovereignty and 
dignity, the AU took notice of the Kenyan ICC predicament. The regional body adopted 
a more assertive and collective voice in its dealings with the Court, especially on 
Kenyatta’s and Ruto’s cases. 
3.4.2.1. Renewing African protectionism 
African protectionism resulted in the mantras of African solutions for African 
problems, which encompassed the AU’s policy positions on non-cooperation with the 
ICC regarding Kenyatta’s and Ruto’s cases. In a 2013 address to the UN General 
Assembly regarding Uhuruto’s trials, Museveni decried their ICC’s mishandling and 
reminded the international community about one of the de-colonization slogans of 
“Africa for the Africans” (Museveni 2013, 1). Further, the Ugandan president reminded 
the Assembly of African patriotic forces’ intentions of acting accordingly against 
hegemonism (ibid). 
Museveni’s sentiments were shared by several African leaders as revealed in their 
almost unanimous declarations and decisions on non-cooperation with the ICC. At the 
height of the 2013 summit, the then AU chairman, Hailemariam Desalegn, lamented 
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the ICC’s degeneration into “some kind of race hunting’ despite its initial motives of 
fighting impunity (cited in Daily Nation 2013b, 1). Desalegn’s choice of the phrase 
“hunting Africans” was evocative – it brought to the fore some of the horrors and 
images of the West’s subjugation of Africans (Mutua 2016, 48). It was therefore 
ironical that the ICC was accused of committing some of the unspeakable crimes it was 
created to deal with (ibid). 
More assertively, the AU reiterated its reservations on the ICC’s politicization and the 
skewed indictment of African leaders, and the continued trials of Kenya’s sitting 
President and his Deputy (AU 2013, 2). Consequently, the AU decided that Kenyatta 
and Ruto’s charges should be terminated until the end of their term in office, and that 
the UNSC should listen to AU’s demands (ibid). The regional body also reaffirmed its 
earlier decisions on Sudan and asserted that no sitting AU head of state would be 
subjected to any international court or tribunal, in order to “safeguard the constitutional 
order, stability and, integrity of Member States” (ibid).  
Although the AU policy positions were unsuccessful in case terminations, regional 
solidarity helped to moderate the ICC’s dealings in respect of the Kenyan charges. As 
a journalist who followed the Kenyan cases revealed, the ICC was restive during the 
2013 AU summit, and the Court’s registrar requested Africa against taking any drastic 
decisions, but raise their concerns during the next ASP meeting (Menya 2016,1) 
Furthermore, at an ASP meeting in 2013, the AU succeeded in pushing through 
amendments to the Rome Statute’s rules of evidence and procedure. The amendments 
allowed Kenyatta and Ruto to be excused from continuous appearance at the ICC due 
to their state responsibilities (ICC, 2013). Regional solidarity also enabled Kenyatta 
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and Ruto to effectively resist the OTP’s attempts to use the amended Rule 68, which 
allowed admission of recanted evidence in cases of witness interference, in Ruto and 
Sang’s case (Obala, 2015; Makana, 2015). 
Moreover, the AU adopted Kenya’s proposal for Africa’s collective withdrawal from 
the ICC. While campaigning for the proposal, Kenyatta called upon Africa to send a 
powerful message in defiance to a system that disregards sovereignty and African 
dignity (PSCU 2016a, 1). However, as a Jubilee Alliance insider revealed that 
“somethings are done for the moment and Kenya was not keen on leaving the ICC” 
(Interview, Nairobi, Kenya, 9 February 2016). He believed that the AU posturing on 
Africa’s mass withdrawal was more about influencing decisions (ibid). 
Despite a commanding majority in the National Assembly and control of government, 
the Jubilee Alliance did not follow proactive steps to withdraw Kenya from the ICC 
despite its perceived neo-colonial agenda. Probed on withdrawal, Kenya’s Foreign 
Affairs Minister denied any intentions of leaving the ICC, but reforming it (Ilado, 
2016). The minister also observed that the ICC is a “Kenyan Court and treats its as 
such” (cited in Sanchiz, 2015). Similarly, on numerous occasions, Kenyatta has called 
for the ICC’s reform, and refrained from calling for Africa’s withdrawal from the Court 
(Anderson and Smith, 2016).  
After Sang and Ruto’s cases were terminated in April 2016, marking the final collapse 
of all the ‘Ocampo Six’ cases, Kenyatta thanked the AU for its solidarity in the Kenyan 
cases (PSCU 2016b, 1). According to Kenyatta, the country’s success with the ICC 
cases was due to the “strong position taken by the AU and its member states” (ibid, 1). 
Kenyatta also said that the country would “continue partnering with other countries in 
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the continent to achieve Africa’s agenda” (ibid, 1). As he concluded, unity of purpose 
and a Pan- African spirit would champion the continent’s interests within the global 
power system (ibid, 1).  
The chairman of the Defence and Foreign Affairs Committee in parliament, Ndung’u 
Gethenji, remarked that “Kenyatta celebrated the 2013 election as a moment where the 
Kenyan people had stood up to foreign interference, rekindled the Pan-African spirit 
and reconceptualised African solidarity” (Gethenji 2016, 1). In his view, Kenyatta’s 
approach paid dividends in the face of the worries that the ICC cases presented, such 
as international isolation.  Gethenji concluded that under similar circumstances, “most 
African presidents getting into power would have grovelled at the feet of the 
international community and begged to be accepted into the community of world 
leaders” (ibid).  
In sum, the Jubilee Alliance’s pragmatic politicization of the ICC’s intervention 
enabled them to overcome the Court’s moral agency in local spaces, besides evading 
its reach by turning to regional solidarity. With regards to the latter outcome, the 
Alliance reduced non-compliance risks as the AU’s collective actions moderated the 
Court’s actions on Kenyatta’s and Ruto’s cases.   
3.5. Conclusion 
 It is thus clear that domestic political elites’ translations of international criminal 
interventions in their realms condition the shape of other actors and institutions’ uptake 
in diverse spaces. More worrying is the political elites’ orchestration of transactional 
and adversarial exchanges on the ICC’s interventions. This is instructive of the 
phenomena of glocalization of ICJ, which results in the blend of local and global 
139 
 
perspectives, with unique outcomes as demonstrated by the Ugandan and Kenyan 
cases.  
As the chapter has illustrated, the GoU’s orchestration of transactional exchanges 
culminated in the ICC’s selective focus on the LRA. This resulted in the options of 
selection bias with conditional cooperation on the ICC’s universality of justice or 
alternatives to the Court in annihilating the LRA. In a similar vein, the Jubilee 
Alliance’s adversarial exchanges with the neo-colonial narratives had multiple 
outcomes: shifting attention from the ICC’s utility to local agency in addressing the 
2007/2008 PEV, questioning the Court’s frames of justice, and courting regional 
solidarity as an impetus for protectionism.  
Notwithstanding the GoU’s and the Jubilee Alliance’s orchestration of transactional 
and adversarial exchanges on the ICC’s interventions, local spaces are contested 
sovereignties in which there are constant struggles over international intrusion. The 
next chapter explores the phenomena of domestic normative contestations over ICJ, 
and the salience of the narratives as a continuation of glocalization. 
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Chapter 4 
Overcoming domestic normative contestations over international criminal 
justice 
Within Uganda’s and Kenya’s domestic realms, there were robust normative 
contestations over the ICC’s intervention, that were similarly overcome by the GoU’s 
selective referral and the Jubilee Alliance’s neo-colonial framing. In other words, a 
combination of competing conflict narratives and the existence of multiple actors and 
institutions implied that besides the GoU and the Jubilee Alliance, other actors and 
institutions equally contested domestic uptake of ICJ. Some other interested parties that 
were directly involved with the ICC’s interventions in the two countries were: victims, 
affected communities, governance and human rights activists, religious groups, 
representatives of international NGOs, Western diplomats, and government officials. 
Whereas calls for the universality of justice presupposed a balance of power between 
the LRA and the GoU, the former’s referral to the ICC unsettled the relative power 
equilibrium that existed between the two antagonistic parties. After the referral, the 
LRA was disempowered with the ICC’s stigma, as the GoU was empowered as an actor 
whose cooperation was expected in the moral universe. Furthermore, the site of 
domestic normative contestation over ICJ was shifted to the LRA, given the ICC’s 
subsequent focus. 
In a similar vein, the Jubilee Alliance’s neo-colonial narrative alienated the ICC and its 
sympathizers from the Alliance’s domestic support base. In so doing, the narrative 
persuaded targeted local constituencies to elect the Jubilee Alliance while 
delegitimizing the ICC. The narrative also gained concessions from some of the Court’s 
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supporters, such as the Jubilee Alliance’s main political opponents in the Coalition for 
Reforms and Democracy (CORD), Western diplomats as well as governance and 
human rights activists. 
This chapter discusses the salience of the narratives in overcoming domestic normative 
contestations over ICJ to further attest to the critical challenges they pose to the ICC’s 
moral authority. In this regard, the narratives are indicative of subtle and sophisticated 
ways under which the Court is undermined in domestic spaces by some of the political 
elites. 
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. The next part sets the scene on 
domestic normative contestations over ICJ in Uganda and Kenya. It discusses the array 
of actors and institutions that either supported or opposed the ICC’s interventions, as 
well as competing conflict narratives amongst antagonistic parties to the conflicts.  The 
chapter then turns to the salience of the GoU’s selective referral and the Jubilee 
Alliance’s neo-colonial narratives in overcoming domestic normative contestations 
over the ICC’s interventions. The chapter then concludes with a brief summary of the 
foregoing discussions, and also draws some implications of the narratives for long-term 
peace-building in national and regional spaces.  
4.1. Domestic normative contestations over international criminal justice 
During the course of Uganda’s northern conflict and Kenya’s 2007/2008 PEV, and the 
ICC’s subsequent interventions, several actors and institutions negotiated, contested 
and departed on mechanisms of transition to long-term peace. This was because of 
varying worldviews and competing conflict narratives amongst a multiplicity of actors 
and their supporters. The plethora of actors and institutions that were involved in 
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domestic discourses on the ICC’s involvement included: governance and human rights 
activists, religious groups, victims, government officials, Western diplomats, political 
elites, and representatives of INGOs. 
For the Ugandan situation, contestations on the ICC’s intervention followed the 
conflicting and competing conflict narratives amongst the NRM regime, the LRA and 
their respective support bases. Thus, there were differences of opinions on whether the 
ICC should intervene in the conflict, and if so, who was to be held accountable for the 
atrocities. 
Similarly, in the Kenyan situation, the majority of the Kikuyu and Kalenjin – 
Kenyatta’s and Ruto’s co-ethnics – differed in their explanations for the 2007/2008 
PEV and responsibility for the violence. Moreover, the ICC was supported by the 
Jubilee Alliance’s main opponents in CORD, and many of their supporters, who 
predominately hailed from the Luo, Luhyia, Kisii and coastal communities. Some other 
proponents of the ICC included Western diplomats as well as many governance and 
human rights activists.  
4.1.1.  Questions on the International Criminal Court’s intervention in Uganda 
The ICC’s involvement in Uganda coincided with ongoing local efforts to end the 
northern conflict via several peace initiatives. Spearheaded by Acholi religious and 
cultural leaders, the peace mechanisms (amnesty, traditional justice and mediation) 
roped in many northern based civil society organizations (CSOs), the GoU and the 
international community. 
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For example, the amnesty process was not only supported in the north, but it also 
attracted funding from the AU, the World Bank and the United Nations Development 
Program (UNDP) (Amnesty Commission 2013, 14). Similarly, the Juba peace process 
was supported by the USA, UK and the UN, and regional actors, such as South Sudan 
and the AU (Hendrickson and Tumutegyereize, 2012).  
Significantly, the peace efforts contributed to de-escalation of the conflict, as a large 
number of LRA combatants took advantage of amnesty proposals, traditional justice 
and peace talks to return home and rebuild their lives. In addition, the ongoing peace 
talks in Juba between the GoU and the LRA delegation led to relative calm, as dialogue 
minimized incentives for militarism. 
More importantly, the Juba recommendations of traditional justice in Uganda’s TJ 
trajectory reinforced the utility of such mechanisms in contributing to peace. Several 
forms of traditional justice among northerners, namely: Ailuc (Iteso), Culo Kwor 
(Acholi and Lan’gi), Kayo Cuk (Langi), Tonu ci Koka (Madi) and Mato Oput (Acholi) 
were defined and designated as integral parts of accountability and reconciliation 
(Republic of Uganda, 2007a). The various traditional rituals are performed to reconcile 
formerly warring parties, after exhausting options for accountability (ibid, 2).  
The inclusion of various forms of traditional in the final peace settlement instilled in 
them relative authority and legitimacy in nurturing Uganda’s post-conflict transition. 
In contrast, the ICC’s entry into the fray was a formidable challenge to the utility and 
recognition of local mechanisms that had been tried and tested over times. Hence, to a 
significant number of Ugandans, especially in the north, local dynamics predisposed 
the ICC’s intervention as an unnecessary disruption of ongoing peace-building efforts. 
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As a senior official of the Kampala based Refugee Law Project (RLP) summarised, the 
ICC’s entry in Uganda halted vibrant local TJ processes that were ongoing, given that 
substantial resources and attention shifted to prosecutorial mechanisms (Interview, 
Kampala, Uganda, 27 January 2016). Moreover, as he alluded, before the ICC’s 
intervention, an Amnesty Act and traditional leaders “were at the centre of everything” 
(ibid).  
According to Acholi religious and cultural leaders, the ICC’s intervention was a 
worrying concern. As a religious leader narrated, their stand was that the arrests should 
be postponed, and it was unwise to arrest Kony and others, owing to their prominent 
roles in the Juba peace mediation (Interview, Gulu, Uganda, 30 March 2016). Similar 
concerns were shared by an Acholi cultural leader, with arguments that the ICC’s 
intervention prolonged the conflict due to Kony’s fears of arrest, continued stay in the 
bush and commission of atrocities (Interview, Gulu, Uganda, 21 March 2016). Thus, 
he posed: “We challenge it [ICC]. If you talk about arrest, you should arrest him. What 
is the use of the law? If it does not work, it becomes no law. It was not timely” (ibid).  
For the Acholi religious and cultural leaders, the ICC’s intervention undermined the 
mix of ideas and strategies they had proposed and enacted over the years, which 
significantly contributed towards relative peace in the north (Interview, Acholi 
religious and cultural leaders, Gulu, Uganda, 21- 30 March, 2016). Indeed, as a result 
of their efforts, many LRA combatants abandoned rebellion and returned home (ibid). 
It was also their pressure and diplomacy that persuaded the GoU to agree to the 
mediation process in Juba between 2006 and 2008 (ibid). 
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Collectively, under the Acholi Religious Leaders Peace Initiative (ARPI), the clergy’s 
stand was slowing the ICC’s intervention, and if possible, postponing the idea of 
indicting the LRA (Interview, Acholi religious leader, Gulu, Uganda, 30 March 2016). 
According to them, the LRA were key parties in the peace negotiation, and their arrest 
would kill the talks (ibid). Consequently, they rejected the path of accountability and 
justice (ibid).  
Some local CSOs and pressure groups also questioned the timing of the ICC’s process. 
For instance, Refugee Law Project commended the ICC’s investigation, but questioned 
the wisdom of intervening in an ongoing conflict (RLP 2014,1). The organization’s 
judgement was premised on the belief that the Court’s intervention would motivate the   
LRA to continue the cycles of violence and human rights violations (ibid). In addition, 
RLP was concerned about the feasibility of peaceful resolutions to the conflict with 
active arrest warrants against the insurgents (ibid).  
Apart from the timing of investigations, the ICC was also confronted with questions on 
who bore the greatest responsibility for the violence. These stemmed from competing 
conflict narratives between the GoU and the LRA, and their respective support bases. 
Concurring with these contestations, a prominent human rights activist observed how 
“there is no one or two causes of the conflict, but multiple factors based on history, 
perceptions and real things that happened” (Interview, Kampala, Uganda, 3 February 
2016). Overall, the competing narratives revolve between the extremes of the LRA’s 
description as a ruthless religious and criminal organization, or revolutionary forces in 
defence of northern Ugandans that suffered Museveni’s wars and marginalization 
(Hendrickson and Tumutegyereize 2012, 12).  
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As the northern conflict unfolded, it elicited extreme views in the Ugandan society, 
along the fault lines of the regime and the insurgents’ core sympathizers. To illustrate, 
a government official averred that “there is no solid premise apart from the fact that 
one group – the LRA – desired to take state power, to address supposedly imbalances 
and governance questions” (Interview, Kampala, Uganda, 03 February 2016). 
According to him, “there was no scenario of the NRA’s demonstration of bias against 
ethnic groups” to give them credence for rebellion, but concerted efforts to put away 
the new government before it consolidated power (ibid). Consequently, he concluded 
that “two forces arose: a government with values on the one hand, and rebels on the 
other” (ibid).  
With regards to accusations of the government’s complicity in committing atrocities in 
IDP camps, the government official wondered how they sought to protect people, but 
at the same time, they were accused of harming them (ibid). These claims were 
corroborated by a senior UPDF official, who noted that the LRA got access to some of 
their uniforms and committed atrocities while disguised as government soldiers, such 
as the Barlonyo IDP camp attacks in February 2004 that led to approximately 200 
civilian deaths. As a former senior NRM official, opined, the UPDF was fighting 
insurgents, and therefore cannot be accused unless there is evidence that they 
committed crimes (Interview, Kampala, Uganda, 16 December 2015). Another 
government official argued that the conflict was politically motivated to capture power 
through violence, and there is no evidence on alleged regime marginalization, as the 
north has enjoyed power more than any other region (Interview, Kampala, Uganda, 4 
February 2016). 
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Departing from the regime’s narrations, the majority of the Acholi believed that the 
conflict’s genesis was the NRM’s provocation and persecution of former Acholi 
soldiers. This, according to them, informed the regime’s responsibility for the ensuing 
atrocities. According to many Acholi, the LRA insurgency was also exacerbated by 
perceived marginalization of the north and militarization of the Acholi economy. In 
this regard, an Acholi elder suggested that the LRA original founders were blessed by 
some Acholi elders from the Payera and Palabek clans to fight the north’s repression 
(Interview, Gulu, Uganda, 25 March 2016).  
Given the accounts of the regime’s repressions in the north, the LRA attracted 
considerable support from some sections of the population. As an Acholi academic 
posed, “people were caught between a rock and a hard place, the UPDF put them in 
camps, so people died there. Which was the bigger evil to people on the ground?” 
(Interview, Kampala, Uganda, 13 January 2016). 
An Acholi elder posited that the occurrences in the north took a shift towards proxy 
wars between Uganda and Sudan, and hence extended beyond the concerns of local 
interests and issues (Interview, Gulu, Uganda, 21 March 2016). These perceptions 
about the conflict’s external participants fitted with the majority of the Acholi’s 
convictions of provocations with the violence, and consequent non-responsibility for 
its unfortunate repercussions.   
Within the logic of the violence’s rationalization amongst the majority of the Acholi, 
the amnesty path was a natural choice, as opposed to criminal accountability. Further, 
as they suggested, any deliberations on pursuing criminal justice were to be predicated 
on focusing on both sides to the conflict – the GoU and the LRA (Interview, Acholi 
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elders, Gulu, Uganda, 21-30 March 2016). A human rights activist opined that the 
Acholi community had evidence of alleged government atrocities, “so they would 
rather see a comprehensive and impartial process to hold both sides accountable” 
(Interview, Kampala, Uganda, 27 January 2016). Similarly, for an Acholi religious 
leader, “whether crimes were committed by the GoU, individuals, the LRA, all should 
be investigated” (Interview, Gulu, Uganda, 30 March 2016).  
Besides the Acholi sentiments on the universality of justice, other observers called on 
both sides to the conflict to be investigated. For instance, a Ugandan lawyer suggested 
that due to the reality of two warring parties, there were legitimate concerns that each 
of the sides committed atrocities (Interview, Kampala, Uganda, 15 December 2015). 
Human Rights Watch (2004, 1) also regretted “many shocking abuses by the LRA” as 
well as the crimes allegedly committed by the government troops.  
Equally contested was the place of child soldiers in the raging debate on ICJ. Given 
their nexus between perpetrators and victims, there were questions on whether to 
prosecute them as a result of the former identity, or whether they deserved amnesty in 
consideration of their latter position. As perpetrators of serious atrocities, the LRA 
combatants were to be investigated for their alleged criminality in accordance with the 
ICC’s statute. Conversely, as victims of forced abduction, there were arguments that 
“the family and government did not protect the child, everybody gave the child out, 
and so the child victim did not deserve double punishment” (Interview, Acholi elder, 
Gulu, Uganda, 22 March 2016).  
Nearly similar events of domestic normative contestations followed the ICC’s 
intervention in Kenya’s 2007/2008 political crisis. The Kenyan scenario unfolded 
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along the lines of competing conflict narratives amongst the majority antagonistic 
Kikuyu and Kalenjin communities, as well as backlashes and support for the Court’s 
interventions in the same measure. 
4.1.2. Counter narratives, criticisms and support for the International Criminal 
Court’s intervention in Kenya 
The Jubilee Alliance’s battles with the ICC were preceded by two critical precedents. 
First, there were counter narratives on the 2007/2008 PEV amongst the majority of 
Kikuyu and Kalenjin communities, which collectively intensified domestic backlashes 
against the Court. Second, there was considerable support for the ICC by political elites 
in CORD, their supporters from the Luo, Luhyia, Kisii and coastal communities, as 
well as Western diplomats and governance and human rights activists.  
In retrospect, the majority of the Kikuyu and Kalenjin were on opposite sides of the 
political divide during the 2007 general elections. Some of their members reportedly 
fought each other, and supported the ensuing violence based on their specific interests 
and circumstances (Republic of Kenya, 2008). Thus, their explanations for the violence 
bordered on ethnic antagonisms, accusations of each other as the most responsible, and 
calls for the prosecution of the other.12 These developments followed Rabkin’s (2005, 
755) contention of justice as local, as it is perceived and invoked in different ways. 
                                                          
12 Many Kikuyu and Kalenjin interviewees expressed such sentiments.  
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To illustrate, the majority of the Kalenjin believed that the violence was spontaneous13 
after the controversial announcement of Mwai Kibaki, a Kikuyu, as president. 
According to this strand of narrative, the youth who were contesting the presidential 
elections results were provoked with violence, hence should not be crucified at the 
altars of justice. Conversely, punishment was to be directed at the stolen presidential 
elections results, which was perpetrated by the Kikuyu political elites. 
Amongst the majority Kalenjin, a proclamation of the violence as organized was 
victimization of the community and an error in judgement. In this regard, Kalenjin 
respondents complained that the Waki Commission was hijacked by human rights 
activists based in Nairobi and did not seek local opinions about the PEV (Lynch 2014a, 
105). A Kalenjin interviewee opined that many believed that they were not given an 
opportunity by the Waki commission to submit evidence on the violence, and meetings 
were hurriedly convened in Eldoret town with earmarked as witnesses (Interview, 
Eldoret, Kenya, 3 November 2015). 
The majority of the Kalenjin believed that the ICC was committing an injustice by 
relying on the Waki commission, human rights reports, and other secondary accounts 
of events. Seemingly contradicting the Waki report and its basis for criminal 
accountability for the PEV, Ruto argued that it was incorrect for the report not to link 
the violence with the declaration of the presidential election outcomes (Ruto, cited in 
Daily Nation 2009, 1). According to Ruto, the Waki report focused on people who 
                                                          
13 Most Kalenjin interviewees expressed these views.  
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challenged the elections results and left out the masterminds of electoral fraud (ibid, 
1). 
Fuelling the Kalenjin discontents with electoral irregularities were associated 
discourses on historical land injustices in the Rift Valley, the purge of senior Kalenjin 
officials from Kibaki’s government, and fears of further injustices.14 Hence, targeting 
the Kikuyu with forceful evictions, killings and destruction of their property in the Rift 
Valley was part of Kalenjin revenge for ‘encroaching on their ancestral land,’ and 
exclusion from government. 
In this sense, alleged Kalenjin perpetrators were not to be held accountable for the 
violence, because they were correcting historical injustices meted against them. This 
was succinctly articulated in a Kalenjin youth’s recollections of justifications for the 
Kikuyu evictions and killings on their aggression and intentions to dominate others 
(Interview, Nairobi, 15 October 2015). As the youth further revealed, their leaders were 
supportive of such sentiments, given that the Kikuyu would take their farms, and thus 
should always be living in fear (ibid).  
Hence, the association of Kalenjin leaders with alleged responsibilities for the violence 
conferred unto them a hero status, and not stigma within the community’s moral 
compass. A Kalenjin interviewee narrated how after Ruto’s ICC indictment, the 
community embraced him as Nyinganet, denoting someone who is bold and brave 
enough to face any situation and challenges (Interview, Nakuru, Kenya, 2 November 
2015). In a similar vein, a Kalenjin politician summed that “Ruto went to the ICC on 
                                                          
14 Several Kalenjin interviewees articulated these positions.   
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behalf of the Kalenjin” (Interview, Nairobi, Kenya, 12 April 2016). Likewise, a 
Kalenjin youth revealed that Ruto “was a victim of circumstances and the face behind 
the community’s resistance against the Kikuyu” (Interview, Nairobi, Kenya, 17 
February 2016). 
The Kalenjin criticisms also benefited from the ICC’s references to the community’s 
network of businessmen, politicians, youths and elders, as well as cultural practices in 
the 2007/2008 violence matrix. During Ruto’s opening trial at the ICC in 2013, the 
OTP argued that the violence was planned and executed by a network of powerful 
Kalenjin political and business elites, under Ruto’s leadership (ICC 2013, 3). Towards 
the elections, the OTP asserted, several private and public meetings were organized, in 
which Ruto assembled the Kalenjin network and allotted roles, raised money, and 
organized meetings to implement their criminal ventures (ibid, 3). The OTP also argued 
that Ruto used the community structures to assemble and army and spread hate against 
the Kikuyu in public rallies and through the mass media (ibid, 3). In so doing, the OTP 
used circumcision footages during Court proceedings as evidence of Kalenjin 
preparation for violence (Cheserek, 2013). 
Conversely, the majority of the Kalenjin were unhappy with the mention of cultural 
systems as means of rallying organized militia (Interview, Kalenjin politician, Nairobi, 
22 September 2015). As such, the ICC was perceived to be “delivering mob justice” 
by targeting the whole community’s cultural practices (ibid). As a Kalenjin elder 
argued, the broadcasting of the initiation ceremonies contravened the sanctity of 
Kalenjin customs and traditions (Cheserek 2013, 1). 
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For their part, the majority of the Kikuyu believed that the violence exposed the 
community to a siege mentality as they were attacked from different fronts: in the Rift 
Valley by Kalenjins, and in the western region by the Luo and Luhyia communities.15 
In this vein, retaliatory attacks that their leaders were accused of were justified. Indeed, 
the CIPEV concluded that in the North Rift where the Kikuyu were victims, “the 
violence was more intense, more widespread, was urban as well as rural and lasted 
longer” (Republic of Kenya 2008, 38). Thus, the majority of the Kikuyu argued that 
the revenge attacks stopped the violence, salvaged the community from plausible 
annihilation, and that their leaders should not be held accountable for retaliation. 
Further, the majority of the Kikuyu likened the community’s 2007/2008 predicaments 
to similar events in 1992, 1997 and 2002, where they were also targeted in the Rift 
Valley. According to them, iteration of violence reinforced arguments that the 
community was perennially attacked due to their industrious nature and envy from 
other communities. On this note, a Kikuyu youth recalled that in the 2007 elections, 
their opponents talked of madoa doa,16 implying a sense of the community as a soft 
target because they are hardworking,17 “people felt jealous of them, and wanted to grab 
their hard-earned wealth” (Interview, Kiambu, Kenya, 30 November 2015). 
                                                          
15 Most Kikuyu interviewees articulated this position. 
16 Swahili corded word for unwanted people.  
17 The Kikuyu are locally known for their entrepreneurial spirit.  
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Therefore, the majority of the Kikuyu premised their quest for justice on losses of 
property, land and community members, which they believed would guarantee non-
repetition. With domestic inaction, some of the Kikuyu political elites and their 
supporters demanded for justice for the victims of the PEV, including at the ICC. 
For instance, during a public address in the aftermath of the violence, Kenyatta called 
for the ICC’s prosecution of alleged perpetrators of the violence (KTN, 2016). 
Additionally, a Kikuyu politician revealed that support for the ICC obtained from the 
inability of Kenyan courts to deliver justice for victims due to the backlog of cases and 
political interference (Interview, Nairobi, Kenya, 29 September, 2015). 
Nonetheless, the Kikuyu embrace of justice had a caveat: a focus on their perceived 
enemies; namely, the Kalenjin and the ODM leadership who were believed to have 
provoked the violence. From a leaked American diplomatic cable, a Kikuyu MP 
revealed that many believed that the community’s leaders who were implicated in the 
violence acted as self-defence and therefore “should not be equated with Rift Valley 
organizers” (Wikileaks 2008, 1). 
Consequently, the ICC’s indictment of Kenyatta reinforced his position as a defender 
of the Kikuyu community. In turn, the majority of the Kikuyu professed Kenyatta’s 
innocence, and rebuked his ICC’s trials as unjust and unwarranted. For instance, a 
Kikuyu youth observed that Kenyatta’s prosecution accelerated his hero status and 
gave him credit for the community’s defence (Interview, Kiambu, Kenya, 30 
November 2015). Likewise, a Kikuyu teacher argued that Uhuru was never expected 
in the list of suspects, but Odinga and some Kalenjins (Interview, Kiambu, Kenya, 30 
November 2015).  
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Some popular Kikuyu musicians, notably Kamande wa Kioi and Muigai wa Njoroge, 
composed songs in praise of Kenyatta while castigating the ICC and some of its 
supporters. Njoroge’s (2012) ‘Hague bound’ song accused Kenyatta’s political 
opponents for his woes and claimed that judges were biased. On the other hand, Kioi 
(2012) used a biblical allegory to liken Kenyatta to Moses, who was anointed by God 
to deliver the community from Egypt to Canaan.  
Collectively, the competing conflict narratives amongst the majority of the Kikuyu and 
Kalenjin, and counter accusations on alleged responsibility, complicated Uhuruto’s 
battles with the ICC and political ambitions. Uhuruto’s predicaments were 
compounded by significant domestic support for the ICC by CORD and its Luo, 
Luhyia, Kisii and coastal supporters, several governance and human rights activists and 
Western diplomats. More importantly, domestic support for the ICC added a rider to 
local narratives under which the majority Kikuyu and the Kalenjin rationalized the 
PEV: atrocity crimes were committed and had to be punished under international law.   
During the PEV’s timeline, some governance and human rights activists congregated 
under Kenyans for Peace with Truth and Justice (KPTJ), for concerted efforts in 
collecting and preserving evidence, contemplating long term solutions for the crisis, 
and pursuing justice. As a former KPTJ official reiterates, “they began thinking about 
the potential involvement of the ICC, asked about it through proxies and began putting 
together information on the nature of the violence” (Interview, Nairobi, Kenya, 22 
September 2015). 
Although the idea of ICJ was initially meant as a threat for catalyzing domestic 
prosecutions, it became KPTJ’s default tool and framework for confronting impunity 
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after glaring demonstrations of domestic inability and unwillingness (ibid). The KPTJ 
subsequently shaped domestic discourses on the violence by their insistence on “truth 
and justice” for the presidential elections and violence as conditions for lasting peace 
(KPTJ 2015, 1). 
Over time, KPTJ consistently countered the Jubilee Alliance’s backlashes on the ICC, 
enhanced victims’ participation in proceedings, collected and collated evidence and 
increasing the Court’s visibility through advocacy.18 At the international stage (ASP 
meetings and the ICC trials), KPTJ countered the government’s narratives on 
cooperation with the ICC and domestic investigative efforts. 19 More so, in the run up 
to the 2013 elections, KPTJ challenged Uhuruto’s candidature in a Supreme court 
petition (which was dismissed) under the integrity clause of Chapter Six of the new 
constitution. 
The Jubilee Alliance’s main rivals in CORD also opposed the Alliance’s anti-ICC 
rhetoric on many occasions. Prior to the formation of the Jubilee Alliance, Kenyatta 
and Ruto’s allies in the PNU wing of the coalition government contemplated 
withdrawing Kenya from the Rome Statute, deferring the cases or terminating them 
altogether. In turn, key players in CORD opposed such efforts in national platforms 
and wrote to the UNSC not to act on the deferral requests.20 
                                                          
18 Views collected from interviews with KPTJ officials in Nairobi, Kenya.  
19 Ibid 
20 Views collected from interviews with CORD officials in Nairobi.  
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Towards the 2013 elections, CORD partly campaigned on the platform of Uhuruto’s 
unsuitability for elections. CORD’s presidential candidate, Odinga, called on Kenyatta 
and Ruto on numerous occasions to first clear their names before running for elections. 
In a televised presidential debate in February 2013, Odinga chided Kenyatta’s 
presidential bid, stating how “it would pose a challenge to run a government via Skype 
from The Hague” (Citizen TV, 2013). 
Besides, Western diplomats expressed their support for the ICC’s processes in Kenya 
as a policy position from their home countries. Due to the probabilities of Uhuruto’s 
election, the diplomats hinted at the plausibility of Kenya’s international isolation. For 
instance, in February 2013, the USA’s Assistant Secretary of State, Johnnie Carson, in 
a telephone briefing with journalists, stated thus: “We live in an interconnected world 
and people should be thoughtful about the impact that their choices have on their 
nation. Choices have consequence” (Joselow 2013, 1). Similarly, the UK High 
Commissioner to Kenya, Christian Turner, stated that there would be no contacts with 
ICC suspects should they win elections, unless it is essential (Anami 2013, 1). 
Owing to the West’s pronounced support for the ICC’s trials, there were concerns that 
Kenya would suffer from international isolation should the ‘alliance of the accused’ 
win the 2013 elections. There were also public discussions on the possibilities of the 
suspects’ imprisonment during their terms in office, and whether they would step down 
if convicted. 
These concerns raised questions on Uhuruto’s suitability to hold public office, 
including from their Kikuyu and Kalenjin co-ethnics. Specifically, Kikuyu voters faced 
the dilemma of voting for Kenyatta and Ruto, while they still faced criminal charges 
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(Burbidge 2014, 218). Similarly, Donald Kipkorir, a prominent Kalenjin lawyer 
dissuaded Kenyatta and Ruto from running for office on the belief that they would 
jeopardize Kenya’s road to success and actualization of the Vision 2030 economic 
blueprint (Kipkorir 2012,1). According to Kipkorir, electing the two suspects would 
enlist Kenya in the pariah group of states and confine it to diplomatic and trading 
relations with Eritrea, Sudan, North Korea, Zimbabwe and Syria – a path that should 
be avoided (ibid, 1).  
From the foregoing discussions, Uganda’s and Kenya’s orientations as contested 
sovereignties raised normative questions on who should be prosecuted by the ICC, and 
the moral basis for the Court’s prosecutorial discretions. In turn, the GoU’s selective 
referral of the LRA to the ICC, and the Jubilee Alliance’s neo-colonial narratives 
unlocked such normative contestations over ICJ. Whereas the selective referral 
unsettled the relative power equilibrium between the GoU and the LRA, the neo-
colonial narrative alienated the ICC and its sympathizers from the Jubilee Alliance’s 
domestic support base. 
4.2.  Unsettling the relative power equilibrium between the Government of 
Uganda and the Lord’s Resistance Army. 
Calls for the universality of justice and competing conflict narratives between the GoU, 
the LRA and their respective supporters presupposed a relative power equilibrium 
between the GoU and the LRA. Although the insurgents’ crimes were more intense 
after the ICC’s establishment in 2002, there were instances of alleged government 
atrocities that increased the risks of investigating both sides to the conflict. 
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More interestingly, even the regime acknowledged some of their culpabilities in the 
conflict. For example, in October 2012, Museveni succumbed to pressure from 
northerners and openly apologized for the army’s massacres in the region (Eriku and 
Kwo 2012, 1). In his apology, Museveni blamed alleged government atrocities on “bad 
elements” in the NRA (ibid, 1). There have been similar incidences of the government’s 
apologies during the NRM’s annual anniversary celebrations (see for example 
Walubiri, 2014). 
As such, the Ugandan scenario exemplifies the balance of power that involves 
pluralism and hostilities, and the struggle for power that unfolds in two waves: 
“competition and direct opposition” (Morgenthau’s (1948, 239). With the selective 
referral of their military/political opponents to the ICC, the GoU perfected their direct 
opposition to the LRA in competition for post-conflict legitimacy.  
Simply put, the selective referral unsettled the relative power equilibrium that pervaded 
Uganda’s domestic normative contestations over ICJ. As one interviewee summed, the 
referral was a working relation between the ICC and the GoU, in which the LRA had 
no voice (Interview, professor, Kampala, Uganda, 13 January 2016). In this sense, the 
LRA was portrayed as “where the problem was, and were the perpetrators, and it was 
the north in which the victims were” (ibid). 
In other words, the referral partially put to rest some domestic normative questions, 
particularly concerns on: alleged responsibility for the violence, and the location of 
suspects and victims. Therefore, answers to the questions were to be found in the LRA 
and their alleged atrocities. Pursuant to the referral, the site for domestic normative 
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contestations over ICJ also shifted to the LRA – the subsequent focus of the ICC’s 
investigations and prosecutions.   
4.2.1. Partially resting domestic normative questions on the northern conflict 
In the post-referral era, several domestic normative questions with regards to the 
northern conflict were partially put to rest, as shaped by the attendant shifting power 
relations. For example, questions on alleged responsibility for atrocities found 
immediate answers in the LRA’s top leadership. 
After the referral and subsequent prosecutorial steps, the OTP observed that there was 
sufficient evidence to believe that Joseph Kony, Vincent Otti, Okot Odhiambo, Raska 
Lukwiya and Dominic Ong’wen ordered the commission of crimes within the ICC’s 
jurisdiction (ICC 2005d, 2). Subsequently, in October 2005, the Court unsealed the 
LRA leadership’s warrants of arrests, on the belief that they had established a systemic 
pattern of brutality aimed at the civilian populations and the Ugandan army (ibid, 2). 
Moreover, the ICC’s investigative steps overrode the concerns for assuaging the LRA’s 
submission to peace processes. As a result of Uganda’s acceptance of the Court’s 
jurisdiction, domestic authorities were expected to enhance state cooperation at local 
and international levels, for an effective war on impunity for the crimes that the LRA 
were accused. The GoU’s cooperation would therefore include collaborating in 
arresting the indicted LRA soldiers and commencing complementary national trials for 
many other alleged perpetrators. 
Conversely, the LRA’s cooperation entailed surrendering and attending trials at The 
Hague. In one of her public appeals, Bensouda “called on Joseph Kony to hand himself 
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in and face justice,” failure to which the OTP would continue to pursue his arrest (ICC 
2016a, 1). In the end, fears that the trials would disrupt local peace efforts were 
alienated by the growing support for justice and calls for international cooperation 
towards prosecutorial outcomes.  
For their part, some of the ICC’s officials responded to demurs on selection bias with 
equivocations on gravity thresholds, and insufficient evidence on alleged regime 
atrocities. Explaining prosecutorial discretion, Ocampo (2005, 3) argued that after the 
OTP’s analysis of the gravity of crimes committed by both parties, it emerged that the 
insurgents’ crimes had higher gravity than the UPDF’s. On Olara Otunu’s21 assertion 
that alleged government atrocities should be equally investigated, Ocampo challenged 
Otunu to prevent evidence to the ICC (New Vision, 2010). Similarly, a Kampala based 
ICC official suggested that if individuals have evidence on regime atrocities, they 
should present it to the OTP (Interview, Kampala, Uganda, 2 February 2016). 
Even so, the ICC official cautioned that communications alone from individuals do not 
guarantee prosecution, but sufficient threshold (ibid). At a media briefing in Gulu in 
2016, the ICC’s head of Jurisdiction, Complementarity and Cooperation Division 
(JCCD), Mochochoko Phakiso, also responded to local complaints on selection bias 
that “whoever has evidence against the UPDF to come forward” (cited in Owich 2016, 
1). 
                                                          
21 Olara Otunu is a Ugandan opposition politician from the north and former UN 
Special Representative for Children and Armed Conflict. 
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Although the ICC officials’ pronouncements could be construed as positive gestures 
and willingness to open up communication channels between the Court and local 
actors, such an interpretation is potentially misleading. There is no provision in the 
Rome Statute that expressly bars the OTP from commencing investigations on its own 
motion. In anticipation of domestic lapses, the drafters of the Statute conferred 
discretion on the part of the OTP under Article 15. The Article clearly illustrates that 
“the Prosecutor may initiate investigations proprio motu on the basis of information on 
crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court.” It also hints at the OTP’s discretions on 
fact-finding from States, the UN’s organs, INGOs, or other appropriate and credible 
sources that might be received orally at the seat of the Court or in writing (ibid).  
Perhaps, in awareness of the objections to continuing selectivity, the OTP struck a more 
conciliatory tone with some members of the affected communities in northern Uganda 
and implored their patience. During her visit to northern Uganda in February 2015, 
Bensouda spoke of the slow turn of the wheels of justice, and a need for leaving justice 
to take its own path (ICC 2015c, 1). Bensouda further requested the communities to 
embrace the ICC’s impartial and judicial process as a pathway to healing, closure for 
the victims, and guaranteeing non-repetition (ibid). 
Besides, the selective referral shifted the burden of contesting the ICC’s intervention 
to the LRA. As the ICC’s subsequent focus, the LRA was isolated in the moral 
universe, given the growing consensus on accountability for atrocity crimes. However, 
a significant number of the people in northern Uganda were resilient to the ensuing 
configurations, thus their insistence on alleged government responsibility and amnesty 
for the LRA.  
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4.2.2. Shifting patterns of domestic normative contestations 
Two critical junctures in the northern conflict’s timeline support the proportion that the 
selective referral shifted the site of domestic normative contestations over ICJ to the 
LRA. These are the Juba mediation process in which the LRA negotiated from a weak 
power position, and the ICC’s case developments.  
At Juba, the LRA’s disempowerment with the ICC’s stigma constrained their ability to 
engage in the talks as assertive actors.  As Hendrickson and Tumutegyereize (2012, 6) 
rightly suggest, the structure of the Juba process wrongly assumed the participation of 
two partners with adequate abilities and incentives to negotiate. A human rights activist 
who participated in the talks recalled how, due to the LRA’s position, they could not 
extract good concessions for themselves, thus their focus on negotiations for the people 
in the north (Interview, Kampala, Uganda, 03 February 2016). Similarly, a senior 
Acholi politician who was at Juba revealed the LRA delegations’ pursuit of social 
justice, whose essence was the comprehensive solutions in the talks (Mao, 2008a). In 
this regard, the LRA’s position envisaged not only disarmament and reintegration of 
ex-soldiers, but also on tackling structural causes of violence, which would lead to 
discourses on the distribution of wealth, power and opportunities (ibid).  
More disempowering to the LRA was the onus of negotiating under the constraints of 
the ICC’s indictments and challenging them altogether. As an Acholi religious leader 
recalls, “Kony was interested in amnesty, but there was voice at the background that 
the ICC would not allow it” (Interview, Gulu, Uganda, 30 March 2016). The Acholi 
delegate also reveals that the LRA was interested in amnesty, after seeing people close 
to Kony such as Brigadier Banya and Colonel Sam Kolo benefit from it (ibid). Another 
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religious leader recollects how at Juba, they proposed amnesty, to which Kony 
responded that by 25 December, Christmas day, he would come out and sign as long 
as the government assured him on safety from arrest, since nobody can go to prison 
alone (Interview, Gulu, Uganda, 21 March 2016).                
Opportunistically, the GoU’s side built on the LRA’s predicaments to extract 
maximum concessions from them. The regime proposed the establishment of a special 
court and subsequent petition to the UNSC for a deferral, albeit under a gentleman’s 
agreement (Wierda and Otim, 2011). According to the agreement, Kony would be 
incarcerated in the north, under sufficiently flexible conditions “to meet the 
international requirement for his freedom and movement to be significantly curtailed, 
while sparing him the humiliation of formal jail in a prison” (Hendrickson and 
Tumutegyereize 2012, 24). Furthermore, Kony was advised that the agreement’s 
conditions would not be easy (ibid). As such, he was required to trust Museveni, and 
consent to the language of any public statements of the agreement, that would also be 
different from the text of the gentleman’s agreement (ibid, 24). 
Compounding the LRA’s shifting power positions were the ICC’s subsequent 
investigations and trials at The Hague. Locally, debates were reinvigorated on what 
was to be done to child soldiers among the LRA’s rank and file. On the contrary, there 
was little attention to the UPDF soldiers, some of whom were recruited as child soldiers 
in the army’s rank or as village vigilantes against the LRA. 
A case in point were controversies surrounding Ong’wen’s surrender and transfer to 
the ICC for imminent trials. Ong’wen’s predicaments represented the plight of child 
abductees/ soldiers. Critical in the ‘Ong’wen debates was the idea of the child’s agency, 
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or the ability to act based on personal will, and when it begins or ends (Kasande and 
Ladisch 2017, 1). Many Ugandans deliberated on the transition from childhood to 
adulthood, and whether it is marked by age 15 or 18, with overarching conclusions that 
social conceptions and expressions of a child’s agency is contextual (ibid).  
More specifically, dissent on the ICC’s continued prosecutions of the LRA was 
pronounced in northern Uganda. As one Acholi religious leader argued, the 
international community should not punish children, or “killing machines in the hands 
of the LRA” (Interview, Gulu, Uganda, 25 March 2016). Besides Ong’wen’s 
predicaments, the Acholi remained largely critical of the shifting terrains of positioning 
the LRA as the site of the northern conflict’s atrocities. 
With the near international consensus that mass atrocities should not go unpunished, 
sympathies for the LRA risked the dangers of marginalization. Discussions about the 
moral universe compass subsumed compassions for suspected war criminals with the 
ever-growing articulation of intolerance for impunity. Indeed, the GoU succeeded in 
positioning themselves as dependable partners in combating impunity, of which the 
LRA were starting points. For Kenya, the Jubilee Alliance’s neo-colonial narrative was 
salient in overcoming domestic normative contestations over ICJ, with different 
outcomes.   
4.3. The Jubilee Alliance’s neo-colonial narrative: intentions and impacts 
The Jubilee Alliance won the 2013 elections against the backdrop of Kenyatta’s and 
Ruto’s ICC indictments, their respective communities’ competing conflict narratives, 
and considerable domestic support for the Court’s process. Although many questions 
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were raised on the results’ credibility, the majority Kikuyu and Kalenjin voted for the 
Jubilee Alliance and welcomed the results (Lynch 2014a, 104). 
The two communities’ legitimation of the electoral outcome followed a pattern of 
individual ethnic communities’ attribution of credibility of elections to their everyday 
realities and expectations, as opposed to technical features of election management 
(Shah 2015, 45). Seen from this angle, the majority of the Kikuyu and Kalenjin voters 
were happy with the election results, considering the significant obstacles the ICC’s 
indictments posed to Kenyatta and Ruto, and their overwhelming support for them in 
the electoral process.  
Adding to the Jubilee Alliance’s political legitimacy was their clear majority in the 
National Assembly and a slim majority in the senate (IEBC, 2013). They also gained 
support from neutral voting zones and obtained more votes in CORD areas than the 
latter did in theirs (Wolfe 2015, 165). 
Whereas the Jubilee Alliance’s electoral success in the 2013 elections could be 
attributed to several factors as discussed in Chapter 3, their neo-colonial narrative was 
salient in overcoming domestic normative contestations over ICJ. Towards this end, 
the narrative had multiple intentions and impacts: persuading targeted local 
constituencies to elect them, delegitimizing the ICC and gaining concessions from 
some of the Court’s sympathizers.  
4.3.1. Persuading targeted constituencies to elect the Jubilee Alliance and 
delegitimizing the ICC 
As a Kikuyu politician observed, “the 2013 elections campaign was not about who was 
going to do a good job, but about preventing Uhuru from going to The Hague … The 
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election recorded the highest turnout” (Interview, Nairobi, Kenya, 23 September 2015). 
For a Kikuyu elder, the community felt that Kenya had been put under trial by the West, 
and whoever brought Ocampo, a representative of the West, had the intentions of 
eliminating some political players (Interview, Kiambu, Kenya, 29 February 2016). In 
the words of a Kalenjin youth, “the ICC is present-day colonialism ... People were not 
ready to be taken back by a white man. Nobody understood what ICC stands for” 
(Interview, Nairobi, Kenya, 2 October 2015). These sentiments show that attitudes 
were already formed before the 2013 election and affected people’s decisions. 
Against the backdrop of competing Kikuyu/Kalenjin conflict narratives and sceptical 
voters on electing the ICC’s suspects, the Jubilee Alliance’s neo-colonial narrative 
presented a viable option for overcoming the Court’s moral force. Owing to the ICC’s 
focus in Africa, the West’s visible support for the Court financially, logistically and in 
policy positions abroad, and Africa’s history of Western domination (colonialism and 
slavery) (Hoile, 2014), neo-colonialism found new relevance with the ICC’s 
intervention in Kenya. 
Conflating the ICC’s intervention with Western conspiracies to subjugate Kenya and 
the wider African continent was important in the Jubilee Alliance’s court of public 
opinion. With the West’s positioning as a dominant force that aimed to curtail 
Kenyatta’s and Ruto’s presidency, the Jubilee Alliance promoted anti-Western, and 
hence anti-ICC logic (Burbidge 2014, 219). Lending credence to such claims, a Kikuyu 
voter revealed one of his reasons for electing Kenyatta and Ruto as Kenyans’, and 
Africa’s collective voice of resenting the West and their hypocrisy and double 
standards (ibid, 220).  
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More significantly, the neo-colonial narrative presented a safe ‘space’ in which the 
Jubilee Alliance could maximize on opportunities for public vituperation of the Court 
while minimizing threats of antagonizing the Kikuyu and Kalenjin communities. In this 
vein, the narrative united a majority of sceptical Kikuyus and Kalenjins under the 
banner of victimhood at the hands of the ICC, and a waning national sovereignty due 
to Western interference. 
Through the neo-colonial narrative, the Jubilee Alliance invoked Kenya’s suffering 
under British colonialism and the struggle for the country’s independence under 
notable nationalists. The six nationalists who were incarcerated at a Kapenguria prison 
were famously known as the Kapenguria Six (Jomo Kenyatta, Achien’g Oneko, 
Kung’u Karumba, Fred Kubai, Bildad Kaggia and Paul Ngei), whom the Jubilee 
Alliance likened to “the Ocampo Six.” As Ngugi (2011, 1) persuasively argued, the 
‘Ocampo Six’ “purported an equivalence between their circumstances and those of 
Kenyatta and his colleagues at Kapenguria.” 
To illustrate, in one of the Jubilee Alliance’s well attended political rallies in 2011, 
speakers invoked Jomo Kenyatta’s (the founding father of the nation) spirit, together 
with those of other national heroes (Ngirachu and Musembi 2011, 1). At the rally, Mrs 
Kenyatta (Jomo Kenyatta’s widow and Uhuru Kenyatta’s mother), vowed that Kenya 
would never succumb to colonial domination and stated that the ‘Ocampo Six’ would 
collapse (ibid, 1). The former first lady also conducted prayers for her son and Ruto, 
and laid her hands on them, as her husband’s speech was broadcast to the crowd (ibid, 
1).  
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Persuasively for the majority of the Kikuyu, the neo-colonial narrative was a reminder 
of the independence struggle that the Mau Mau freedom fighters staged under Jomo 
Kenyatta to fight British rule. Besides gross human rights violations under colonialism, 
Kikuyu fertile highlands were expropriated for white settlement and indigenous 
Africans were relocated to unproductive reserve lands. Hence, the neo-colonial 
narrative called upon the Kikuyu to resist the reincarnation of colonialism through the 
ICC – a mzungu Court – which was targeting Kenyatta’s son in a new affront on 
Kenya’s sovereignty. A Kiambu resident observed that according to the people’s 
narratives, the ICC’s intervention reminisced Western rule that was to be collectively 
fought in the same way the mzungu was battled many years ago (Interview, Kiambu, 
Kenya, 30 November 2015). 
Similarly, the majority of the Kalenjin were in part persuaded by the linking of Ruto’s 
ICC tribulations to those of the famous leader of the Nandi rebellion – Koitalel arap 
Samoei, whom some even suggested hailed from Ruto’s Talai clan (Interview, Kalenjin 
peace activist, Nakuru, Kenya, 22 February 2016). In this light, the anti-ICC rhetoric 
was a manifestation of Kalenjin history, with Ruto’s struggles reminiscing that of 
Koitalel (Maupeu 2014, 30). 
To date, Koitalel remains very popular amongst the contemporary Kalenjin, who 
constantly refer to his heroic acts and resistance to British colonialism (ibid, 30). While 
the state has since emphasized Koitalel’s role in Kenya’s anti-colonial struggle by 
constructing a national mausoleum on the site of his incarceration, a popular Kalenjin 
radio station, Kass FM, has produced many stories about him (ibid). For his part, Ruto 
benefitted from this legacy, given that his father was Daniel Cheruiyot Samoei, and 
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Ruto is known as William Samoei Ruto (ibid, 30). Therefore, for the ICC’s trial of 
Ruto, the majority of Kalenjin “thought that the ICC is an extension of colonialism … 
and was manipulated by outside powers and interested partners in Kenya” (Interview, 
Kalenjin youth, Nairobi, Kenya, 22 September 2015). 
Essentially, the Jubilee Alliance linked the ICC’s intervention to the re-emergence of 
Western domination of Africans (through targeting their leaders while ignoring other 
serious conflicts), and therefore a need for Kenyans to safeguard their sovereignty. In 
this regard, statements by Western envoys were reframed as undue external 
interference in domestic affairs, and, by default, support of their main rival – Odinga. 
Specifically, the statement from the USA Assistant Secretary of State that “choices 
have consequences” was problematic, given that the country is not a party to the Rome 
Statute, commits atrocities globally and was demanding Kenyans’ fidelity to the ICC. 
A CORD official noted that “the statement showed that unlike Jubilee, CORD had the 
goodwill of the international community and that progressive Kenyans would believe 
this to attract international investments and improve international relations” (Interview, 
Nairobi, Kenya, 28 September 2015). However, he also observed how the Jubilee 
Alliance, “used the statement to entrench propaganda that Raila, CORD and the West 
wanted to take Ruto and Uhuru to the ICC” (ibid).  
As a result, the neo-colonial narrative resonated with the majority of the Jubilee 
Alliance’s domestic constituencies. Reflecting on the narrative’s effects on public 
perceptions, a Kalenjin youth remarked how, given Kenyatta’s and Ruto’s persuasion, 
they easily understood that the ICC was not here for a good assignment, but to subject 
them to present-day colonization through a judicial process (Interview, Nairobi, Kenya, 
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2 October 2015). Thus, the youth observed, many people reacted by making them 
president and deputy president. 
In turn, a journalist who followed the ICC’s discourses in Kenya posed: “The question 
this begs is, where does politics end and where does judicial process begin in this case?”  
(Interview, Nairobi, Kenya, 29 September 2015). Likewise, a prominent human rights 
activist observed that the “Jubilee Alliance’s neo-colonial narrative made it difficult 
for the Court to project itself as balanced” (Interview, Nairobi, Kenya, 7 October 2015). 
According to the activist, the framing of the 2013 election as a referendum on the ICC 
(Warah, 2014) helped to mobilize the Alliance’s support base (ibid). 
Besides, in February 2013, just before the elections, the KNDR monitoring report 
concluded that debates on the ICC were ethnicized and politicized, and the Court’s 
image was subsumed by political accusations and impunity (South Consulting 2013, 
vii). However, national support for the ICC remained high (at 66 percent) but low in 
the home regions of the accused (ibid). In part, this reveals that voters in other regions 
were not persuaded by the Jubilee Alliance’s neo-colonial claims. Nonetheless, 
Kenyatta spoke of his election victory as a triumph of Kenyans against neo-colonial 
intentions (PSCU 2013, 2). 
4.3.2. Gaining concessions from the ICC’s sympathizers 
With support for the ICC being construed as pro-neo-colonialism, some of the Court’s 
most audible proponents, mostly Western diplomats, CORD and governance and 
human rights activists, embraced a more cautious approach in public discourses on the 
Court. In turn, their retreat provided opportunities for the Jubilee Alliance’s neo-
colonial narrative to flourish in sub-national and national spaces.  
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After the backlash against their statements, Western diplomats refrained from making 
bold pronouncements in support of the ICC trials. The head of a Nairobi-based 
international NGO noted that the “choices have consequences” mantra was one of the 
worst things for the Western world to do, and partly explained their retreat (Interview, 
Nairobi, Kenya, 16 October 2015). She also revealed her subsequent cautious approach 
for ICJ, thus: “If I am pro-ICC in the field, I can be seen as pro-West … I am careful 
not to be seen as a puppet of the West” (Ibid).  
Likewise, in the run-up to the 2013 elections, CORD developed a more careful 
approach to the ICC “because of the surge in portraying the coalition as pushing for 
ICC prosecutions” (Interview, CORD official, Nairobi, Kenya, 1 October 2015).  A 
former Odinga ally and party official remarked that “the ICC became Odinga’s 
waterloo in the Rift Valley ... Ruto had managed to mobilize the Kalenjin around the 
ICC and this occasioned his (Odinga’s) change of tune” (Interview, former ODM 
official, Kisumu, Kenya, 11 November 2015). For example, during a campaign rally in 
Eldoret, Odinga promised to bring the Kenyan cases back home (Interview, CORD 
official, Nairobi, Kenya, 1 October 2015). Though a pragmatic political statement, it 
reinforced the Jubilee Alliance’s views that the ICC trials were unwarranted and 
unnecessary disruptions in Kenya’s domestic affairs. 
In addition, during successive Ruto’s fixing debate that the Jubilee Alliance 
orchestrated to claim that the cases were based on a witch hunt and ought to be halted, 
CORD took a more pragmatic approach and also supported case termination (Citizen, 
2015).  Some CORD MPs signed the Jubilee Alliance’s petitions to terminate the cases 
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(Muthoni and Makena, 2015), whereas, Odinga offered to testify in Ruto’s favour at 
the ICC (Chanji and Oudia, 2015).   
Despite their branding as ‘evil’ society and puppets of the West, governance and human 
rights activists continued with their national and international advocacy in support of 
the ICC. However, as Hansen and Sriram (2015) reveal, their labelling as agents of 
imperialism undermined their pro-accountability message. Many of them found 
themselves on the defensive and had difficulty in countering the neo-colonial narrative 
(ibid). 
More so, with the Jubilee Alliance in power, the activists no longer felt they could push 
as actively for accountability, and especially for the ICC (ibid). On several occasions, 
the Jubilee administration targeted prominent governance and human rights activists 
with threats of physical harm and intimidation. For example, at the side-line of a 2016 
ASP meeting in The Hague, a top government official threatened Gladwell Otieno of 
KPTJ, cautioning her “to prepare for the consequences of the route she chose” (Allison, 
2016). The Jubilee Alliance also proposed amendments to the Public Benefits 
Organization (PBO) Act, which sought to cap funding to CSOs (FIDH and KHRC, 
2013).  
Though unsurprising, Western countries reneged on their “choices have consequences” 
crusade after the Jubilee Alliance’s election victory. This followed a pattern of the 
West’s reluctance to enforce stated positions, undervaluing their influence in local 
spaces, and prioritization of stability that alienate concerns for democracy and justice 
(Brown and Raddatz 2013, 44). For some Western countries, economic and security 
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interests overrode the concerns for justice, hence their decisions to restore relations 
with Kenya (ibid). 
The USA, Germany, Italy, France and the UK embarked on business as usual and 
embraced the Kenyatta administration (ibid, 52). While the UN and the EU suspended 
or redefined “essential contact,” the UK invited Kenyatta to London for a summit, and 
the American president reached out to Kenyatta and reaffirmed their relations with 
Kenya (ibid, 55). 
Seemingly, Kenyatta and Ruto’s neo-colonial narrative was instrumental in navigating 
Kenya’s political terrain, their quests for legitimacy, and battles with the ICC. Their 
election victory, together with the West’s strategic interests in Kenya, accelerated their 
admission to the club of global leaders, despite the West’s initial reservations on their 
ICC cases. 
4.4. Conclusion 
The configuration of domestic spaces as contested sovereignties subjected the ICC’s 
interventions in Uganda and Kenya to domestic normative contestations. In this vein, 
competing conflict narratives amongst antagonistic groups and the availability of 
diverse actors and institutions led to critical questions on the ICC’s discretions on 
alleged suspects, as well as differences of opinion on the Court’s suitability. 
Nevertheless, and as similar to the outcomes of the transactional and adversarial 
exchanges, the narratives on the ICC’s interventions unlocked domestic normative 
contestations over ICJ in both situations. 
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In the Ugandan situation, the selective referral unsettled the relative power equilibrium 
which existed between the antagonistic parties to the northern conflict. In a similar 
vein, the Jubilee Alliance’s neo-colonial narrative alienated the ICC and its supporters 
from the Alliance’s support base, which consolidated their legitimacy and quest for 
political power.  
The precedents of the narratives’ roles in undermining the ICC’s ability to delegitimize 
some powerful political actors raises several questions. Of great importance is their 
potential impacts on domestic efforts at cultivating long-term peace in transitioning 
from conflict. The next chapter demonstrates why the narratives on the ICC’s 
interventions were antithetical to TJ discourses in Uganda and Kenya, and by 
extension, in other regional contexts, namely the DRC, Côte d’Ivoire, South Sudan and 
Burundi.  
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Chapter 5 
Narratives on the International Criminal Court’s interventions as antithetical to 
transitional justice discourses 
Beyond their obfuscation of domestic imports of ICJ, the narratives on the ICC’s 
interventions portended as antithetical to TJ discourses in Uganda and Kenya. In so 
doing, they reproduced and reinforced the same (divisive) societal binaries that 
contributed to Uganda’s northern conflict and Kenya’s 2007/2008 PEV. In turn, the 
binaries undermined some of the gains made by TJ discourses and compounded their 
limitations. The end result was a resurgence of Uganda’s pervasive north-south divide 
and the mutation of Kenya’s ethno-regional formations. 
By discussing the narratives on the ICC’s interventions as antithetical to TJ discourses, 
this chapter further attests to their prominence, in addition to providing insights on their 
far-reaching impacts in local and regional realms. 
More specifically, in Uganda, narratives of the ICC’s selectivity replicated and 
reinforced dichotomies of ‘just’ (GoU) versus ‘unjust’ actors (LRA) in the northern 
conflict. The ensuing dichotomies aggravated some of the limitations of Uganda’s TJ 
mechanisms, whose institutional designs also followed the ‘just/unjust’ actor binaries. 
In the long-run, perceptions of the Court’s contribution to perpetual injustices in 
northern Uganda undermined prospects for bridging the north-south divide, and limited 
opportunities for comprehensive truth-telling. 
Similarly, in Kenya, the Jubilee Alliance’s neo-colonial narrative revived and sustained 
colonial era binaries as markers of identity amongst ethnic communities. By allotting 
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nationalism to the ICC’s opposition and vice versa, the narrative reinvigorated ethno-
regional divisions and emerged as a misnomer for Kenya’s TJ trajectory. 
Besides their domestic impacts on TJ and long-term peace-building, the narratives had 
far-reaching implications for other conflict scenarios in the African region. First, 
Uganda’s selectivity deciphered the ICC’s impartiality, after which other regional 
players invited the Court to investigate their domestic military/political opponents. The 
ensuing cases in such situations (the DRC and Côte d’Ivoire) had similar implications 
on domestic efforts towards peace-building. Second, Kenya’s neo-colonial narrative 
gave new relevance to African protectionism; thus, a shield to potential ICC situations, 
such as South Sudan and Burundi. 
The next section provides an overview of evident societal binaries that the narratives 
on the ICC’s interventions reproduced and reinforced in Uganda and Kenya. The 
section is followed by discussions of the GoU’s selective referral of the LRA to the 
ICC and its contributions to perpetual injustices in northern Uganda. The chapter then 
turns to explanations of the Jubilee Alliance’s neo-colonial narrative and its departure 
from the aspirations of Kenya’s TJ processes. The chapter then assesses regional level 
effects of the Ugandan and Kenyan precedents, such as on ICC situations (the DRC 
and Côte d’Ivoire), and other potential situations, namely South Sudan and Burundi. 
The chapter concludes by briefly revisiting some of the main arguments, and 
subsequently links to discussions of Uganda’s and Kenya’s complementarity dilemmas 
in their transitions from conflict to peace.   
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5.1. The International Criminal Court’s interventions and reinforcement of 
divisive binaries 
The ICC’s entry into Uganda’s and Kenya’s domestic realms was preceded by deep 
ethno-regional divisions, that formed the cleavages under which their conflicts erupted 
and resulting apportion of blame. Additionally, the emergence of narratives revived the 
same societal divisions, thus intensifying the countries’ retrogression in transition from 
conflict to more sustainable peace.  
During the northern conflict, the north-south dichotomy was so eminent that it attracted 
sentiments of a neglected north (UN, 2004c; Kaaya, 2014; Hitchen, 2017). As a 
Ugandan government official recalled, for close to two decades, the north was a no-go 
zone, was marginalized, had limited services and was less attractive (Interview, 
Kampala, Uganda, 4 February 2016). The region was also characterized by a 
breakdown in the rule of law and many people lived on donations because the land 
could not be utilized for fear of attacks (ibid). 
Comparatively, the south was more prosperous and people experienced fairly better 
living conditions, as it was less affected by war after the NRM’s rise to power in 1986. 
Hence, in the south, there were pronouncements of the north as “another country” 
(Interview, professor, Kampala, Uganda, 13 January 2016). The majority of the people 
in the south were also indifferent to the conflict because it affected “those people in the 
north” (ibid).   
In Kenya, the 2007/2008 political crisis renewed societal mistrust along the PNU-ODM 
party axis under which most people voted and the violence occurred. These 
dichotomies mutated into the Jubilee-CORD division during, and after the 2013 
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elections. As already discussed in Chapter 2, the ethno-regional divisions were so deep, 
such that there were remote considerations for the country’s sub-division along the 
voting blocks. In the aftermath of the 2007/2008 PEV, intra-national relations 
bifurcated a second-tier identity of being either pro-ODM or pro-PNU, to the detriment 
of a national identity. More worryingly, the divisions included group references of the 
significant ‘other’ as the enemy. 
In a similar vein, Kenya’s post 2013 ethno-regional realignments were triggered by the 
ICC’s December 2010 naming of suspects. After Kenyatta’s and Ruto’s inclusion in 
the ICC’s charge sheet, the majority from their respective Kikuyu and Kalenjin 
communities joined them in rejecting the Court. Conversely, the majority of Luo, 
Luhyia, Kisii and other coastal communities, whose leaders were not indicted, 
supported the ICC. As a result, Kenyatta and Ruto’s anti-ICC stances under the neo-
colonial narrative further widened the ethnic divisions that predispose the country to 
perennial political violence.   
In sum, Uganda’s and Kenya’s narratives on the ICC’s interventions provided impetus 
for the continuation of the countries’ societal divisions. By propagating the GoU’s 
dichotomies of ‘just/unjust’ actors to the conflict, narratives of the ICC’s selectivity 
reinforced a sense of ‘being northern,’ or the region and its people as targets of 
marginalization, both at home and abroad. Likewise, Kenya’s neo-colonial narrative 
brought to the fore, and ringfenced the salience of ethnicity as a marker of identity and 
a sense of division in equal measure.   
The arguments that the GoU’s selective referral of the LRA to the ICC reproduced the 
‘just/unjust’ actor dichotomy is not a novel finding in this thesis, as similar arguments 
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have been made elsewhere. For instance, Nouwen and Werner (2010, 960) posited that 
the referral denoted a friend-enemy dichotomy with the international community, to 
the extent that the two parties were never to be treated under equal terms or as same 
warmongers. Branch (2016, 1) has also argued that the trials produced conflict 
narratives of ‘an evil’ LRA and ‘a good’ GoU.  
Building on the aforementioned arguments, this thesis goes further to assess the binary 
differentiations that the ICC’s intervention accentuated, and their implications for TJ 
discourses, which the scholars paid little attention to. For the purposes of these 
discussions, the ICC’s processes, together with TJ discourses, are conceptualized as 
performances of the narrative content of the past. This suggests that the performances 
reconstruct some of the past events, and imbue them with elements of truth-telling, 
fresh memories and legitimacy. Therefore, the simultaneous discussion of the 
performance of Uganda’s past in the ICC’s processes and TJ mechanisms shows that 
the country’s circumstances are not unique as similar occurrences can unfold 
elsewhere.  
Although the ICC’s fact-finding mission is contested (for example Stahn, 2012), there 
are also arguments that international tribunals “interact with agents of memory” besides 
their substantial leverages in this domain (Hirsch 2017, 1). In this context, 
Koskenniemi (2012, 3) elaborates that the significance of international criminal trials 
lies elsewhere than in retribution – “establishing the truth of events.” Indeed, during 
the opening of Ong’wen’s prosecution, the OTP argued that the trial would certainly 
illuminate on the northern Ugandan situation and contribute to truth-telling regarding 
the crimes prosecuted (ICC 2016a, 1). 
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5.2. The International Criminal Court’s selectivity in Uganda: perpetual 
injustices in the north? 
To a significant number of northern Uganda’s population, the ICC’s selective processes 
denoted the propagation of enduring injustices with regards to the northern conflict. 
These perceptions were particularly important, given that the region was neglected by 
the state, and suffered the most severe consequences of the conflict. 
In this sense, the Court’s focus on the LRA, and inattention to alleged GoU’s atrocities 
legitimized existing and dominant binaries; of the latter as ‘just’ and the former as 
‘unjust’ actors to the northern conflict. Promoted by the GoU for the most part of the 
conflicts’ timeline, the binaries emerged as critical reference points amongst many 
local and international observers. 
The ‘just’ versus ‘unjust’ actors’ dichotomy included a government official’s 
articulation of how, Museveni is honoured at home, and internationally, for liberating 
Uganda (Mayega 2016, 1). Moreover, according to the official, Museveni was credited 
for eliminating barbaric sectarianism and political indiscipline of the 1960s and 1980s 
(ibid,1). Moreover, in the words of the GoU’s spokesman, Ofwono Opondo, the “NRM 
has led the country on an uphill journey from the unflattering reputation as the ‘sick 
nation of Africa,’ to a nation of hope and opportunities” (cited in Kidimu 2015, 22). 
For Opondo, this success is attributed to the regime’s leaderships’ twin historical duties 
of liberation and transformation.   
On the contrary, in the NRM’s lexicon, the LRA labels alternated between bandits, 
criminals and terrorists, depending on prevailing circumstances. This followed a 
similar pattern of belittling opponents in degrading tags (such as the Rwandan 
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Genocidaire), in order to promote their hate and isolation (Interview, researcher, 
Kampala, Uganda, 27 January, 2016). The de-humanizing strategy is “a standard way 
to make people think badly of who you want to crush” (ibid). The demeaning tags were 
oblivious of the LRA’s rationalization of the war based on: perceived provocation by 
the NRA/M, marginalization of the north, and intentions to establish a theocracy and 
purify Uganda. 
During the northern conflict, Museveni was at the forefront of degrading the LRA with 
the various labels that subsequently informed the regime’s action points. For instance, 
he described the insurgents as “a purely tribal opportunist group” or “the Kony bandits 
that are all in one way or another linked to the old Obote regime” (Museveni 1997, 
215). Museveni further argued that the northern problem was over-emphasized, and 
that he could not negotiate with the bandits on insecurity, due to their criminal nature, 
as opposed to their armed opposition to the government (ibid, 297).  
Departing from the criminal tag, Museveni conflated the LRA’s insurgency with 
terrorism after the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks in the USA. Building on Mao 
Tse Tsung’s definition of just wars that involve popular participation, Museveni 
(2001,6) distinguished Africa’s revolutionary wars from terrorism. According to him, 
fighting a just war with terrorism is a misstep (ibid, 6). This is because terrorism; can 
target those who are not opposed to revolutions, and attacking civilians delegitimize 
revolutionaries and limits their support base (ibid, 6). Turning to Uganda, Museveni 
claimed that the country had been battling terrorists (for more than a decade), who 
could be defeated by enough spending on defence (ibid, 7). In turn, Kony admitted that 
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he had lost in the “war of propaganda that Museveni waged against him” (Cakaj 2016, 
92). 
In furtherance of the ‘just/unjust’ actor dichotomy, some of the NRM’s original 
founders or ‘historicals’ demarcated the regime’s intentions from the. For example, a 
former NRM’s political commissar, Eriya Kategaya, proclaimed that the northern 
populations realized that the LRA, who posed as their sons, inflicted more harm against 
them than the NRA ‘foreigners’ (Kategaya 1993, 26). 
Similarly, another ‘historical,’ Amama Mbabazi singled out the LRA for genocidal 
intentions in the north. Mbabazi (2014, 18) argued that people ran to the UPDF during 
instances of insecurity as evidence of the regime’s intents to “protect and not destroy 
them” (ibid, 18). His claims were reinforced by the ongoing ICC investigations, which 
he posited were testimony to the LRA’s genocidal intents, while the government’s side 
was cooperating with the cases (ibid). 
The ICC’s subsequent focus on the LRA, and not any of the alleged regime atrocities 
affirmed the dominant dichotomies of ‘just’ versus ‘unjust’ actors in the northern 
conflict. Moreover, the Court’s labels of war crimes and crimes against humanity in 
the LRA’s charge sheets corresponded with the GoU’s labels of bandits, criminals and 
terrorists. 
In summary, the referral concurred with the GoU’s narrative of having contributed to 
peace in the country after years of turmoil, hence their ‘just’ actor categorization. 
Overall, the ICC’s intervention was part of the GoU’s broader conflict management 
platform that comprised: military campaigns, peace talks, and possibly, ICJ in 
annihilating the obstinate LRA.  
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5.2.1. The International Criminal Court’s processes and transitional justice as 
performances of the past 
As a result of Uganda’s ICC’s processes and TJ institutional designs following the 
‘just/unjust’ actor dichotomy, the country’s transition trajectory (on the northern 
conflict) only reconstructed alleged LRA atrocities. In other words, official accounts 
of the northern conflict were mostly attributed to only the LRA’s crimes, and not the 
conflict in totality. 
Given that the ICC’s, amnesty’s and traditional justice’s performances coalesce as a 
‘chain of complementarity,’ the exclusive focus on the LRA constrained efforts at 
providing a holistic account of the past and fostering truth-telling (Interview, human 
rights activist, Gulu, Uganda, 30 March 2016). This was so because the various 
components of the ‘chain of complementarity’ have different principles, serve different 
purposes, and complement each other (ibid). 
With regards to traditional justice, an Acholi elder recounted how the processes are 
holistic, pro-life and bridge the gulf between the victim and perpetrator communities 
(Interview, Gulu, Uganda, 25 March 2016). As he further revealed, the commission of 
atrocities is followed by personal identification, and then cleansing and acceptance 
rituals known as Nyono Ton’g Gweno. The next step is truth-telling, whereby the 
perpetrator reveals the identity of his/her victims, the motives for killing, and the exact 
location of the atrocities (ibid). 
Afterwards, efforts are made to reach out to the bereaved parties via a neutral arbiter, 
and the perpetrator’s community acknowledges wrongdoing (ibid). If the victim’s 
group are satisfied with the explanations, they mourn their dead for six to twelve 
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months, which is then followed by compensation from the perpetrator’s community 
(ibid). 
The two parties then seek reconciliation, which culminates in either Gomo Ton’g 
(performed by the Acholi and other ethnic groups) or Mato Oput (between Acholi 
clans) (ibid). For Gomo Ton’g, a spear is bent by the perpetrator’s and the victim’s 
communities, signifying that they will “no longer use spears against each other” (ibid). 
Mato Oput entails drinking of the bitterness of the violence after accepting 
responsibility (ibid). It involves symbolically drinking the bitter herbs of Oput tree, 
which is a family tree – it grows together (ibid). During the rituals, two Oput trees that 
share the same root are cut in the middle, and mixed with local brew, Kon’go. (ibid). 
The concoction is put in a calabash, placed in the middle and shared by three or four 
representatives from each group (ibid). 
While kneeling, the representatives form pairs on each side and hold hands at their 
back, as a sign of complete disarmament. In so doing, they are witnessed by the living, 
the living dead (ancestors), the unborn children and God (ibid). The whole process is 
called “confrontation with your enemies” (ibid). More importantly, the representatives 
make covenants to the effect that they will never do harm to each other (ibid).  
At the height of the northern conflict, many LRA returnees underwent the elaborate 
rituals in ceremonies that were supported by NGOs, churches, Acholi in the diaspora, 
government officials, amnesty commissioners and senior army commanders (Afako, 
2002). However, some LRA soldiers opted out of the largely voluntary processes, 
whereas some of them reported to government reception centres which lacked 
traditional justice procedures (Interview, Acholi elder, Gulu, Uganda, 25 March 2016). 
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Yet still, the rituals that some of the LRA rebels undertook revealed instances of 
atrocities – their nature, identity of some victims and motives. On the other hand, 
confining such rituals to only the LRA’s side of the conflict perpetuated their 
connotations with injustices, and not their antagonistic partners. 
Acholi traditional justice was intrinsically connected with the amnesty processes as an 
alternative to formal justice. Through the Amnesty Act of 2000, the country expressed 
its desire to end armed rebellion, foster reconciliation with alleged perpetrators and 
reconstruct communties. The Amnesty Act advocated for “pardon, forgiveness, 
exemption or discharge from criminal prosecution or any other form of punishment by 
the State” (Amnesty Act, 2000). However, amnesty was conditional on an individual’s 
renunciation of armed resistance, after which a certificate was issued (ibid). 
For enforcement purposes, an Amnesty Commission was established for an initial 
period of six months. The Act and the commission were later on extended for an 
indefinite period, due to their relative success in encouraging many combatants’ 
defection. As of 2013, approximately 13,022 LRA soldiers were granted amnesty and 
reintegrated into society (Amnesty Commission 2013, 20). By accepting amnesty, the 
LRA’s rank and file were acknowledging wrongdoing on their part, which was an 
extension of truth-telling.  
Similarly, the ICC’s processes followed the trajectory of local responses to the LRA’s 
atrocities, which placed limitations on counter-factual narrations of the northern 
conflict. From the initiation of investigations, collection of evidence and 
documentation of victims, the ICC legitimized official accounts of the northern conflict 
on the GoU’s single focus. The climax of these legitimations was in Court proceedings, 
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as exhibited by the altercations between the OTP and defence lawyers that provided 
some insights into the conflict. The exchanges also brought to the fore some events 
which were clouded in contested conflict narratives, albeit under restrictions of the 
LRA’s culpability. 
On collection of evidence and witness testimonies, the vast majority of victims’ 
submissions were confined to specific cases for which they were applying to be 
enjoined (Cody et.al 2015). It therefore followed that many victims’ accounts were 
limited to specific case incidences of the LRA atrocities that were under the ICC’s 
focus. For example, one victim recalled ordeals of the LRA’s beatings, torture, and 
memories of the insurgents’ killings and burning of people’s houses (Cody et al. 2015, 
33). According to another victim, participation in the ICC’s processes would contribute 
to evidence on the atrocities Kony meted on communties, as well as amplify the 
victims’ voices (ibid, 33) 
As further illustrated during the opening of Ong’wen’s trial in December 2016, the 
OTP revisited four specific LRA attacks in Pajule, Odek, Lukodi and Abok, that 
occurred between October 2003 and June 2004 (ICC 2016b,1). Besides, the OTP 
revealed that nearly 4,000 people had requested to be enjoined as victims of these 
attacks (ibid). The OTP also recalled that during the attacks; several residents were 
murdered, homes were burnt, and some survivors were enslaved by the LRA as potters 
for domestic animals, food, clothes, money and other basic necessities (ibid). 
Moreover, the LRA captured children for longer periods and used them as soldiers and 
sex slaves (ibid, 1).  
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In subsequent court proceedings, the witness list also consisted of some former LRA 
soldiers and government officials, who also provided incidents of the rebels’ atrocities. 
Taken together, their testimonies had overbearing implications for the LRA’s claims to 
non-liability, in addition to overriding alleged government’s culpability in the northern 
conflict. 
In one of the proceedings, a Ugandan top military lawyer, Timothy Kanyonganya, 
revealed that the country’s intelligence agencies gave the ICC evidence against 
Ong’wen and 15 other LRA commanders (Maliti, 2017a). Kanyonganya also disclosed 
that Uganda had a joint intelligence committee that investigated the northern conflict, 
and collected evidence was passed on to the ICC (ibid). In another court proceeding, a 
former LRA intelligence officer recalled how, the LRA used three different groups to 
attack Pajule in October 2003, with Ong’wen leading abductions and looting at the 
trading center, as Raska Lukwiya led the three groups (Maliti 2017b, 1)  
Evidently, narrations of the northern conflict in the ICC’s investigation and prosecution 
of the LRA, and the insurgents’ involvements in traditional justice and amnesty were 
critical steps in Uganda’s transition. However, similar opportunities were missed with 
other parties to the conflict – the GoU – who did not undergo comparable, if not, the 
same processes. 
Consequently, Uganda’s performances of the past were revealing of their danger – 
constant narrations of one dominant narrative of an ‘unjust’ LRA, as the other (the 
GoU’s injustices) diminished. This begs the questions, how did the ICC’s involvement 
in Uganda contribute to national healing and reconciliation, that some commentators 
list amongst the prospects for ICJ? 
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With nearly all performances pointing to the LRA’s atrocities, it is increasingly 
becoming difficult to point empirical evidence to the GoU’s alleged atrocities. This 
limits opportunities for the latter’s redress and comprehensive truth-telling. In the 
absence of a truth-telling process for the northern conflict, the ICC’s and domestic 
performances of the past constrain efforts at reconciling the north with the rest of the 
country.  
Against the backdrop of the selective performances, several people in the north 
continued to narrate their experiences in the conflict, which included incidences of 
regime atrocities. As a Gulu elected representative summarized, “there is dismay 
among people in the north about the failure by the ICC to demonstrate fairness in 
investigating both sides” (Interview, Gulu, Uganda, 23 March 2016). According to an 
influential Acholi religious leader, the ICC’s intervention is incomplete, only targets 
one side, and the selective prosecution is indicative of shielding one party to the conflict 
(Interview, Gulu, Uganda, 30 March 2016). For a Gulu based human rights activist, 
“the government committed atrocities post 2002, such as the Mucwini massacre 
(Interview, Gulu, Uganda, 30 March 2016). 
Dissenting sentiments on the official narrations of the conflict reveal the apparent lack 
of closure on perceived regime atrocities, of which the GoU intends to downplay as 
much as they can. Yet still, the selective prosecutions of the LRA contributes to the 
creation of large amounts of silence, from which real impunity originates and helps 
victors to write history (Interview, researcher, Kampala, Uganda, 3 February 2016).  
The Ugandan precedents generally fit in the ICC’s accusations of producing moral 
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narratives of African conflicts, and then imposing them by siding with states that intend 
to use them in justifying their authorities (Branch 2017, 7). 
Perceptions of the ICC’s contribution to perpetual injustice in the north further 
distanced the region from the rest of Uganda, and the central government in Kampala. 
As an Acholi religious leader observed, the north-south divide is still evident, and is a 
very serious issue (Interview, Gulu, Uganda, 25 March 2016). For an Acholi native 
based in Kampala, “there is still a sense of indifference between the north and the 
south” (Interview, Kampala, Uganda, 28 January 2016). There are also sentiments of 
the south’s domination of the government and the army – a system in which the north 
feels alienated (ibid). 
In recent elections, the north votes overwhelmingly for the opposition, although the 
regime has made considerable gains in recent elections. However, some commentators 
attribute the upsurge in the regime’s support in the north to electoral malpractices, 
including vote buying, rigging, and over spending in an otherwise poor region 
(Kasasira, 2011). Apparently, Museveni’s conflation of voting with development, and 
more realistic beliefs in his longevity in power breeds resentment, and pockets of 
approval in equal measure. 
Departing from the Ugandan precedent of contributing to perpetual injustice in the 
north, the ICC’s intervention in Kenya’s political crisis was conflated with neo-
colonialism by the Jubilee Alliance. Subsequently, the narrative reinforced ethno-
regional divisions and subsequent disruptions of the country’s TJ discourses. 
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5.3. The neo-colonial narrative as a disjuncture for transitional justice 
discourses in Kenya. 
Consequent to the Jubilee Alliance’s success with the neo-colonial narrative in battling 
the ICC, Kenya’s trajectory was set on a collision path with the normative aspirations 
of TJ discourses. This obtained from the narrative’s entrenchment of ethno-regional 
divisions and exacerbation of politicization of ethnicity, which is one of the root causes 
of election-related violence in the country. 
As a crucible for propagating negative ethnicity, the neo-colonial narrative undermined 
the contributions of TJ mechanism that strived towards building a more cohesive 
society.  These included the NCIC’s endeavours of promoting unity, and the TJRC’s 
calls for “concerted efforts to foster reconciliation and sustained community dialogues” 
(Republic of Kenya 2013, 62). Besides, the narrative’s promotion of negative peace 
between the antagonistic Kikuyu and Kalenjin communities closed avenues for 
addressing long-standing issues that prompted their violent confrontations in the 
2007/200 PEV.  
Due to the narrative’s reminiscence of Kenya’s past under British colonialism, binaries 
of ‘collaborators/traitors’ versus ‘resistors/nationalists’ were brought to the fore in 
public discourses after the ICC’s intervention. During colonial times, nationalists were 
individuals and groups who resisted British rule, such as the Kapenguria Six, trade 
unionists and freedom movements. Notably, the last group consisted of the Mau Mau, 
the Nandi rebellion, and other organized groups whose resistance accelerated Kenya’s 
fight for independence. Conversely, ‘traitors/collaborators’ were individuals and 
communities who cooperated with British colonialism, such as: Kikuyu home guards 
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(anti Mau Mau groups), and traditional leaders, including Nabongo Mumia of Wanga 
and Lenana of the Maasai. 
Therefore, the Jubilee Alliance’s translation of the ICC’s intervention as neo-colonial 
encouraged hints of whom/which ethnic groups were either ‘collaborators/traitors’ or 
‘resistors/nationalists. Many interviewees talked of the former as individuals and 
communities who were perceived as the ICC’s proponents, and the latter as the Court’s 
opponents. Such interpretations were specific to the majority of the Kikuyu and 
Kalenjin, who were convinced that the Court’s intervention was a reincarnation of 
colonialism. 
Simply put, the majority of the Kikuyu and Kalenjin who shared the Jubilee Alliance’s 
neo-colonial re-interpretations considered themselves as nationalists. On the contrary, 
they perceived other groups, mostly CORD supporters from Luo, Luhyia, Kisii and 
coastal communities, including their own, and civil society activists, who were not 
strongly opposed to the ICC or pronouncedly supported the Court, as 
‘collaborators/traitors.’ According to the ‘nationalists’ logic, opposition to the ICC was 
protective of withering Kenya’s sovereignty, whereas support constituted the 
promotion of Western imperialism. 
Furthermore, in the veneer of the binary differentiations were deep ethno-regional 
sentiments. As such, a peace activist revealed that amongst the majority of the Kalenjin, 
whoever supported the ICC was seen as an enemy of the community and its rejection 
was a point of convergence (Interview, Nakuru, Kenya, 11 November 2015). Likewise, 
a Kalenjin youth noted that Odinga’s support for the ICC, including their co-ethnics, 
portrayed them as traitors, pro-West, opponents and troublemakers (Interview, Nairobi, 
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Kenya, 2 October 2015). For his part, a Kikuyu politician wondered how some Kenyans 
could want one of their own to be convicted, suggesting that the ICC’s supporters were 
enemies of the Kikuyu nation (Interview, Nairobi, Kenya, 23 September 2015). 
In short, the neo-colonial interpretations were underpinned by a philosophy of we-ness, 
and concomitant disdain on ‘them’ who are against ‘us.’ As one Rift Valley peace 
activist argued, “in Kenya, the ICC divides and connects people” (Interview, Nakuru, 
Kenya, 2 November 2015). In other words, the neo-colonial narrative flourished 
because of, and continued entrenching, the pervasive deep ethnic cleavages in the 
Kenyan society which domestic TJ discourses, though inadequate, attempted to 
respond to. 
Nonetheless, the newfound Kikuyu/Kalenjin alliance was testament to negative peace, 
temporary ceasefire or superficial reconciliation. A Kikuyu youth narrated how their 
relationship with the Kalenjin was a truce and that of convenience, since the pain in 
their hearts would never let them forgive (Interview, Kiambu, Kenya, 30 November 
2015). In a similar vein, a Kalenjin politician posited that the reconciliation with the 
Kikuyu lasted as long as it was convenient, and that none of the issues which led them 
to the violence had been addressed (Interview, Nairobi, Kenya, 12 April 2016). As a 
peace activist noted, the Jubilee Alliance was not a reconciliation between communties, 
but an ethnic alliance that was glued by concerns on the ICC’s prosecution of leaders 
(Interview, Nairobi, Kenya, 27 October 2015). 
From the foregoing revelations of apparent non-closure amongst many Kikuyu and 
Kalenjin, it follows that the neo-colonial interpretations obfuscated the narratives of 
differences amongst them. For the purposes of fighting the ICC, the Jubilee Alliance 
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needed to construe the 2007/2008 PEV as spontaneous, and that peace had returned to 
Kenya. Though conveniently deployed to delegitimize the ICC and mobilize voters, 
these manoeuvres made it more difficult to address the divide between the two 
communities. 
To date, many Kikuyu who were evicted from the Rift Valley have not returned to their 
former homes or farms, despite their purported reconciliation with the Kalenjin. A 
Kikuyu peace activist based in the Rift Valley observed that many could not go back 
to their original land despite the government’s resettlement programmes, because of 
mistrust and fear (Interview, Nakuru, Kenya, 23 February 2016). According to the 
peace activist, some people say that: “I know my neighbour who killed my brother, 
how can I trust that he will not come down and kill me?” (ibid). In this regard, Daley 
(2013, 895) rightly argued that aggressions towards perceived ‘outsiders’ continuously 
produces group identities under conditions of “exclusionary practices,” due to the 
forms of their previous dislocation.  
Moreover, after Kenyatta’s charges were withdrawn in March 2015, and Ruto’s and 
Sang’s cases were ongoing, tensions escalated in the Rift Valley.22 There were fears of 
new waves of violence and retaliation against the Kikuyu, stemming from perceptions 
that Kenyatta had abandoned Ruto at the ICC. Indeed, a senior Kalenjin politician 
decried how the Kikuyu relaxed after Kenyatta’s case was offloaded, while the 
                                                          
22 Many peace activists advanced this proposition, as well as some Kikuyu and 
Kalenjin interviewees.  
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Kalenjins still felt pressurized by Ruto’s trials (Interview, Kalenjin youth, Nairobi, 
Kenya, 2 October 2015). 
More worryingly, the possibilities of Ruto’s conviction increased the risks of violence. 
For example, a peace activist noted that in the event of Ruto’s conviction, locals would 
mobilize violence and evict the Kikuyu from the Rift Valley (Interview, Nakuru, 
Kenya, 2 November 2015). A senior official in the Jubilee administration opined that 
there was uncertainty and caution on how the ICC process would end, which dampened 
the momentum for reconciliation (Interview, Nairobi, Kenya, 21 November 2015). 
As a result, some Kikuyu victims conducted prayers for an end to Sang’s and Ruto’s 
cases in April 2016. As one victim said, “we expect the best results … and if in any 
way they rule against their favour, we shall be forced to travel to ICC and appeal the 
decision” (cited in Kibor 2016,1). According to another victim, “they had reconciled 
and forgiven each other and are now engaging in development activities together” 
(ibid).  
The negative peace between the Kikuyu and Kalenjin is susceptible to an eventual 
breakdown, due to Kenya’s shifting ethnic alliances and political dynamics. Despite 
the Jubilee Alliance’s feats with the anti-ICC logic, the Kikuyu and Kalenjin continue 
to distrust each other, and the Alliance’s longevity is dependent on Kenyatta’s and 
Ruto’s healthy relations (Cheeseman et.al. 2014, 16). 
Overall, the neo-colonial narrative reinforced the salience of Kenya’s ethnic identities 
and a sense of difference and competition amongst them. This is particularly important, 
given that, while the Jubilee Alliance has held to date, many people question whether 
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it will continue after Kenyatta’s second term ends, and whether the Kikuyu will back 
Ruto in the next elections scheduled for 2022. 
Beyond the national level impacts on TJ, the ICC’s accusations of being selective in 
Uganda and neo-colonial in Kenya had implications for other regional conflict 
scenarios. The latter effects partly contributed to the Court’s legacy on the African 
continent.  
5.4. ‘Inventing’ the International Criminal Court’s legacy in Africa 
Contrary to aspirations of the drafters of the Rome Statute, the GoU’s selective referral 
and the Jubilee Alliance’s neo-colonial narratives invented the ICC’s legacies in the 
African region – demonstration effects and African protectionism. These outcomes 
undermined the ICC’s universality of justice in other conflicts scenarios, notably the 
DRC, Côte d’ivoire, South Sudan and Burundi. 
Precisely, the GoU’s example was followed by domestic authorities in the DRC and 
Côte d’Ivoire, who similarly invited the ICC to investigate their military/political 
opponents, with almost the same implications on TJ. On the other hand, the Jubilee 
Alliance’s neo-colonial narrative provided impetus for African protectionism as well 
as demonstration of the narrative’s utility in battling global justice. The beneficiaries 
of the Kenyan precedents included some of the affected political elites in South Sudan 
and Burundi.  
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5.4.1. Demonstration effects of Uganda’s selective referral and implications for 
transitional justice 
Perhaps, the GoU’s selective referral deciphered the ICC’s normative imperatives such 
as its blindness to justice, and aspirations of overcoming the Nuremberg legacies of 
victor’s justice. To this effect, a questions and answers section on a UN document 
indicated how on the occasion of the ICC’s establishment, there would be fair and 
competent judges, as well as protection of individuals from politically induced criminal 
prosecutions (UN 1998c, 1). 
Furthermore, it was clarified that there would be an equal application of criminal 
liability to all people, regardless of their senior positions in government (ibid, 1). This 
clarification spoke to Article 27 of the Rome Statute that deliberates on “irrelevance of 
official capacity,” or non-exemption of state officials from criminal liability based on 
their positions.  
Similarly, the OTP’s policy paper on Case Selection and Prioritization outlined their 
adherence to impartiality, which obtains from Articles 21(3) and 42(7) of the Rome 
Statute (ICC 2016c, 8). As further stated, the OTP would be guided by constant 
standards and methods, notwithstanding the States, parties, groups or individuals 
involved (ibid). Bensouda (2012, 506) reiterated that the ICC owes its legitimacy and 
standing to its working environment as dictated by the Rome Statute, and the OTP’s 
consistence, clarity, transparency, and predictability in its operations (ibid, 506). With 
regards to institutional legitimation, Bensouda argued that the ICC is in every respect 
a judicial actor, which enables it to operate in the political international sphere (ibid). 
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However, the GoU’s success with the selective referral signalled to other regional 
players that such a strategy was plausible at the ICC. Equally accused of committing 
international crimes, the DRC and Côte d’Ivoirean authorities appropriated the 
Ugandan precedent, thus entangling the ICC in the Nuremberg legacies that it so sought 
to disengage from. After state invitations, the ICC opened investigations in the DRC in 
June 2004, and October 2011 in Côte d’Ivoire (ICC, 2017a).  
The DRC situation emerged from the country’s long history of intractable conflicts that 
resulted from state failure. Accordingly, the UN Economic Commission for Africa 
(2015, vii) attributes the DRC’s fragility to a combination of factors, namely: a weak 
economy and macroeconomic conditions, poor governance, and a decline in social 
spheres. The Congolese conflicts were also induced by legacies of institutions which 
created and reinforced competitions state power and control of natural resources, 
differences of opinion on configuration of the state – federalism vs. centralization, and 
manipulation of citizenship and legislation by politicians (ibid, vii). Taken together, 
these factors undermined the state’s capacity to deliver public goods, thus creating 
enabling conditions for grievance versus greed motivated struggle for state power (ibid, 
vii).  
Beginning in 1996, the Congolese wars endured up to the 2000s after the ICC’s 
establishment. As a state party to the Rome Statute, the DRC was under obligations to 
commence domestic trials for the international crimes committed within its borders. 
Nevertheless, President Joseph Kabila opted to refer his military/political opponents to 
the ICC in June 2004, despite similarly facing accusations of committing war crimes. 
Hence, the DRC’s case selection was believed to be based on the ICC’s intentions of 
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cultivating cordial relations with government actors, thereby excusing them from 
prosecutions and enhancing the Court’s investigative activities (Clarke 2008). 
Since then, the ICC’s intervention in the DRC has focused on international crimes that 
were committed in the east, north and south Kivu, and in the Ituri region (ICC 2017a, 
1). The Court’s processes have subsequently led to: (1) convictions, in the case of The 
Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo and The Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga, (2) 
acquittal of Ngudojolo Chui and (3) ongoing trial of Bosco Ntaganda (ibid).  
Similarly, Côte d’Ivoire has endured state fragility that emanates from ethnic 
fractionalization and geographical inequalities between the north and south. The climax 
of the country’s fragility was the 2010-2011 political crisis that built up from the 
disputed presidential elections results. 
The main protagonists in the elections were Laurent Gbagbo (incumbent) and Alassane 
Ouattara (his main rival), whose supporters fought along ethnic, religious and regional 
differentiations. The ensuing violence led to the death of approximately 3, 000 
civilians, besides other human rights violations (Human Rights Watch 2011b, 26-90). 
With the backing of French soldiers, Ouattara declared a military victory in April 2011, 
and was consequently installed as the country’s president (ibid). 
As of the time of the political crisis, Côte d’Ivoire was not a state party to the Rome 
Statute, but had accepted the ICC’s jurisdiction in April 2010. The Presidency 
reconfirmed the acceptance in December 2010 and May 2011 (ICC, 2017a). Thus, the 
OTP requested Pre-Trial Chamber authorization to commence investigations in the 
country, which was granted in October 2011 (ICC, 2017a). 
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Subsequently, the OTP declared its intentions to impartially investigate the situation 
and prosecute alleged perpetrators of the violence (ICC 2011, 1). However, the 
prosecution’s successive focus on the losing side can be best described as “a tactical 
rapport with the government” (Rosenberg 2017, 475). In so doing, the OTP employed 
a pragmatic vision of impartiality rather than a political one; with a view of operating 
as “an effective prosecutorial body” in its interaction with the regime’s tactics in post-
crisis legitimation (ibid, 475). The political vision of impartiality dictates neutrality that 
involves simultaneous investigations and prosecutions of both sides of the political 
divide (ibid, 474). 
As such, the OTP’s charge sheet concentrated on the alleged atrocities committed by 
the pro-Gbagbo camp, namely: Laurent Gbagbo, his wife Simone and Charles Blé 
Goudé. The three were jointly accused of committing crimes against humanity in Côte 
d’Ivoire’s PEV (ICC 2016d, 1). Whereas Gbagbo and Blé Goudé are in the Court’s 
custody, with ongoing trials, Simone is still at large (ICC, 2015d). Simone was charged 
in national courts for war crimes, after which she was acquitted in March 2017 (Tawa 
and Engelsdorfer, 2016). 
As in the Ugandan case, the DRC and Côte d’Ivoirean situations faced similar 
experiences of the ICC’s investigation and prosecution of one side to the conflict. Such 
an approach was expected, due to the nature of the Court’s modus operandi of relying 
on state cooperation. Given that both the DRC and Côte d’Ivoire were also 
characterized by haphazardly implemented TJ frameworks, the ICC’s subsequent 
selective investigative and prosecutorial steps aggravated the limitations of their TJ 
mechanisms and prospects for long-term peace. 
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To illustrate, several problems undermine the DRC’s redress to its violent past, which 
also worsened with the ICC’s inattention to some of the alleged perpetrators. Although 
some suspected war criminals were prosecuted in domestic military courts and 
tribunals, the majority of them remained unpunished (Human Rights Watch 2014, 1). 
This was because of the reality of corruption, limited capacity and political meddling 
in the DRC’s justice system (ibid, 1). 
Additionally, the DRC authorities abandoned efforts to establish a truth commission, 
which implied a loss in avenues for accountability, truth-telling, promoting 
reconciliation and conflict mitigation (Tunamsifu, 2015). Moreover, the DRC’s 
vastness and the absence of the state in some parts of its territory endures it to protracted 
conflicts in the peripheries. These include instances of communal violence in the east 
in February 2016, and the August 2017 Kasai violence between militias and the 
government, that both led to civilian deaths and human rights violations (Voice of 
America, 2016; UN, 2017a).   
Likewise, Côte d’Ivoire’s post-conflict trajectory was bedevilled with numerous 
challenges at the domestic level, which the ICC’s single focus accentuated. For 
example, national criminal accountability for alleged perpetrators of the 2010-2011 
PEV was directed to losers in the civil strife, as the victors were guaranteed impunity 
(Kobi, 2016). Even though there were several instances of arbitrary detentions of 
opposition figures from the Ivorian Popular Front (Front populaire ivoirien, or FPI), 
the 20 pro-Ouattara soldiers who were equally accused of committing atrocities 
remained untouched (ibid). 
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The aforementioned developments negated the National Commission of Inquiry’s 
(CNE) report on the PEV that adduced evidence of both sides’ responsibility (Republic 
of Côte d’Ivoire, 2012). Hence, as Kobi (2016, 1) posited, the country’s judicial system 
constrained efforts at consolidating social cohesion by reinforcing impunity. 
Besides, the Commission for Dialogue, Truth and Reconciliation’s (CDVR) report on 
the PEV was not made public by the government (Human Rights Watch 2015, 57). 
Instead, the Ouattara regime established a national reparation and reconciliation 
commission, as the CDVR’s successor (ibid). Despite its attention to some of the 
victims’ needs, the selective focus on reparations undermined the far-reaching aims of 
addressing the triggers of the country’s political violence (ibid, 58). 
With the lack of comprehensive approaches to TJ, Côte d’Ivoire remained a deeply 
divided society. The ICC’s selective trials added to societal divisions by alluding to 
perpetuation of injustices amongst some sections of the society. In this regard, Kobi 
(2016,1) rightly argues that the ICC’s trial of Gbagbo and Charles Blé Goudé is 
inadequate in securing justice for victims. As Remi (2015,1) posited, Côte d’Ivoire’s 
reconciliation process is perhaps a ‘mission impossible,’ due to inattention to divisions, 
pronounced impunity and injustice, and the selective trials and intimidation of 
Gbagbo’s allies (ibid).  
Evidently, Uganda, the DRC and Côte d’Ivoire demonstrate the constraints that the 
ICC’s selective trials impose upon domestic peace processes. In a similar vein, Kenya’s 
neo-colonial narrative undermined the Court’s inputs in other conflicts scenatios in the 
region – South Sudan and Burundi.   
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5.4.2. Kenya’s neo-colonial narrative and African protectionism 
After Kenya’s promotion of the neo-colonial narrative, potential ICC situations 
(Burundi and South Sudan), were subsequently shielded from the Court’s prompt 
focus. As of the time of Burundi’s 2015 violence, it was an ICC member state, hence 
the Court could potentially trigger jurisdiction either through a self-referral or the 
proprio motu provision. Conversely, for South Sudan, a non-ICC member state, the 
ICC could only derive jurisdiction via the UNSC’s referral.  
None of the ICC’s three trigger mechanisms was promptly deployed to expedite the 
course of justice in the two countries. Burundi’s and South Sudan’s recent conflicts 
which warranted the Court’s interventions followed much longer histories of protracted 
political problems. 
Since gaining independence from Belgium in July 1962, Burundi has been entangled 
in political violence along clan, ethnic and regional fault lines (Vandeginste 2009, 66). 
Some of the episodes of Burundi’s violence include in 1965, 1972, 1988, 1991, and 
from 1993 onwards (Leclercq 2017, 7). According to Nkurunziza and Ngaruko (2005, 
2), grievances on poor governance and exclusion have fuelled cycles of violence and 
perpetual mistrust amongst the Tutsi and Hutu communities.  
The 1993 violence was triggered by the assassination of President Melchior Ndadaye, 
a Hutu, which led to a civil war whereby many people were killed and institutions 
collapsed (Leclercq 2017, 7). After the signing of a peace agreement in Arusha, 
Tanzania, in August 2000, Burundi experienced relative peace under power-sharing 
arrangements. 
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Following the 2005 elections, the Hutu led National Council for the Defence of 
Democracy-Forces for the Defence of Democracy (CNDD-FDD) assumed state 
authority (Nindorera, 2012). Since then, the CNDD-FDD has dominated Burundi’s 
political processes (ibid). The CNDD-FDD’s decision in 2015 to back President Pierre 
Nkurunziza for a controversial third term in violation of the Arusha peace agreement 
sparked new waves of violence (International Crisis Group, 2016). 
Thus, post-2015 Burundi was marked with fear, deepening social divisions, economic 
decline, urban guerrilla warfare, targeted assassinations, torture and disappearances 
(ibid). According to the UNSC (2017, 2) report of the Secretary General on Burundi, 
the violence led to increasing intolerance and harassment by the CNDD-FDD’s youth 
wing – Imbonerakure. By February 2017, approximately 387,000 Burundians had 
dispersed from the country, with the figure projected to go higher (ibid, 2).   
South Sudan gained independence in July 2011 from Sudan following a referendum 
that was part of the January 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA). The CPA 
sought to address some of the causes of civil wars that plagued Sudan between 1955 to 
1972, and 1983 to 2004 (Grawert 2010, 1). At the centre of the civil wars were 
grievances against economic marginalization and exclusion from the Arab dominated 
government (ibid). 
The second set of civil wars were fought by Sudan People’s Liberation Army (SPLA), 
under the leadership of John Garan’g. After Garan’g’s death in July 2005 in a plane 
crash, his deputy, Salva Kiir, was named his successor in August that year (Nguyen, 
2005). Kiir became South Sudan’s president after the South’s independence, with Riek 
Machar as his deputy. Nevertheless, autonomy brought to the fore the salience of South 
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Sudan’s ethnicity as a marker of identity and division, and a lack of national identity 
(Stigant 2013, 1). 
Within the SPLA, factional politics escalated between rival factions of Kiir (a Dinka), 
and Machar (a Nuer). Afterwards, their rivalries spilled over into large scale communal 
violence, and a resurgence in the historical split between the Dinka and the Nuer 
(Stigant, 2013). The Dinka and the Nuer have historically been embroiled in localized 
conflicts over pasture and grazing land, a rivalry which was carried over in their wars 
for independence (Ayiei, 2014). 
The first overt form of power struggles between the Dinka and the Nuer emerged from 
ideological differences between John Garan’g (a Dinka), and Samwel Gai Tut (a Nuer) 
in 1984, which led to their direct confrontations. As a result, Garan’g killed Gai Tut, 
after which another Nuer military leader, Abdallah Chuol, fought Garan’g forces with 
an almost entirely Nuer army (ibid). 
More so, the Dinka-Nuer split culminated in a fully-fledged war in 1991 after Garan’g’s 
and Machar’s ideological differences over independence (ibid). Whereas Machar 
wanted the full separation of South Sudan from Sudan, Garan’g’s vision was a unified 
new Sudan (ibid). With the disagreements developing into tribal warfare, both Garan’g 
and Machar orchestrated widespread massacres against each other’s community, which 
led to Dinka and Nuer’s further divisions and mistrust (ibid). 
As such, Kiir’s dismissal of Machar from the vice-presidency in July 2013 was 
perceived by the Nuers as “Dinkas’ final step in silencing them in politics” (ibid, 1). 
These perceptions ignited ethnic animosities and triggered new waves of violence (ibid, 
1). 
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Starting from December 2013, South Sudan’s civil war resulted in “widespread and 
systematic attacks,” and the commission of crimes against humanity, including murder, 
rape and other acts of sexual violence (UNMISS 2014, 3). More worryingly, by 22 
April 2014, more than 78,000 IDPs had sought protection at the UN’s bases, from an 
estimation of over 1,000,000 displaced across the country (ibid, 17).  
The conflict temporarily came to a halt after mediation by the Intergovernmental 
Authority on Development (IGAD) in August 2015. The parties to the conflict agreed 
to the formation of a Transitional Government of National Unity (TGoNU), which was 
to embark on a raft of TJ initiatives in order to work towards more sustainable peace 
(IGAD, 2015). The parties to the conflict agreed on establishing the Commission for 
Truth, Reconciliation and Healing (CTRH), a hybrid judicial institution – the Hybrid 
Court for South Sudan (HCSS), and Compensation and Reparation Authority (CRA) 
(ibid, 40). These endeavours were envisaged as platforms of building “an inclusive and 
democratic society founded on the rule of law” (ibid, 3).   
However, the feasibility of South Sudan’s peace was undermined by the apparent lack 
of political will to exercise restraint and adhere to IGAD’s recommendations on TJ. As 
the AU Commission revealed, many people in South Sudan did not have confidence in 
either the national judiciary or the political system to deliver accountability for the 
violence (AU 2014, 300). Moreover, in a 2016 New York Times opinion piece, Kiir 
and Machar (2016, 1) suggested that the country’s unity was best guaranteed by 
pursuing peace as opposed to criminal accountability. According to them, it was better 
to grant amnesty to alleged perpetrators of the violence, even in the absence of their 
expression of remorse (ibid).  
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Furthermore, Kiir and Machar called on the international community, and more so the 
USA and the UK, to rescind their stances on the envisaged Hybrid Court for South 
Sudan (ibid). Instead, they proposed the path of pursuing truth and reconciliation 
processes (ibid). Additionally, timelines for creating the hybrid court were expunged 
in the final signed peace settlement, making the process open-ended (UN 2017b, 13). 
Also, at a 2017 meeting on TJ, the South Sudanese authorities reiterated their 
unwillingness to pursue the accountability path by declaring their preference for peace, 
as opposed to establishing the hybrid tribunal (Sudan Tribune, 2017).   
South Sudan’s TJ was significantly undermined by the collapse of the peace agreement 
in July 2016. After fighting erupted in Juba, Machar, together with hundreds of his 
soldiers, fled the country, leading to further escalation of the conflicts (Ainebyoona and 
Kasasir, 2016). The civil war continued from then, with the commission of atrocities 
by both the government and opposition forces (Human Rights Watch 2017b, 1). 
Notwithstanding the South Sudanese authorities’ blatant admissions of unwillingness 
to prosecute the atrocities, and the escalating humanitarian situation, the UNSC was 
hesitant to refer another African situation to the ICC. Such a referral would attract 
backlashes from the AU and individual African states. With the deadlocks in the UNSC 
in referring other potential situations, such as Syria, Yemen, and Israel/Palestine, an 
African referral would reinforce the arguments that the ICC is surely targeting 
Africans. 
More so, regional human rights activists did not call for the UNSC’s referral, but opted 
to support the tribunal’s establishment, despite their reservations on its feasibility. A 
senior Amnesty International’s official revealed that many human rights activists were 
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pushing for the tribunal, “because they did not want drama, and the ICC in South Sudan 
would be madness” (Interview, Nairobi, Kenya, 13 August 2015). The head of the EU 
delegation to the AU also backed the tribunal’s formation and indicated their readiness 
to support it (Barasa 2016, 1). 
Revealing African protectionism, the AU commission’s recommendations on criminal 
accountability for South Sudan were loaded with such phrases as: “Africa-led, Africa-
owned, Africa-resourced and the AU’s leadership” (AU 2014, 300). Instructively, the 
AU’s language left little room for manoeuvres with an international criminal 
intervention, in addition to sending a clear message that the ICC’s intervention was 
unwarranted in South Sudan. As a human rights activist argued, Kenya’s anti-ICC 
rhetoric and the AU’s collective action “created an environment where there is no 
alternative voice:  the AU is governments, and the governments are the only voices,” 
which is certainly the most dangerous situation” (Interview, Nairobi, Kenya, 20 August 
2015).  
Similarly, in Burundi, prompt domestic action on the violence was limited because of 
the direct involvement of the CNDD-FDD regime. As a result, the ICC instituted 
preliminary investigations in the situation of Burundi (ICC, 2017d). This followed the 
OTP’s findings that the 2015 Burundian political crisis amounted to more than 430 
civilian deaths, 3,400 arrests and over 230,000 forced displacements (ICC, 2017d). The 
OTP also noted that several communications and reports described acts of killing, 
imprisonment, torture, rape and other forms of sexual violence and enforced 
disappearances, which all fell within the ICC’s ambit (ibid). In September 2017, the 
OTP requested Pre-Trial Chamber III for an authorization to open investigations 
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proprio motu (under seal), which was granted on 25 October, before the maturity of 
Burundi’s withdrawal from the ICC (ICC, 2017). 
The ICC’s decision to intervene in Burundi, and the country’s eventual withdrawal 
from the Rome Statue were preceded by neo-colonial narratives that domestic political 
elites appropriated to shield them from justice. By deciding to withdraw from the ICC 
altogether, the Burundian authorities utilized a more radical version of Kenya’s 
adversarial exchanges with the Court. 
In efforts to curtail the ICC’s action, Burundi’s top government officials articulated the 
neo-colonial narrative in international and local spaces. For example, at an ASP 
meeting, the Burundian delegation alluded to the ICC’s neo-colonialism, condemned 
the Court and warned of adverse consequences (Interview, CICC official, Kampala, 
Uganda, 27 January 2016). 
Locally, political elites triggered debates on the ICC that were lauded with undertones 
of Africa’s subservience to global powers, and a need for asserting sovereignty. These 
led to a final vote in the National Assembly, whereby the lower house voted for 
withdrawal from the ICC, after which the decision was unanimously endorsed by the 
senate (Ngendakumana, 2016). Afterwards, Burundi sent its notification to withdraw 
from the Rome Statute to the UN in October 2016 (UN, 2016). Given its actions, 
Burundi extracted “reputational benefits” from other African countries that pursue 
impendence from the ICC, an institution that is conflated with neo-colonial intentions 
(Vandeginste 2016, 3). 
Explaining the withdrawal in the National Assembly, Justice Minister, Aimée 
Laurentine Kanyana, argued that the ICC is biased towards African suspects, and is 
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used by the West to exert pressure and domination on poorer states (cited in 
Ngendakumana 2016, 1). Furthermore, Minster Kanyana observed that there was no 
justification for Burundi’s membership in the Rome Statute, because the Statute is “not 
respected anymore” and non-members have undue influence in its processes (ibid, 1). 
Hence, Kanyana declared that Burundi ought to defend its sovereignty from an 
“international conspiracy” that was determined to subvert a popularly elected 
government (ibid, 1).  
Against the backdrop of domestic inaction, the UN Human Rights Council mandated a 
Commission of Inquiry on Burundi, which documented instances of atrocities. The 
commission believed that attacks on the civilian population that occurred since April 
2015, amounted to crimes that were under the Rome Statute (UN 2017c, 13). Citing 
Burundi’s impunity and lack of judicial independence, the commission called for a 
prompt ICC intervention (ibid, 16). 
To open up Burundi for investigations, the commission called on the authorities to 
rescind their ICC withdrawal venture, cooperate with ongoing preliminary 
investigations, and continue with that cooperation, as well as ensure the protection of 
victims and witnesses (UN 2017c, 18). In turn, the Burundian authorities resorted to 
the neo-colonial rhetoric against the ICC. 
For example, Willy Nyamitwe, the senior adviser to the Burundian President, declared 
that the report was authored by mercenaries to legitimize Western narratives, with the 
aim of inviting the ICC – the West’s tool of enslaving Africans (cited in Ngendakumana 
2017, 1) Likewise, a CNDD-FDD party official argued that the UN report was 
unimpressive due to its aims of facilitating the ICC’s political motives in Africa, and 
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not justice (Ngendakumana 2017, 1). For a Burundian diplomat to Russia, the report 
was the ICC’s and Western powers’ vengeance for Burundi’s intentions of withdrawing 
from the Court (cited in Egorov 2017, 1). 
Burundi’s neo-colonial claims were intensified after the ICC’s decision to intervene 
following the preliminary examinations. Declaring Burundi’s intentions of non-
cooperation, Minister Kanyana stated that the Court decision confirmed “the 
politicization of human rights and international justice, as well as the attempt to 
destabilize African countries” (cited in AFP, 2017). Thus, in the event the ICC 
intensifies its intervention, Burundi’s neo-colonial affront is likely to attract the AU’s 
collective actions, given the regional body’s history with the ICC, and recent 
condemnation of the Court’s decision by the Ugandan and Tanzanian presidents 
(N’gwanakilala, 2017).  
In sum, Africa’s renewed protectionism against the ICC resulted in two sets of 
paradigms: protected African states and a cautious Court. With regards to the former, 
Uganda’s Deputy Speaker declared Africa’s intentions of abandoning the ICC if it 
continues to focus on African leaders (Amamukirori 2017, 1).  Moreover, as a senior 
Jubilee administration official observed, there would be no ICC in Africa, if the Court’s 
defendants continue to be exclusively Africans (Interview, Nairobi, 21 November 
2015). These sentiments were premised on the view that an African focus reinforces 
discrimination, promotes imbalance, and cost reputation, which Africans would not 
tolerate (ibid).  
For the ICC, the consequences of African protectionism caused more caution and 
restraint on its part, in order to avoid entanglements on the continent. As a human rights 
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activist revealed, “the ICC is now cautious, and the international community is careful 
too to refer matters. There is political and diplomatic baggage from Africa” (Interview, 
Nairobi, Kenya, 9 October 2015). Likewise, an ICC official talked of the far-reaching 
consequences of the neo-colonial narrative, thus: 
The ICC cannot investigate cases it would like to, since then, it has to be 
cautious and selective about the cases it has to bring to trial … but since 
the ICC’s mandate is to investigate serious breaches to international law, it 
therefore has to use the gravity test more carefully. (Interview, The Hague, 
Netherlands, 22 July 2015) 
To summarize, the ICC’s inattention to deserving situations, such as Burundi and South 
Sudan (owing to African protectionism) compounds their internal challenges in 
overcoming accountability debacles. At best, Burundi’s TJ is described as disjointed 
with varying interests, preferences, and motives, thus undermining societal 
transformation (Leclercq 2017,1). Moreover, the challenges to Burundi’s TJ have led 
to multiple forms of injustice, including: denial of justice via ‘provisional immunities,’ 
denial of justice via negotiations geared towards paralysis, and potential imbalanced 
justice via the timing of the truth-telling process (ibid, 1). 
In contrast, South Sudan is yet to embark on TJ processes, which could perhaps be 
accelerated with an active ICC intervention. As such, the Court would express a need 
for complementarity and victims’ centeredness, thus stimulating international 
cooperation towards these endeavours.  
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5.5.  Conclusion 
So far, it is evident that the narratives on the ICC’s intervention in both Uganda and 
Kenya portended as antithetical to domestic TJ discourses, with far reaching 
implications for other fragile societies on the continent. In Uganda and Kenya, the 
narratives reproduced and reinforced dominant but divisive binaries: the GoU’s 
dichotomy of ‘just’ versus ‘unjust’ actors in the northern conflict, and Kenya’s ethno- 
regional divisions. 
Consequently, in Uganda, the ensuing binaries reinforced perceptions of injustices in 
the north, as all performances of the narrative contents of the past (traditional justice, 
amnesty law and the ICC interventions) were focused on LRA atrocities. This led to 
large amounts of silence amongst northerners, because of their limited opportunities in 
narrating alleged regime atrocities via formal platforms. In Kenya, the neo-colonial 
narrative departed from the aspirations of TJ by reinvigorating ethnic divisions along 
support for or opposition to the ICC. In so doing, the narrative propounded negative 
peace that subsumed narratives of differences amongst the antagonistic Kikuyu and 
Kalenjin communities. 
Besides their domestic impacts on TJ mechanisms, the narratives had far reaching 
implications for other conflict situations on the continent, thus inventing the ICC’s 
legacy. Whereas Uganda’s selectivity had demonstration effects of the Court’s 
malleability to misappropriation, the neo-colonial narrative renewed African 
protectionism, and fuelled a perception of the ICC as neo-colonial, which shielded 
several potential ICC situations from prompt interventions. 
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Worryingly though, Uganda’s and Kenya’s challenges on TJ were compounded by the 
dilemmas of complementarity that stemmed from contextual difficulties in effecting 
the innovation. The next chapter examines the dilemmas of complementarity in the two 
countries as further evidence of their impasses on TJ.  
Chapter 6 
The dilemmas of complementarity 
With the onset of the ICC’s interventions in Uganda and Kenya, it was anticipated that 
the principle of complementarity would contribute to domestic efforts at combating 
impunity atrocity crimes and strengthen the rule of law. In contrast, the principle 
achieved little success, even after international cooperation in performing positive 
complementarity – strengthening domestic legal, investigative and prosecutorial 
infrastructures. 
This chapter presents the dilemmas of complementarity in Uganda and Kenya as 
indications of the limits of the ICC’s normative imperatives that arise from 
complexities and competing paradigms in fragile societies. The two countries’ 
complementarity stories provide insights on the transferability of some of the ICC’s 
innovations to local spaces, against the backdrop of local contestations over legitimacy 
and authority in the nurture of post-conflict transitions. In so doing, the chapter revives 
the peace versus justice debate, which is a long standing discursive frame in sequencing 
the two paradigms in transitional societies. The debate is applied with regards to the 
applicability of the complementarity regime and its confrontation with realities on the 
ground. 
215 
 
Specifically, the chapter demonstrates non-compliance on complementarity as 
exhibited in the traction of amnesty in Uganda, and the Jubilee Alliance’s pervasive 
peace over justice messaging. In the Ugandan situation, the chapter highlights 
amnesty’s appeal as a pull factor for combatants to abandon rebellion, as well as its 
battles with justice due to the agency of some victims and powerful force of 
international norms. For Kenya, the chapter discusses the Jubilee Alliance’s continued 
opposition to the ICC and promotion of ‘peace’ through persuasions (of the Kikuyu 
and Kalenjin communties), and coercion of justice advocates that increased the risks 
of social exclusion and security. 
The next part of this chapter revisits the peace versus justice conundrum and locates 
the statutory obligations imposed upon domestic authorities to cooperate with the ICC, 
including on the principle of complementarity. Thereafter, the chapter attends to 
Uganda’s and Kenya’s experiences with complementarity and international 
cooperation towards these endeavours. The chapter then explains the two countries’ 
dismal performances on complementarity, owing to the reinvigoration of the peace 
versus justice debate. More explicitly, this part discusses the traction of amnesty in 
Uganda and its battles with justice, and the Jubilee Alliance’s peace narrative that 
undermined complementary trials for the 2007/2008 PEV. Finally, the chapter 
concludes by suggesting that the two countries’ experiences offer a more nuanced 
explanation for the remote success of the complementarity regime, rather than 
arguments in favour of impunity. Indeed, the peace versus justice debate still reigns in 
nurturing post-conflict transitions, despite the significance of justice for long-term 
peace, and the ICC’s innovations with such principles as complementarity.  
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6.1. The peace versus justice debate: the primacy of justice over peace? 
Perhaps, the establishment of the permanent ICC was an indication of the increasing 
recognition of the primacy of justice over short-term considerations for peace in 
transitions from conflict scenarios. Additionally, the Court’s calls for international 
cooperation in prosecuting heinous crimes, together with its complementarity regime 
further stifled sympathies for the peace track. 
With the ICC’s articulation of the ever urgency for justice, Ugandan and Kenyan 
authorities were called upon to cooperate in prosecuting alleged perpetrators of mass 
atrocities, including by commencing complementary domestic trials. It is therefore 
critical to assess the GoU’s and the Jubilee Alliance’s compliance with the ICC on 
complementarity, given the former’s cooperation with the LRA’s prosecutions at The 
Hague, and the latter’s defiance to international justice.  
Over time, the peace versus justice debate has informed ideational paradigms regarding 
transitions of post-conflict societies to long-term peace (Hale, 2017; Oette, 2010). 
Central in the conundrum are discussions on whether to pursue one track over the other, 
or the appropriate sequencing of the two tracks. Thus, even if justice and peace were 
to co-exist, there are differences of opinion on how to strike a balance between the 
approaches to attaining peace and justice (Keller 2008, 14). 
Weighing in on the peace versus justice dilemma, the Overseas Development Institute 
(ODI) expresses the difficult choices that transitional societies have to make in 
overcoming past abuses, while also undertaking peace-building (ODI 2009, 1). 
Whereas inaction emboldens impunity and propagates feelings of loss, injustice, 
trauma and exclusion amongst victims, the justice track can undermine peace initiatives 
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especially where perpetrators are still powerful (ibid, 1). The former ICTY and ICTR 
chief prosecutor, Richard Goldstone, opines that at the beginning, prosecutions might 
undermine peace processes, while trials have also helped, rather than undermine peace 
deliberations (Goldstone 2005,421).  
To some observers, the peace versus justice conundrum is unwarranted or even a false 
dichotomy. For example, the International Center for Transitional Justice (ICTJ) argues 
that there has been a significant shift in the practice of exempting powerful perpetrators 
from justice during peace negotiations (ICTJ 2011, 1). According to the ICTJ, 
achieving lasting peace depends on criminal accountability, rather than the immediate 
aims of conflict termination (ibid, 1). Likewise, Meron (2011, 157) concludes that the 
peace versus justice dichotomy is incorrect, and that justice is a significant ingredient 
to peace and reconciliation. 
Nevertheless, proponents of the justice track also agree on a need for sequencing, given 
that criminal trials are only possible when a certain level of peace is in place. By the 
same token, the drafters of the Rome Statute contemplated the UNSC’s deferral of the 
ICC’s proceedings in case they pose a significant threat to international peace and 
security. 
Turning to the primacy of justice over peace, it has been argued that the former lays 
the base for a culture of accountability in fragile societies, despite its threats to peace 
negotiations (Mendez and Kelley 2015, 481). In this regard, justice should not be 
subject to bargaining, predisposed to the whims of peace processes, and it must work 
on its own separate channels (ibid). There are also suggestions that notwithstanding the 
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contestations on the deterrent effects of ICJ, it is obvious that a culture of impunity 
bolsters the commission of atrocities, or intensification of ongoing conflicts (ibid, 483). 
Furthermore, the recitals in the preamble of the Rome Statute indicate the international 
community’s conscious decision to connect peace and justice (ibid). In the preamble 
of the Statute, the global community: affirms “that the most serious crimes must not go 
unpunished,”23 is “determined to put an end to impunity for the perpetrators of these 
crimes,”24 and “recalls that it is the duty of every State to exercise its criminal 
jurisdiction over those responsible for international crimes.”25 These aspirations were 
predicated on the notion that “such grave crimes threaten the peace, security and well-
being of the world.”26 In this regard,  Mendez and Kelly (2015) rightly asserted that the 
ICC created new rules which actors must adjust to, such as on international cooperation 
and the complementarity regime.  
The most overt speculations of the peace versus justice debate within the Rome Statute 
are Articles 53 (1) (c) and 53 (2) (c), that provide for the OTP’s discretions on whether 
to proceed with investigations “in the interests of justice.” Nevertheless, a 2007 internal 
OTP policy paper on “the interests of justice” settled the speculations (ICC, 2007). In 
it, the OTP clarified that Article 53 would be invoked in exceptional circumstances, 
and that there is a presumption in favour of prosecutions. The OTP also argued that the 
                                                          
23 Preamble, Rome Statute.  
24 Ibid. 
25 Ibid. 
26 Ibid. 
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interests of peace fall under the ambit of other institutions and not the ICC (ibid, 4). 
Finally settling the speculations, the OTP concluded that “the issue is no longer about 
whether we agree or disagree with the pursuit of justice in moral or practical terms: it 
is the law” (ibid, 4).  
Moreover, the OTP affirmed that adulteration of justice results in unabated cycles of 
violence, given the past precedents of peace negotiations (Bensouda, 2013). For this 
reason, the OTP concluded peace should be achieved through justice (ibid, 1). Thus, in 
order to guarantee long-term peace, Ugandan and Kenyan authorities were under 
statutory and normative compulsions to match the ICC’s trials with complementary 
domestic prosecutions for their incidents of mass atrocities.   
6.2. Putting complementarity into practice 
Besides statutory obligations to comply with the Rome Statute, complementarity 
expounded a division of labour between the ICC and domestic mechanisms.  Ideally, 
Uganda’s and Kenya’s implementation of the passive variant of complementarity 
would strengthen national rule of law programmes, and avail avenues of justice to many 
victims of the northern conflict and the 2007/2008 PEV. In so doing, complementarity 
would provide a more realistic account of the international community’s aspirations of 
constructing a moral universe, in which impunity for heinous crimes is confronted. 
As a first step towards complementarity, the urgency for criminal accountability for the 
northern conflict was expressed in the Juba peace negotiations, and during discourses 
amongst interested parties.  At Juba, several informal discussions were held with the 
LRA, in which it was clarified that accountability would be part of any final settlement 
(Wierda and Otim 2011, 1164). The LRA delegation was also reminded that the 
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international community and the affected populations were intolerant to any peace 
agreement with amnesty clauses (ibid). As an official in the DPP’s office revealed, they 
could not watch impunity unfold for the LRA atrocities in defiance of international 
norms, due to their capacity as an institution charged with criminal justice (Interview, 
Kampala, Uganda, 31 March 2016).  
Notwithstanding the GoU’s stated intentions of complying with the obligations to 
prosecute atrocity crimes, the authorities encountered considerable domestic resistance 
from ongoing amnesty processes. To a significant number of many combatants, 
amnesty appealed as a pull factor to abandon rebellion and rebuild their lives, as 
opposed to the threats of prosecutions. To this end, Uganda’s complementarity ventures 
only roped in one former LRA commander, Thomas Kwoyelo, whereas the amnesty 
process is still on course.  
In the Kenyan situation, and as mentioned in Chapter 3, a handful of low and mid-level 
suspects of the 2007/2008 PEV were prosecuted at the High Court, while most of the 
alleged perpetrators remained at large (Human Rights Watch, 2011a). Moreover, 
governance and human rights activists, notably KPTJ, worked with some victims to 
push the accountability agenda. KPTJ’s efforts led to harnessing many victims’ voices, 
and their mobilization into a community of justice (Interview, CSO official, Nairobi, 
Kenya, 8 February 2016).  As a result, some victims sought redress in court, including 
on reparations for SGBV, police brutality and forced displacements (Interview, human 
rights activist, Nairobi, Kenya, 20 August 2015). 
Yet, all mid and higher level, and the vast majority of low level suspects still remained 
at large because of the Jubilee Alliance’s stiff opposition to criminal accountability for 
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the 2007/2008 PEV. The Jubilee Alliance’s opposition to the ICC’s intervention 
extended to the complementarity regime, under a pervasive peace messaging that was 
enforced by a combination of persuasions to the Kikuyu and Kalenjin communities and 
coercion of justice advocates. Consequently, the latter group was exposed to risks of 
social exclusion and security, particularly in the (Rift Valley and Central) regions that 
accounted for a substantial combination of victims and alleged perpetrators of the 
2007/2008 PEV. 
As further evidence of resistance to complementarity in Uganda and Kenya, there was 
no motion in effecting the principle, even after international cooperation in performing 
‘positive complementarity.’ The basis for assisting Uganda and Kenya improve on their 
institutional and prosecutorial capacities was constructive (international) 
interpretations of inabilities, that called for sustained local-international exchanges in 
performing complementarity. However, this explanation was an error in judgement, as 
it departed from statutory interpretation of admissibility (Article 17), that hinted at local 
normative resistance to criminal prosecutions.   
6.2.1. Performing positive complementarity 
The proponents of positive complementarity envisaged it as a remedy for Uganda’s and 
Kenya’s institutional failures in prosecuting alleged perpetrators of mass atrocities. 
With assistance from transnational, international and local actors, the two countries 
accelerated steps at reforming their legislative, investigative and adjudicative 
capacities to enhance complementarity. Specifically, the two countries were assisted in 
drafting national ICC implementing legislations, training and hiring prosecutors, 
reforming national courts, and strengthening other prosecutorial functions. 
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It is important to note that some of the aforementioned reform initiatives coincided 
with routine rule of law programming and assistance from international actors. Parallel 
to reforming local institutions for complementarity, Uganda had a sector wide approach 
– the Justice Law and Order Sector (JLOS) – that is based in the Ministry of Justice. 
The JLOS is a multi-sectoral organ that links institutions that have close functions of 
justice administration and rule of law programmes, in order to come up with common 
action plans and policies (Republic of Uganda, 2017a). Likewise, Kenya had a cross-
cutting institutional strengthening programme under the Governance, Justice Law and 
Order Sector (GJLOS) in the Justice Ministry (Republic of Kenya, 2017). In addition, 
the new constitution of 2010 triggered a plethora of reforms in Kenya’s administration 
of justice and the security sector.  
The starting point of performing Uganda’s positive complementarity was at the Juba 
peace processes where the ICC’s normative framework had a bearing on the final 
settlements.  A human rights activist who participated in the mediation reveals that 
pressure from the ICC guided how the agreements were crafted, with a clarity that there 
was no blanket amnesty (Interview, Kampala, Uganda, 3 February 2016). Towards this 
end, delegations at the conference had to “carefully navigate and propose measures that 
were not in conflict with the ICC and give it room to operate” (ibid). 
Consequently, the ‘Agreement on Accountability and Reconciliation between the GoU 
and the LRA’ made references to the ICC in some of its recommendations. In the 
agreement, the parties stated their commitment to combat impunity and promote 
redress mechanisms that aligned to international obligations and the Rome Statute’s 
complementarity principle (Republic of Uganda 2007a, 1). Moreover, they agreed to 
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commit any alleged individual perpetrators of human rights abuses or international 
crimes to formal criminal and civil justice (ibid, 5). Subsequently, in the agreement’s 
annexure, there was a provision for the establishment of “a special division of the High 
Court of Uganda” to affect the provision of criminal accountability (Republic of 
Uganda 2007b,3). 
Therefore, the GoU created the War Crimes Division (WCD) within the High Court in 
2008, and later renamed it the International Crimes Division (ICD). Justifying the 
ICD’s establishment, the GoU argued that it was an ICC complementarity Court, in 
compliance with the Rome Statute and the Juba mediation agreement (Republic of 
Uganda 2017b, 1). Since then, the ICD has slightly departed from the norms of ICJ by 
expanding its jurisdiction to include terrorism, human trafficking, piracy and other 
international crimes, besides the traditional war crimes, crimes against humanity and 
genocide (ibid). 
As a government official revealed, the ICD’s judges were also trained and exposed to 
international crimes and tribunals in Sierra Leone, and in The Hague (Interview, 
Kampala, Uganda, 3 February 2016). There were also trainings at specialized levels 
and support to the ICD in developing its regulations (ibid). 
To further perform complementarity, Ugandan authorities were assisted in drafting the 
ICC’s implementation legislation. In so doing, the country adopted The 
Commonwealth’s Model Law, which culminated in the International Crimes Act of 
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2010 (De Vos 2015, 386). The Act “gives effect to the Statute and provides for offences 
under Ugandan law corresponding to offences within the jurisdiction of that Court.”27 
There were also efforts at improving Uganda’s witnesses and victims’ protection 
schemes. According to the UN Office for the High Commissioner of Human Rights 
(OHCHR), Uganda’s legislative and policy guidelines were inadequate in enhancing 
witnesses and victims’ protection and, hence needed to adapt to ICJ best practices 
(OHCHR, 2010). Subsequently, Ugandan authorities drafted a witness protection bill, 
which is pending adoption in parliament. Under the influence of the ICC’s precedents, 
the GoU also embarked on enhancing victim centeredness by: transforming the 
complaints desk into victims’ desk, conducting outreach, and appointing counsels for 
victims (Interview, judiciary official, Kampala, Uganda, 31 March 2016).  
Summing up Uganda’s significant steps towards positive complementarity, an ICC 
outreach official narrated how, 
The ICD is a concrete example of complementarity to the communities. 
Uganda has gone steps ahead. The question is, how does it become 
functional? They went to The Hague for a study visit. The witnesses’ 
protection borrows heavily from the Court. One of the most concrete things 
is the ICD. (Interview, Kampala, Uganda, 2 February 2016) 
As in Uganda, Kenya’s ability to perform complementarity included improvements in 
domestic legal, investigative and prosecutorial capabilities. A human rights activist 
who followed Kenya’s journey on positive complementarity revealed that the 
                                                          
27 International Crimes Act, 2010 
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government embraced the concept, and was open to improving capacity (Interview, 
Nairobi, Kenya, 7 October 2015). 
First, with the assistance of international actors, the National Assembly drafted and 
passed the International Crimes Act of 2008. In this vein, Kenya followed the 
commonwealth script that Uganda used in implementing a similar legislation (De Vos, 
2015). Accordingly, the Act “made provision for the punishment of certain 
international crimes … and enabled Kenya to co-operate with the ICC in the 
performance of its functions.”28  
Second, Kenyan authorities mulled with the idea of establishing an International 
Crimes Division (ICD) within the High Court in 2012. According to the Judicial 
Service Commission (JSC), creating the ICD was the best bet for Kenya in order to 
comply with the principle of complementarity and uphold state sovereignty (Republic 
of Kenya 2012, 9). Also, the JSC noted that local trials have symbolic effects, 
including: setting examples and standards, and effecting the sanctity of the rule of law 
(ibid, 142). The JSC went further to show how the ICC’s inability to handle many cases 
constrains its role in combating impunity, hence a need to establish domestic systems 
(ibid, 139). 
Following the Ugandan precedent, Kenya’s ICD was envisaged to have jurisdiction for 
traditional international crimes, and other transnational crimes, namely: drug 
trafficking, human trafficking, money laundering, cybercrime, terrorism and piracy 
(ibid, 39). According to the JSC, the ICD would adopt the ICC’s standards, with similar 
                                                          
28 International Crimes Act, 2008.  
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guidelines and modes of operation (ibid, 149). The JSC also proposed the establishment 
of a well facilitated and independent prosecution unit within the DPP’s office to deal 
exclusively with international crimes (ibid). 
To inspire public confidence, the chairman of the ICD steering committee revealed that 
they had completed consultations with most agencies and the civil society, besides 
visiting Uganda, Rwanda, Cambodia and The Hague to learn best practices (Barasa, 
2013). Given the ICD’s potential, its architects argued that it would determine the 
ICC’s success in Kenya (ibid). This optimism was boosted by the DPP’s revelations 
that out of some 5, 300 PEV which were under investigations, a multi-sectoral task 
force had settled on some 4,500 cases that were open for further investigations (ibid). 
The ICD’s envisioned establishment was welcomed in several quarters as a 
revolutionary concept in opening avenues for prosecuting many suspects of the 
violence. For instance, the Law Society of Kenya (LSK) hailed “the long overdue 
decision” as a crucial step for prosecuting mid-level perpetrators (Barasa, 2013). For 
his part, the German director of International Law at the Federal Foreign Office, Dr 
Pascal Hector, noted that the ICD was important because it would prosecute mid-level 
suspects and other serious crimes (cited in Barasa 2013, 1). Besides, TJRC’s final 
report called for an acceleration of the ICD process (Republic of Kenya 2013, 9). Some 
victims also hailed the ICD proposal, arguing that it would increase their chances of 
prosecuting their tormentors (Amnesty international 2014, 32). Similarly, governance 
and human rights activists welcomed the ICD idea as part of the long search for justice 
for victims of the PEV (KPTJ 2014, 14). 
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In spite of the ICD’s potential, it did not take off because of inadequate political will. 
Although a meeting was held in February 2014 with the judiciary, law enforcement 
agencies and development partners on the ICD’s establishment, no concrete steps were 
followed through (Amnesty International 2014, 25). A former judiciary official 
revealed that the ICD was not a genuine effort at criminal accountability, but a scheme 
to frustrate the ICC’s prosecution of Kenyan cases, and it was supposed to be “still 
born at birth” (Interview, Nairobi, Kenya, 22 September 2015). Indeed, Kenya’s 
submissions at the ICC on case deferrals made reference to domestic investigative 
steps, including the new constitution of 2010 and a reformed judiciary. 
Similarly revealing Kenya’s unpreparedness to commence domestic proceedings with 
the ICD, a prominent human rights activist questioned the viability of the witness 
protection scheme amidst its budget reduction (Barasa 2013, 1). As the activist further 
posed, “What magic will we need as Kenyan leaders to generate the will to be fair in 
the ICD, when we have initially failed several times?” (cited in ibid, 1). 
Overall, the performances of positive complementarity in Uganda and Kenya did not 
point in the direction of matching the ICC’s trials at The Hague with domestic 
investigative and prosecutorial efforts. As Witte (2011, 7) rightly summarized, 
Uganda’s main obstacles to complementarity were political and legislative. With 
Uganda’s Amnesty Act allowing any former combatant to be exempted from 
prosecutions, there were misgivings on the feasibility of the ICD’s motion with many 
cases (ibid, 7). In a similar vein, for Kenya, complementarity was undermined by 
political, rather than technical reasons (ibid). As such, the country has a fairly 
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established judicial infrastructure, a vibrant civil society sector and adequate human 
resources (ibid, 8).  
The mismatch between Uganda’s and Kenya’s statutory obligations on cooperation 
with the ICC on complementarity, and resistances to the principle deserves a critical 
assessment. Explanations of the complementarity debacles in the two countries 
therefore need to take into account local precedents of dealing with the past vis-à-vis 
reception of the ICC’s normative imperatives.    
6.3. Expounding complementarity debacles 
Explanations of Uganda’s and Kenya’s complementarity fiascos lead to further notions 
of the ICC’s confrontations with local perspectives on authority and legitimacy in the 
nurture of post-conflict transitions. Simply put, the ensuing clash between 
complementarity and domestic traditions and attitudes resulted in struggles for 
autonomy and validity of one approach over the other, or the appropriateness of the 
international or the local. Subsequently, the contestations between local and 
international standpoints of dealing with the past revived the peace versus justice 
conundrum, thus constraining the utility of complementary criminal prosecutions.  
Notwithstanding the GoU’s intentions of cooperation with the ICC on the 
complementarity regime, the authorities were also confronted with the traction of 
amnesty in many quarters as a feasible mechanism of conflict termination. As of March 
2016, eight years after the ICD’s establishment, more than 80 former LRA combatants 
underwent traditional cleansing rituals (with amnesty), at the headquarters of the 
Acholi Chiefdom in Gulu (Okot, 2016). On this note, traditional justice mechanisms 
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undermined the principle of complementarity in their dispositions as normative 
pedestals for amnesty processes. 
Likewise, the Jubilee Alliance’s opposition to the ICC and its normative imperatives 
undermined the prospects for complementary domestic trials for the 2007/2008 PEV. 
After Kenyatta and Ruto’s elections in March 2013, it was evident that there would be 
no significant motion in the ICD.  The clearest indication of the regime’s unwillingness 
to commence trials for many of the PEV cases was the DPP’s public declarations on 
the unviability of domestic proceedings. As the DPP asserted, “there is neither a reason 
nor a need to replicate the ICC models in the guise of an ICD … opportunity was long 
lost when Parliament rejected the Special Tribunal Bill” (cited in Kiplagat 2014, 1). 
Given the Jubilee Alliance’s promotion of the peace narrative under persuasions and 
coercion, there was little room for manoeuvre amongst victims and human rights 
activists who supported complementary trials.    
6.4. The traction of amnesty and its battles with demands for justice 
As in many other contexts around the world, the northern conflict was accompanied 
with intense national debates that were centred on the peace versus justice dichotomy. 
On the one hand, Acholi religious and cultural leaders were at the forefront of 
advocating for peace in the north, with amnesty proposals for the combatants. On the 
other hand, calls for criminal accountability grew louder and louder over the years. 
Demands for criminal accountability intensified with the ICC’s intervention in 2004, 
and subsequent obligations on Uganda’s cooperation on complementarity.  
However, the GoU’s ability to comply with the ICC on complementarity was 
constrained by the traction of amnesty amongst several constituencies, namely: the 
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GoU, the LRA, some victims and affected populations in the north. Contrary to 
retributive justice, amnesty portended as a pull factor for combatants to abandon 
rebellion and reintegrate into society. In this vein, amnesty’s appeal subsumed the 
principle of complementarity’s autonomy and legitimacy in shaping Uganda’s post-
conflict transition. 
First, the GoU welcomed the proposals for amnesty from the Acholi religious and 
cultural leaders due to its contributions to conflict termination. Formalized in the 
Amnesty Act of 2000, the amnesty process continued to shape the GoU’s efforts to end 
the northern conflict, despite their obligations on complementarity. As a senior official 
in the Amnesty Commission revealed, amnesty was about to go, but there was a 
justification for its extension – pulling out more than 27,000 LRA fighters who were 
potential killers from the bush (Interview, Kampala, Uganda, 5 February 2016). For 
many government officials, amnesty was a necessary evil that would still be relevant 
as long as rebels existed and remained largely unpredictable (Republic of Uganda 2013; 
Twinomugisha 2014, 11). 
Second, to a significant number of the LRA combatants, amnesty was an assurance of 
personal safety, or a second chance to return home and rebuild their lives. For example, 
at the March 2016 cleansing ceremony in Gulu, an LRA returnee, Caesar Acellam, 
declared his gratitude for the community’s gesture and acceptance irrespective of his 
past (Okot 2016, 1). Many other combatants also defected from the LRA, owing to 
their assurances of non-prosecution (Afako 2012; Cakaj, 2016). Indeed, and as Afako 
(2012, 1) has rightly suggested, amnesty has been a useful means of interrupting the 
LRA’s solidity.  
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Third, amnesty appealed to the wider populations in the north that were mostly affected 
by the conflict. An Acholi elected representative argued that amnesty became more 
useful in the region because people realized that the government failed to resolve the 
conflict (Interview, Gulu, Uganda, 23 March 2016). Moreover, as he suggested, the 
nature of the people involved in the conflict contributed to amnesty’s appeal (ibid). As 
he further claimed, “over 85 percent of the people did not join the war voluntarily, but 
they were forced, not as adults, but as young children who were abducted, brainwashed 
and turned into killing machines” (ibid). 
An Acholi religious leader observed that their support for amnesty was informed by 
the reality that “they have so many children still in captivity, and amnesty sends voice 
to them in Eastern DRC, CAR and South Sudan to come back home” (Interview, Gulu, 
Uganda, 22 March 2016). According to another Acholi elder, amnesty has led to the 
return of over 20,000 children from LRA captivity, including victims of sexual abuse, 
and some of them have attained university education (Interview, Gulu, Uganda, 25 
March 2016). 
Collectively, among the Acholi religious and cultural leaders, support for the amnesty 
path followed the logic that the bulk of LRA fighters were forcefully abducted children, 
who were also dying in combat. In this strand of argument, complementary criminal 
trials for the LRA would be a disincentive for their calls to abandon rebellion and 
rebuild their lives. Overall, there were contentions that the abducted children were 
victims of the government’s inability to protect them from harm (Republic of Uganda 
2013, 14).  In this regard, the LRA’s configuration undermined the victim-perpetrator 
dichotomy that would call for criminal liability (ibid, 14). 
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Probed on amnesty, many northerners expressed their support for the provision. 
According to survey results, amnesty was considerably backed by direct and indirect 
victims, including: 80 percent in Soroti (Teso sub- region), 69 percent in Gulu (Acholi 
sub-region), 57 percent in Kitgum (Acholi sub-region), and 53 percent in Lira (Lan’gi 
sub-region) (Pham et. a. l 2015, 28). To a large degree, amnesty was supported in the 
north because of its deep roots in religious and cultural notions of reconciliation and 
forgiveness (Oola 2015, 159). 
Given amnesty’s support by a wide spectrum of the Ugandan society, it posed a critical 
challenge to the ICD’s utility as a complementarity mechanism for the ICC’s. In this 
vein, a Kampala based researcher noted how, “there is also a need to think of all sorts 
of history and cultural inputs, suspend normativity and look at how issues are locally 
internalized” (Interview, Kampala, Uganda, 27 January 2016). As the researcher 
further noted, the notion that the absence of prosecutions is equivalent to impunity is a 
very limited understanding that proposes justice as some kind of given with higher 
normative credentials (ibid).  
Although implicitly, the ICC’s prosecutor, Fatou Bensouda, also alluded to the traction 
of amnesty while appealing for the LRA to abandon rebellion in early 2016. Bensouda 
reminded the LRA that it was only Kony and Ong’wen who were sought for judicial 
proceedings at the ICC (ICC 2016a, 1). Bensouda also underscored the fact that out of 
the initial five arrest warrants the Court issued in 2005, only Kony’s and Otti’s (the 
latter since deceased) remain outstanding, and no other LRA fighters face imminent 
threats of prosecution (ibid). In addition, Bensouda lauded the “encouraging trends” of 
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many LRA returnees, and persuaded others to abandon rebellion and rebuild their lives 
amongst their families (ICC 2016a, 1) 
Notwithstanding its traction, Uganda’s amnesty law seemed to be in constant battles 
with criminal justice. This stemmed from (1) fragmentation of the victim community, 
(2) traditional justice enforcement dilemmas, and (3) the powerful force of 
international norms as espoused by the ICC.  
6.4.1. The fightbacks of criminal justice 
First, fragmentation of the victim community undermined the relative consensus on the 
utility of amnesty in Uganda’s transition from the northern conflict. In spite of many 
victims’ support for amnesty, some of them preferred criminal responsibility for the 
harm they suffered. This was revealed in a survey which showed that 37 percent of 
victims wanted the LRA leadership to be prosecuted, 29 percent opted for the LRA in 
general, 16 percent for the GoU, and 7 percent preferred the military’s prosecution 
(Pham et.al. 2005, 26). 
Furthermore, support for prosecutions was higher amongst respondents from non-
Acholi areas (ibid, 26). In this regard, collective support for criminal trials stood at 44 
percent in Gulu (Acholi sub-region), 61 percent in Kitgum (Acholi sub-region), 88 
percent in Lira (Lango sub-region), and 68 percent in Soroti (Teso sub-region). 
Besides, some of the victims of the LRA’s brutality in the DRC and CAR called for 
international support in holding the insurgents to account for their crimes (Human 
Rights Watch, 2010).  
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Second, the Acholi traditional justice that was positioned as an alternative to criminal 
accountability and a normative framework for amnesty has enforcement dilemmas. 
Given that it is based on voluntary consent of parties, there is no predictability in its 
performance for alleged suspects of atrocity crimes. As such, many LRA returnees 
opted out of the traditional rituals despite its utility in enhancing their reintegration into 
society. Additionally, the UPDF soldiers who allegedly committed atrocities in the 
northern conflict did not avail themselves for the rituals. 
Questions also abounded on the generalizability and enforcement of Acholi traditional 
justice in Uganda’s multi-ethnic society (Interview, professor, Kampala, Uganda, 13 
January 2016). With each community having its own traditional justice mechanisms, 
the performance of one is associated with imposition or cultural imperialism 
(Interview, former CICC official, Kampala, Uganda, 27 January 2016). Moreover, 
efforts to codify the various forms of Acholi traditional justice were resisted because 
of concerns that they would lose their traditional flavour (ibid).   
On the contrary, the ICC Act of 2010 and the ICD emerged as avenues for enforceable 
and expansive justice, hence their potential challenges to Uganda’s amnesty processes. 
As a Ugandan lawyer noted, amnesty and the ICD are two legal paradigms, thus the 
former undermined complementarity by renditioning the peace versus justice 
conundrum (Interview, Kampala, Uganda, 2 February 2016). As such, the Amnesty 
Commission faced challenges from the JLOS, which opposed unconditional amnesty, 
as well as persistent questions of impunity vis-à-vis international norms as exhibited in 
the ICC (Interview, Amnesty Commission official, Kampala, Uganda, 5 February 
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2016). Hence, despite the Amnesty Commission’s challenges to Kwoyelo’s 
prosecution, the ICD proceeded with the trials in the interest of justice (ibid). 
Nonetheless, the High Court upheld Kwoyelo’s right to amnesty, which was in turn 
challenged at the Supreme Court by the DPP’s office. Subsequently, the Supreme Court 
dismissed Kwoyelo’s right to amnesty. The judges argued that the Amnesty Act was 
limited to crimes that were committed in furtherance of war or rebellion, and not attacks 
on innocent civilian populations (Republic of Uganda, 2015). According to the court, 
offences that fell within the ambit of Article 8 (2)(e) of the Rome Statute were to be 
prosecuted, since they were not in furtherance of war or rebellion (ibid). Alternatively, 
the court argued, pardoning the crimes would signify that other forms of violations 
should also benefit from amnesty (ibid, 43). The judges’ decision was also inspired by 
the recommendations in the Juba peace agreement, which they cited as a demonstration 
of the GoU’s and the LRA’s full understanding that there would be individual criminal 
responsibility for northern conflict atrocities (ibid, 44 - 46).  
After the Supreme court’s verdict, some local observers suggested that the peace or 
amnesty versus justice debacle was settled with the court’s ruling validation of 
Kwoyelo’s trial at the ICD (Interview, lawyer, Kampala, Uganda, 2 February 2016). In 
this vein, a Judiciary official remarked that the Supreme court precedents opened up 
avenues for domestic prosecutions of the northern conflict (Interview, Kampala, 
Uganda, 4 February 2016). 
The official also revealed that the Judiciary is working on a TJ Act, which will 
encompass amnesty and its provisions (ibid). The TJ Act will repeal the Amnesty Act, 
which is no longer reviewed after every two years (ibid). Nevertheless, the official also 
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commended amnesty for the return of many abductees, hence its continuation as part 
of the TJ law, that will apparently also include aspects of traditional justice, truth-
telling, and reparations (ibid). 
Whereas Uganda was confronted with the choice between amnesty and criminal 
accountability for perpetrators of the northern conflict, Kenya followed a trajectory of 
de facto immunity for the vast majority of low-level and all mid and upper-level 
perpetrators of the 2007/2008 PEV. With the Jubilee Alliance’s peace over justice 
narrative that favoured short-term relations between antagonistic Kikuyu and Kalenjin 
communities, demands for complementarity were constrained with risks of social 
exclusion and security. These risks were more pronounced in the Rift Valley and 
Central regions that accounted for significant proportions of alleged perpetrators and 
victims of the poll violence.   
6.5. The Jubilee Alliance’s peace messaging, de facto immunity and risks of 
social exclusion and security 
The main challenge to Kenya’s compliance with the principle of complementarity was 
the Jubilee Alliance’s peace over justice messaging that not only departed from 
domestic criminal accountability for the 2007/2008 PEV, but also stifled voices that 
advocated for justice. This followed a similar pattern of the Alliance’s rejection of 
Kenyatta’s and Ruto’s ICC prosecutions in their quests for authority and legitimacy in 
nurturing Kenya’s post-2007 transition. As a Jubilee Alliance supporter signalled the 
continuous and impending battles between the international and the local, “the ICC is 
contradicting local due process ... the greatest contradiction is that we agreed on the 
basis of forgiveness” (Interview, Nairobi, Kenya, 2 October 2015). 
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The Jubilee Alliance made specific references to a need for restoring relations between 
the antagonistic Kikuyu and Kalenjin communities that collectively shared a mix of 
victims and perpetrators, as well as physical spaces in the Rift Valley violence 
epicentre. As such, the Jubilee Alliance argued that resort to retribution would 
undermine the ‘negative’ peace they had cultivated since the 2007/2008 political crisis. 
Given such circumstances, together with the Jubilee Alliance’s legitimacy as state 
authority after the 2013 elections, the principle of complementarity and its proponents 
stared at the risks of domestic alienation.  
After forming a government, the Jubilee Alliance made a deliberate policy decision not 
to prosecute alleged perpetrators of the PEV, whether they were in the low, mid or 
high-level cadres. Subsequently, de facto immunity became the ‘unofficial’ 
government policy on dealing with the alleged suspects of the violence. More so, the 
policy was enforced by covert and overt measures, namely; inattention to the witness 
protection scheme, a hostile political environment for criminal accountability, and non-
cooperation on the part of investigative agencies. 
In this sense, I deliberately use the term de facto immunity because unlike the GoU, 
the Jubilee Alliance did not contemplate or propose an amnesty law to validate 
rejection of domestic criminal trials. Instead, the Jubilee Alliance administration opted 
for public declarations and inaction on the bulk of the PEV cases, which the ICD was 
envisaged to investigate and prosecute. 
To illustrate, in one of President Kenyatta’s public deliberations on accountability for 
the PEV, he reminded Kenyans that their options were not limited to retributive justice 
(Republic of Kenya, 2015). Instead, Kenyatta advanced the necessity of restorative 
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justice for the country’s peculiar circumstances (ibid). In so doing, Kenyatta claimed 
that restorative justice carried great promise because of its deep roots in Kenya’s 
cultural and historical realities (ibid). Kenyatta premised his assertions on the fact that 
the PEV was both political and communal, and that his government was founded on 
reconciliation that many Kenyans had also tried to forge with one another (ibid). 
Expounding the Jubilee Alliance’s peace overtures, one of Kenyatta’s staunch 
supporters argued that although the peace message was misunderstood, it presented the 
best chances for inter-ethnic dialogues and foundation for a united nation (Wambugu 
2016, 1). Moreover, it was suggested that the Jubilee Alliance’s process of unity 
process began from the extremes of the Kikuyu and Kalenjin, from which it would be 
expanded throughout the country (ibid, 1) 
Although many would argue that the Jubilee Alliance’s rejection of criminal 
accountability was a convenient cover for impunity, they also agree that it gained 
significant traction amongst the majority of its targeted constituencies – the Kikuyu 
and Kalenjin communities. For instance, a prominent human rights activist who 
contested Kenya’s peace versus justice conundrum also contended that perhaps the 
imbroglio holds “because of the Rift Valley’s historical past and people’s deep 
grievances which remain unaddressed” (Interview, Nairobi, Kenya, 2 March 2016). 
Notwithstanding the wide acceptance of the Jubilee Alliance’s peace message amongst 
their targeted constituencies, its pronounced non-acceptance, which was conflated with 
support for criminal accountability, raised the risks of social exclusion and security in 
the Alliance’s core support base. Thus, the peace message gained considerable traction 
through a mix of persuasions and coercion – with the former as fostering inter-
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communal relations, and the latter risking social exclusion and security in the Rift 
Valley and Central regions.  
6.5.1. Acceptance of the peace message: persuasions and coercions 
The majority of the Kikuyu and Kalenjin were persuaded with the Jubilee Alliance’s 
peace message as the best chance for the two communities’ co-existence in shared 
physical spaces, especially in the Rift Valley. The ensuing Kikuyu-Kalenjin 
partnership was welcomed because of its significance in the national political arena 
where inter-ethnic alliances determine Laswell’s (1936) conception of “who gets what, 
when and how.” 
More explicitly, the Jubilee Alliance’s formation included elite-level bargains on how 
to share local level seats, and the shared benefits amongst the Kikuyu and Kalenjin 
masses (Lynch 2014, 103). As a Kalenjin youth narrated, their unity “was not just an 
emotional move, but tied to so many deals signed, including what the community 
expected, such as government positions” (Interview, Nairobi, Kenya, 2 October 2015). 
Simply put, the Jubilee Alliance was crafted as a coalition between the Kikuyu 
dominated TNA, and the predominantly Kalenjin URP on a 50-50 power sharing basis 
(Kisia, 2012).   
With regards to shared physical spaces in the Rift Valley, a Kikuyu youth believed that 
his community encroached on Kalenjin traditional homes (Interview, Nairobi, Kenya 
2 March 2016). Hence, according to the youth, it was important that they cultivate 
special relations with their ‘hosts’ because of the large Kikuyu population, and limited 
land at their ancestral homes in Central (ibid). For these reasons, he concluded, co-
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existence with the Rift Valley communities and continuity of livelihoods was more 
important than justice (ibid). 
For his part, a Kalenjin youth praised the choice for peace, given that the community 
fought for their land and had no goodwill for prosecutions (Interview, Nairobi, Kenya, 
23 February 2016). Another Kalenjin interviewee observed that prosecutions would 
open old wounds, and they had no interest in them because the major issues for the 
PEV were unaddressed injustices (Interview, Kalenjin youth, Nairobi, Kenya, 17 
February 2016).  
The aforementioned sentiments from the Kikuyu and Kalenjin interviewees befit the 
‘immigrant-guest metaphor’ that outlines the construction of oppositional identities and 
expected code of conduct in “geospatial imaginaries” (Jenkins 2012, 577). In political 
transitions, the metaphor is propounded by political elites and other actors to govern 
rule-based behaviour amongst guests, such as complying with political inclinations of 
‘hosts’ (ibid, 577) 
Given their positionality as ‘guests’ in the Rift Valley, the Kikuyu were constrained in 
their endeavours to pursue justice for the atrocities they suffered. In this regard, a 
Kikuyu peace activist based in the region concluded that “there was no degree of local 
demands for justice and instead, people opted for restorative justice” (Interview, 
Nakuru, Kenya, 23 February 2016). Moreover, the activist revealed that prospects for 
criminal accountability were diminished by generalization of guilt, as opposed to 
individual attribution (ibid). Thus, in case of identification of perpetrators, “the 
communities will come in defending one of their own and so it is a complex issue” 
(ibid). Whereas some victims could identify their tormentors with such expressions as 
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“I know my neighbour who killed my brother,” they did not pursue justice for fear of 
reprisals (ibid). 
Similarly, in the Central region, demands for criminal justice were muted by the 
potential risks involved. On the one hand, many Kikuyu believed that prosecutions 
could include some of their leaders who engaged in retaliatory attacks. On the other 
hand, there were fears that the trials could rekindle hostilities between the Kikuyu and 
Kalenjin, given the intensity of the violence in the Rift Valley. 
With regards to the latter outcome, many in the Jubilee Alliance from Central believed 
that resorting to criminal accountability would potentially destabilize their newfound 
political coalition and benefit their rivals from other communities. In this vein, a Jubilee 
Alliance activist observed that due to the sensitivity of criminal trials for the 2007/2008 
PEV, they could not open a can of worms, and arrests in the Rift Valley would suggest 
targeting their Kalenjin counterparts (Interview, Nairobi, Kenya, 25 September 2015). 
In a similar vein, the IDP network amongst the Kikuyu that was demanding for criminal 
justice was told to “keep quiet and stop disturbing the peace” (Interview, CSO official, 
Kisumu, Kenya, 5 November 2015). The victims were also reprimanded that their 
demands for justice would target the Kalenjins, in addition to signalling a partnership 
with the opposition and CSOs to bring down the government (Interview, Jubilee 
Alliance activist, Nairobi, Kenya, 25 September 2015).  
Beyond the Jubilee Alliance’s endorsement and expression of de facto immunity for 
many alleged perpetrators of the 2007/2008 PEV, compliance was enforced through a 
combination of mechanisms. These consisted of deliberate actions and tactical errors 
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on complementarity, which increased risks of social exclusion and security for the 
justice community.  
6.5.2. Enforcing compliance with the de facto immunity 
In order to enhance compliance with the Jubilee Alliance’s de facto immunity, risks of 
social exclusion and security were intensified with errors on omission and overt 
coercions on proponents of criminal accountability. Of great concern was the reality 
that the discussions on the anticipated ICD were unfolding amidst official opposition 
to criminal justice (KPTJ 2014, 9). 
Besides, investigative agencies, such as the police and the DPP, adopted non-
cooperation on prosecuting the PEV cases, in addition to publicly commenting on their 
unviability (see for example, Kiplagat, 2014). Also, on several occasions, the Jubilee 
Alliance MPs passed motions in the National Assembly to repeal the International 
Crimes Act that provided for Kenya’s cooperation in investigating and prosecuting 
mass atrocities.  
Furthermore, the country’s witness protection scheme was not strengthened, which 
undermined its independence and public confidence. Instead, in a 2016 amendment to 
the Witness Protection Act, state authorities, including the AG and heads of security 
agencies, were incorporated in the Witness Protection Agency (WPA) board. This was 
despite the security agencies’ alleged roles in the 2007/2008 PEV as direct and indirect 
perpetrators. The WPA was also underfunded, such as its allocation of Kshs. 2.2 
million out of a request of Kshs. 500 million in the 2013/2014 financial year when 
debates on accountability for the PEV were at a peak (KPTJ, 2014). 
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Ultimately, Kenya’s weak witness protection programme undermined 
complementarity by inspiring intimidation on the part of the most vulnerable groups. 
If the OTP regularly complained about witness intimidation and interference in the 
Kenyan ICC cases, what would become of domestic trials? Writing on the 
predicaments of witnesses, Lynch (2015, 2) documented their extremely difficult 
circumstances, including exposure of their identities to co-nationals, some of whom 
were co-opted by political elites. A case in point of the witnesses/victims’ precarious 
situation was the January 2015 abduction and murder of Meshack Yebei, an ICC 
witness, from his home in the Rift Valley (Cherono, 2015). More worryingly, the police 
did not make any serious attempts into conducting investigations into Yebei’s murder. 
Likewise, human rights activists who supported accountability efforts were subjected 
to intimidation and harassment by the Jubilee Alliance and some of their supporters. 
For instance, in the Rift Valley, a prominent human rights activist was threatened and 
declared an enemy of the Kalenjin due to his advocacy against political violence and 
strong support for the ICC (Lubanga 2016, 1). In October 2013, the activist claimed 
that his life and that of his family were in danger, and that he had received threats from 
bloggers, political leaders and rebuke from a vernacular radio station (Lesiew, 2013). 
The Jubilee Alliance was also intolerant to its members who were perceived to be 
accommodative of criminal accountability for the 2007/2008 PEV. A Jubilee Alliance 
interviewee revealed that although some of their MPs consciously believed in recourse 
to criminal justice, they were obligated to be seen as antagonistic, failure to which they 
were sanctioned (Interview, Nairobi, Kenya, 9 February 2016). For instance, Priscilla 
Nyokabi (MP), who initially supported the ICC’s intervention during her previous 
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stints in the civil society was targeted for disciplinary action, after which she changed 
her demands (Interview, Jubilee Alliance activist, Nairobi, Kenya, 25 September 
2015). 
When serving as the Executive Director of Kituo cha Sheria, a local human rights 
organization, Nyokabi (2011, 26) argued that the ICC process gave voice to victims. 
Further, she argued that many Kenyans hoped that the Court would reveal the truth and 
punish perpetrators of the violence (ibid). Conversely, after her censure, Nyokabi 
narrated how she no longer worked for the civil society, but was an elected MP on 
TNA, and served the Jubilee Alliance diligently (Mosoku, 2014). Nyokabi also 
professed her complete belief in the Jubilee Alliance development agenda, and the 
leadership of President Kenyatta and his deputy, Ruto (ibid).  
Perhaps, the final collapse of the ‘Ocampo Six’ cases after the April 2014 ruling on 
Case 2 (Sang and Ruto) (ICC, 2016) attested to the probable social exclusion and 
security risks that would be associated with domestic complementary trials. Victims 
and the wider citizenry responded on the ruling depending on their physical locations. 
Whereas victims in the Rift Valley and Central regions were happy with case 
termination, those in safer spaces and distant ethnic politics from the Jubilee Alliance, 
such as in Nyanza and western regions, were unhappy with the verdicts. 
To demonstrate, a victim from the Rift Valley reacted to the ICC’s ruling by “sincerely 
thanking God for hearing his cry,” and that his heart “was now at peace now that the 
cases have been thrown out” (cited in Daily Nation 2016, 1). Moreover, he “wished 
Deputy President William Ruto and Joshua Arap Sang the very best,” and noted that 
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he had “since forgiven the attackers, it is all history and we should now preach peace 
and reconciliation, and move on” (ibid, 1). 
Similarly, a victim from Burnt Forest in the Rift Valley expressed his confidence in the 
case termination, thus: “I am glad the ICC issue is now behind us … we are now 
optimistic that the Rift Valley region which was hardest hit by the violence will 
experience peace and development” (cited in ibid, 1). An IDP chairperson also 
welcomed the court ruling by narrating how she was “overwhelmed with joy following 
the dismissal of the case … believed all will be well and was satisfied with the ICC 
decision” (cited in ibid, 1).  Another victim in Central said that “we are happy with the 
ICC decision to terminate the case against Mr Ruto and Mr Sang … The DP has been 
in the forefront resettling IDPs and he should now remember those who have been 
forgotten like us” (cited in ibid, 2). 
On the other hand, many victims from Nyanza and western regions expressed their 
disappointments with the ICC’s decision. For example, one victim from Nyanza 
observed that the “ICC prosecutor Luis-Moreno Ocampo did a shoddy job in the Ruto-
Sang case.  The dismissal of the case is a delay for justice to the victims of the violence” 
(cited in ibid, 2). Additionally, a peace-building expert revealed that the victims from 
these regions were more outspoken, less worried about their safety and spoke more 
freely because of a safe social network (Interview, Nairobi, Kenya, 10 March 2016). 
Perhaps, lending credence to the difficulties of individual criminal liability for the 
2007/2008 PEV, a human rights activist revealed that they filed PEV related cases in 
the High Court of Kenya, which sought government’s liability for failing to protect 
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citizens as well as reparations (Interview, key informant, Nairobi, Kenya, 28 August 
2015). They however did not seek individual criminal liability in their court pleadings. 
 
 
 
 
 
6.6. Conclusion 
The arguments in this chapter locate the underwhelming performance of the 
complementarity regime in Uganda and Kenya within a reinvigorated peace versus 
justice debate, as well as the suppression of critical voices in support of the justice 
track. As such, the chapter offers a nuanced explanation of the minimal achievements 
of this important innovative principle of the ICC’s system of justice – complementarity.  
This is contrary to regular accusations of impunity as is common practice from some 
criminal justice advocates, while discerning the failures of the Ugandan and Kenyan 
situations with complementarity. Indeed, and as Akhavan (2016, 1056) observed, there 
is a wide gulf between stating and practising complementarity, which is symbolically 
manifested in the distance between the ideal conditions at The Hague, and the chaotic 
reality of societies emerging from mass atrocities. In this regard, it might be easier to 
criticise local conceptions of justice from the vantage point of global justice, than to 
confront difficult realities and desperations amongst victims (ibid, 1056).  
247 
 
Although both Uganda and Kenya passed the ability test after performing positive 
complementarity, the former’s traction of amnesty and the latter’s peace over justice 
messaging were significant obstacles to converting commitments into concrete actions. 
To this end, Uganda had to contend with amnesty’s utility in dealing with alleged 
perpetrators of the northern conflict, despite the ambitions of the complementary ICD.  
For Kenya, the Jubilee Alliance’s peace messaging was persuasive to the majority 
Kikuyu and Kalenjin in the Rift Valley and Central regions. Though unattractive for 
many justice advocates and long-term peace, the peace narrative proved useful for 
cessation of hostilities and subsequent peaceful co-existence among members of the 
two antagonistic communities, at least in the short-term. For these reasons, the ICD is 
not likely to take off, and various state agencies will continue with non-cooperation in 
investigating and prosecuting the bulk of the 2007/2008 PEV cases under the Jubilee 
Alliance administration.  
The Ugandan and Kenyan failures on complementarity demonstrate that there are real 
struggles and legitimate concerns in balancing the immediate needs for peace and 
demands for criminal justice. The complementarity dilemmas link to broader notions 
of the contest for autonomy and legitimacy between the international and the local, in 
the quest for shaping post-conflict transitions.  
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Conclusion 
Between domestic precedents and the International Criminal Court’s normative 
imperatives 
This thesis has sought to explain the aspirations of the international community towards 
the construction of a moral universe whereby perpetrators of mass atrocities are to be 
punished, but also the push-backs to these visions due to challenges on the universality 
of ICJ. Some of these challenges arise from different power positions and goals on ICJ 
amongst actors and institutions in the spatial hierarchies that inform interactions on the 
ICC’s interventions. In turn, the challenges open up the Court’s interventions to 
politicization in local spaces, albeit with negative impacts on TJ discourses and other 
conflict scenarios.  
The ICC’s contribution in the discussions about the moral universe obtains from its 
universality of criminal justice for atrocity crimes, as opposed to ad hoc tribunals or 
national jurisdictions. The Court potentially intervenes in unable and/or unwilling 
situations through three trigger mechanisms provided in the Rome Statute: UNSC 
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referrals (Article 13(b)), state referrals (Article 14), and proprio motu provision 
(Articles 13(c),15 and 51 (1)). 
Collectively, the ICC’s intervention abilities, focus on the most responsible 
perpetrators of mass atrocities, and innovations on victim centeredness, international 
cooperation and complementarity, point to its normative imperatives. These attributes 
endear the ICC to relative universality, including: a 123 states’ membership across the 
world’s regions, the UNSC’s acceptance, and the Court’s special relationship with the 
UN system. More significantly, the UN Secretary General has since mainstreamed the 
ICC’s proactive role in the TJ doctrines that are prescribed for transitional societies. 
Notwithstanding the relative global acquiescence on the ICC’s universality, domestic 
precedents of politicizing some of its interventions portends as a critical drawback in 
the war on impunity for heinous crimes. In some of its foremost interventions, such as 
in Uganda and Kenya, the ICC was immersed in contestations for power, authority and 
legitimacy amongst local protagonists, and between the local and the international. This 
resulted in global-local exchanges, which culminated in the construction of glocal 
spaces under which the Court’s interventions were permeable to politicization, to the 
detriment of its investigative steps and legacy in situation countries. 
More specifically, the ICC’s interventions in Uganda and Kenya were clouded in 
narratives of selectivity and ne-colonialism amongst some of the critical local 
constituencies. Further, the narratives were antithetical to TJ discourses in local spaces, 
and by extension, in other regional situations, such as the DRC, Côte d’Ivoire, South 
Sudan and Burundi. 
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By the same token, the ICC’s principle of complementarity was resisted in both 
countries under study, owing to contextual adaptions to international norms. 
Specifically, in Uganda, traditional frameworks of providing redress to the past, such 
as amnesty and Acholi cultural systems, posed significant obstacles to 
complementarity, despite the government’s intentions of compliance. Likewise, 
Kenya’s Jubilee Alliance expressed a pervasive peace over justice messaging on the 
2007/2008 PEV, which constrained efforts at domestic complementarity prosecutions.   
Thus, so far, the international community’s aspirations towards the construction of a 
moral universe and the backlashes on this endeavour raise important questions. The 
two competing and contrasting paradigms feed into, and reminisce, broader debates on 
tensions between the concepts of global governance and sovereignty. As the old adage 
goes; “It seems that the concept of sovereignty is not withering and global governance 
seems to be intruding into withering sovereignty.” For the purposes of these 
discussions, the international community’s ambitions of constructing a moral universe, 
with the ICC as its apex, is conceived as a pointer to global governance. Despite some 
levels of success on the Court’s establishment, and its successive interventions, the 
intrusion of global governance into domestic realms is also resisted by domestic 
political elites. 
Most evidently, the latter outcome was the orchestration of transactional and 
adversarial exchanges on the ICC’s interventions, as in Uganda, Kenya, the DRC, Côte 
d’Ivoire and Burundi. Perhaps, the political elites’ prominent roles in shaping domestic 
uptake of ICJ is indicative of their claims to stakes in national sovereignties. Therefore, 
acceptance and resistance to the ICC in equal measure reveals two interesting 
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dynamics: the powerful force of global governance, and the limits state actors impose 
upon it.  
With regards to the power of global governance, there is a degree of acquiescence on 
what the ICC can do, that is beyond domestic actors and institutions. As Paris (2015, 
1) rightly notes, pluralism unlocks the possibilities of tackling an increasing number of 
complicated problems that transcend national boundaries, especially in recent times 
when the utility of traditional international organizations is under question. Similarly, 
Slaughter (2004, 285) observed that there is a remarkable shift towards linking 
sovereignty to participation in international institutions that enhance state cooperation 
in achieving what would traditionally be done alone under territorial confinements.  
Notably, and as the Ugandan and Kenyan cases have demonstrated, there is great value 
in the ICC, especially its ability to overcome domestic conundrums on criminal 
accountability for mass atrocities by overriding local conflict narratives. 
To illustrate, Ugandan authorities declared themselves unable, though willing, to 
prosecute the LRA, which had shifted bases to CAR, South Sudan and the DRC. 
Consequently, after the referral of the LRA to the ICC, the GoU managed to galvanize 
international support in efforts to arrest and prosecute the insurgents. Moreover, 
Uganda’s domestic mechanisms – amnesty, traditional justice and reintegration 
programmes – were bottlenecks in the country’s ability to prosecute alleged 
perpetrators in the northern conflict. Even though the GoU could argue that amnesty 
was not to be extended to the LRA top leadership, its traction in encouraging 
combatants to abandoned rebellion still limited the country’s envisaged complementary 
trials at the ICD.  
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Similarly, in the Kenyan situation, the ICC’s intervention in the 2007/2008 PEV broke 
the cycle of impunity for powerful political elites who would otherwise not face justice 
in any Kenyan court. In this regard, MPs refused to pass laws in parliament to establish 
a Special Hybrid Tribunal, which further widened the impunity gap in the country. 
Hence, in the immediate aftermath of the PEV, the majority of Kenyans, including 
Kenyatta and Ruto, welcomed the idea of the ICC’s intervention, due to its ability to 
overcome domestic deadlocks on criminal accountability for the PEV. More so, long 
after the ICC’s trials of the ‘Ocampo Six,’ Kenya could not establish the much talked 
about ICD that was supposed to complement international efforts.  
On the contrary, there are also limits to the force of global governance, which alludes 
to arguments that sovereignty is still a powerful construct. For example, the ICC is 
limited in preventing political elites from defining what is permitted within ‘their’ 
territory – domestic uptake of ICJ.  It is on this account that the GoU dictated their 
referral agenda to the ICC, despite its notion of the universality of justice. For their 
part, the Jubilee Alliance resorted to adversarial exchanges which defined Kenya–ICC 
relations for the most part of Uhuruto’s trials’ timeline.  
Beyond anti–ICC rhetoric in domestic and regional spaces 
From the Uganda and Kenyan experiences, it is clear that the powerful force of global 
governance weighed in on the ICC’s acceptance, despite the salience of the narratives 
of selectivity and neo-colonialism. Admittedly, the narratives lowered the Court’s 
acceptance amongst some critical constituencies, namely: some victims, the affected 
communities, and other interested parties in both countries. Certainly, the contestation 
of the selective referral by a significant number of northern Ugandans, and the 
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reception of the neo-colonial narrative amongst the Jubilee Alliance’s core support 
base, affirmed the ICC’s relative non-acceptance. 
Even so, the ICC still enjoys considerable acceptance in the two countries, including 
amongst some of its foremost critics in the GoU, the Jubilee Alliance and the affected 
Acholi, Kikuyu and Kalenjin communities. To a large extent, the Court’s acceptance 
obtains from its ability to overcome local conflict narratives and hold some of the 
powerful to account for their alleged crimes. 
Owing to Kenya’s, Uganda’s and other African countries’ fragility, the ICC plays a 
functional role as a ‘safety valve’ amidst turbulent ethnic neighbourhoods. Specifically, 
Uganda is ranked at position 21 and Kenya 23, with alert warnings in the Fund for 
Peace’s 2015 global fragility index (Messner et.al., 2015). The Fund for Peace 
predicates state fragility on resource-driven competitions, poor leadership and 
corruption, and unaddressed grievances amongst various groups (ibid, 16). 
Signalling the ICC’s relative acceptance in northern Uganda, an Acholi elected 
representative argued that although the Court’s reception was low in the region, the 
intervention was symbolic on the administration of justice, sets precedent, and points 
to futuristic visions of treating humanity (Interview, Gulu, Uganda, 23 March 2016). 
Likewise, Regan Okumu, an Acholi MP, observed that Ong’wen’s trial at The Hague 
“was a blessing in disguise” (cited in Branch 2017, 47). According to Okumu, the 
future would only be shaped by the past, as the issue of northern Uganda largely 
remained unresolved by state authorities (ibid, 48). As Okumu further posited, 
notwithstanding the ICC’s single focus on the LRA, the trials could open up the 
avenues of justice by bringing to the fore the regime’s alleged crimes (ibid, 48).  
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In addition, a prominent Acholi politician who was initially opposed to the ICC’s 
intervention nodded to the Court’s significant role in combating impunity. While 
contesting the ICC’s intervention in Uganda at the height of the northern conflict, he 
rebutted Amnesty International’s support for the Court as “smacking of arrogance and 
conceit … based on shaky legal grounds” (Mao, 2008b). Subsequently, he enlisted 
Spain, Chile and Rwanda as world examples of “indigenous justice and reconciliation 
processes,” which the former UN Secretary General had also endorsed (ibid, 1). 
However, in the later phase of the conflict, he narrated how, “the ICC’s shadow around 
the Juba process also made them to re-examine domestic systems … Africa’s domestic 
systems are still drastically wanting” (Mao 2013, 1). He also postulated that the ICC’s 
precedent of pursuing sitting heads of states position it as the only institution that can 
remind masterminds of impunity of their impending prosecutions (ibid, 1).  
Besides, the ICC seems to enjoy relative acceptance from some of Uganda’s 
authorities, regardless of Museveni’s recent outbursts. Towards this end, Uganda has 
not taken any active steps to withdraw from the Rome Statute, despite several threats 
to do so. In an address to parliament in April 2017, Uganda’s AG noted that they had 
not sent a notification on withdrawal from the ICC, and that such an “allegation is based 
on conjecture” (cited in Imaka 2017, 1). The AG further confirmed Uganda’s continued 
cooperation with the ICC in the face of Africa’s intentions on collective withdrawal. 
According to an official in the Ministry of Justice, the ICC is an avenue of 
accountability from a functional point of view, and only when it veers off from known 
norms of justice can the question of a withdrawal be relevant (Interview, Kampala, 
Uganda, 3 February 2016). As the official further noted, “the dissenting voices from 
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the AU is all about choice of geographical region of cases, hence, there needs to be 
juxtaposition with ignored cases” (ibid). Thus, the concerns on an African bias is “a 
viable debate and should be treated at technical levels and pragmatic global levels in 
equal application” (ibid).  
In Kenya as well, the ICC is relatively accepted, including from some of its harshest 
critics and opponents in the Jubilee Alliance. Despite the country’s reform trajectory 
after the 2007/2008 PEV, not much has changed as far as political mobilization is 
concerned. As a veteran Kenyan politician described the Jubilee Alliance and its CORD 
contemporary, “they are ethnic and therefore think, organize, vote and act ethnic in 
every other manner” (Wamwere 2016, 1). Moreover, the coalitions are “ethnic armies 
that are made purposely to defeat ethnic enemies with either the ballot or bullets” (ibid, 
1). 
More so, towards the August 2017 elections, the government declared some parts of 
the Rift Valley, Coast, Nairobi, Kiambu and Kisumu as potential violence hotspots 
(Oduor and Oluoch, 2017; Oloo, 2017). Hence, security agencies made sustained 
efforts to contain the negative peace before the identified areas degenerated into overt 
violence (ibid).  
Perhaps, aware of the country’s political trends, the Jubilee Alliance did not take any 
proactive steps in withdrawing Kenya from the ICC, despite their reservations on the 
institution, commanding vote in the National Assembly, and three withdrawal motions. 
As a Jubilee Alliance MP stated, Kenya should not withdraw from the ICC due to the 
possibility of violence (cited in Wanyoro 2016, 1). Also, the MP noted that the 
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2007/2008 PEV was a reality that Kenyans should not forget, even with the collapse of 
the ICC cases (ibid). 
Similarly, the former Governor of Kiambu County where Kenyatta hails from opined 
that it is unnecessary to withdraw from the ICC due to the Court’s critical role in 
achieving justice by “putting dictators in check” (cited in Maichuihe 2017, 1). For his 
part, a Kikuyu politician who has since been elected into parliament likened the ICC to 
domestic institutions, such as Kenyan laws and the Ethics and Anti-Corruption 
Commission (EACC) that play important roles; although they are unable to combat 
corruption (Interview, Nairobi, Kenya, 9 February 2016). 
A senior official in the Jubilee administration summed up their acceptance of the ICC 
by revealing how, at a closed-door meeting with some MPs who were vocal in anti- 
ICC bashing, candidly talked about the utility of such an international process 
(Interview, Nairobi, Kenya, 21 November 2015). Additionally, the official argued that 
their problem with the Court was the conduct of the cases, of which withdrawal will 
not be an appropriate remedy (ibid). As the official concluded, “there is room for 
international justice … the reality is that we will never go back to a situation where 
there is no international justice” (ibid). 
Besides the Jubilee Alliance’s appreciation of the ICC, the options of withdrawing 
Kenya from the Rome Statute would be an unpopular decision in the country. Besides 
the backing from some Jubilee Alliance politicians, the ICC has a considerable 
domestic support base. These include several governance and human rights activists, 
and the Jubilee Alliance’s political opponents, who transformed from CORD to the 
National Super Alliance (NASA). At a public gathering in December 2016, NASA’s 
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leader, Odinga, reiterated their support for the ICC and rejected any intentions of 
withdrawing Kenya from the Court (Guleid, 2016). 
Moreover, some members of the Kikuyu and Kalenjin communities also believe in the 
ICC’s utility. A Kikuyu interviewee who was critical of the ICC observed that he 
accepts the Court because of Kenya’s elusive justice, and that apart from Kenyatta’s 
predicaments, the Kikuyu have no problem with the Court (Interview, Nairobi, Kenya, 
2 March 2016). Likewise, a Kalenjin politician noted how “they initially opted for The 
Hague because they wanted something that would not be subjected to manipulation … 
they have no faith in own courts” (Interview, Nairobi, Kenya, 12 April 2016). 
A Kikuyu youth also revealed that the same people who rejected the ICC think that the 
community might use the Court’s threat as a deterrent to violence in the future 
(Interview, Nairobi, Kenya, 02 March 2016). Already, during the 2017 electioneering 
period, the Jubilee Alliance leadership threatened Odinga with the ICC’s prosecution 
in case he caused violence (Rono, 2017). Seemingly, in the long-run, the ICC’s 
reception in Kenya will border on support, pragmatic use, and active politicization of 
its intervention. 
To some extent, the ICC’s relative acceptance in local and regional African realms is 
lent credence by the inadequacies of the much talked about alternative to international 
criminal adjudication – the ACJHR. Evidently, the ACJHR’s operationalization is 
slowed down by the apparent lack of the requisite political will from African member 
states. At the 28th Ordinary Session of the Assembly of the AU in January 2017, the 
regional body expressed its reservations at slow signing of the Protocol that made 
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changes to the ACJHR (AU 2017b, 1). Therefore, the AU reiterated its previous call 
on Member States ratify the Protocol immediately (ibid, 1). 
Some of the continent’s top judges commented on the ACJHR’s viability vis-à-vis 
political will at the side-lines of a 2017 Kigali summit on collaboration for access to 
justice. Collectively, the chief justices from Sierra Leone, South Africa and Rwanda 
agreed that Africa has the capacity to create its own tribunal to replace the ICC, but 
only with the necessary political will (Kuteesa, 2017). 
For example, the South African chief justice, Mogoeng, posed whether Africa has the 
willpower to pursue all accused without resorting to all sorts of political and diplomatic 
language to shield suspects (ibid). Turning to Africa’s history, Mogoeng doubted 
whether Africans have the willpower or not, and insisted on settling the question first, 
lets people will be killed, followed by inaction due to diplomatic and political 
arrangements to frustrate justice (ibid).  
Besides, the ACJHR has provisions on immunity for sitting heads of states. Unlike the 
ICC’s precedents of zero tolerance for impunity, the African alternative gives 
incentives for the powerful to commit atrocities, with assured impunity. The ACJHR’s 
immunity clause bodes well with the recent prosecution of former Chadian dictator, 
Hissen Habre, in Senegal, through an AU sanctioned process, long after Habre 
relinquished state authority.  
The absence of viable regional alternatives to the ICC, coupled with domestic inability 
and or/unwillingness to prosecute the power elite for mass crimes in many African 
states, promote the Court’s acceptance in many African spaces. This is despite 
criticisms of an African bias that propels the Court’s resistance on the continent. Some 
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commentators even suggest that the ICC’s focus on the continent means that Africans 
are making use of the Court they were instrumental in creating (see for example Annan, 
2016). According to this strand of argument, it is suggested that six African states made 
use of self-referral, African states voted in favour of the UNSC’s referrals of Libya and 
Sudan, and the ICC’s proprio motu intervention in Kenya was supported 
enthusiastically by the majority of the population (ibid). For some observers, an 
African focus means that many of the continent’s victims of mass atrocities have more 
access to justice than ever before (Human Rights Watch, 2016).  
To date, many African countries have rescinded their intentions of withdrawing from 
the Rome Statute, including Kenya, which sponsored the motion and debates on 
collective action in the AU. It was only The Gambia, South Africa and Burundi that 
formally wrote to the UN on their intentions to leave the ICC in 2016. Nonetheless, 
The Gambia and South Africa rescinded their decisions on withdrawal, leaving 
Burundi as an outlier in departing from the ICC.  
The Gambian decision followed the election of a new president, Adama Barrow, on a 
platform of institutional reforms and restoration of international cooperation (New 
African, 2017). South Africa withdrew its withdrawal notice (UN, 2017d) following a 
domestic court ruling in February 2017 that decried lack of parliament’s participation 
in the process (Tandwa, 2017). Despite speculations and their majority in the National 
Assembly, the ruling Africa National Congress (ANC) party did not contest the 
Democratic Alliance (DA) sponsored court process. Instead, the Minister for Justice 
withdrew a Bill that sought to initiate formal proceedings for South Africa to leave the 
ICC (Mkhwanazi, 2017). 
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During a November 2016 ASP meeting, many African states, including Nigeria, 
Ghana, the DRC, Côte d’Ivoire, Botswana, Mali, Burkina Faso, Tanzania and Lesotho, 
renewed their commitment to the ICC (Keppler 2016, 1). In addition, at the AU 
ordinary session in January 2017, Cape Verde, Nigeria and Senegal entered their 
reservations on the regional body’s decisions on the ICC, including the AU’s 
withdrawal strategy. Furthermore, Malawi, Tanzania, Tunisia and Zambia requested 
more time to study the withdrawal strategy, whereas Liberia entered its reservation on 
paragraph 8 of the decision (AU 2017b, 3). The majority of Zambians also rejected 
calls for withdrawal from the ICC after the question was put to a referendum by the 
ruling party in 2016 (Zambian Watchdog, 2016). 
After the rescissions on collective withdrawal from the ICC, including from some of 
the decision’s pioneers, Africa reverted to its earlier accommodation of ICJ. 
Consequently, these developments speak to the notion that the continent’s collective 
withdrawal strategies were exchanges with the ICC, and not its rejection in entirety. 
This positions the AU’s rejection of the Court as part of pragmatic politics, and not on 
ideals. 
Africa’s withdrawal strategies as exchanges with the ICC 
Africa’s inability to establish a viable regional alternative to the ICC and the Court’s 
capability to punish the power elite relegate the much-touted African mass withdrawal 
to the AU’s articulation of its peripheral location in the global political economy, and 
a need to assert herself in the global order, including on ICJ. This premise is expounded 
in the AU’s draft withdrawal document, in which the regional body backtracks on 
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collective withdrawal from the Rome Statute, and points out Africa’s misgivings in the 
ICJ infrastructure, and thereafter, proposes a raft of reforms to the ICC.  
The draft withdrawal document begins with the AU’s narration of historical and 
contextual backgrounds on the commission of atrocities, and the continent’s initial 
enthusiasm for the ICC. As such, the regional body points out that the original 34 
African states that signed the ICC treaty in 1998 accepted the rule of law crusade as 
part of their pursuit of Africa’s liberation from preceding episodes of injustice that 
accrued from regional conflicts and Western imperialism (AU 2017a, 1). 
Departing from the initial passion for the ICC, the AU registered its misgivings on the 
Court’s selective focus on the continent. In so doing, the AU lamented about the ICC’s 
perceived selectivity as exhibited in the prevalence of African suspects of ICJ, as well 
as suspicions on prosecutorial discretion (AU 2017a, 1). In addition, the AU decried 
the inequity in the global system of making decisions, whose prevalent politics produce 
imbalances in the rule of law application (ibid, 1). 
Principally, the AU pointed to the UNSC system, in which P-5 members make 
decisions based on political considerations, as opposed to the interest of justice and 
law. According to the AU, some of those interests are not shared among Africans, 
besides the fact that the council makes legally binding decisions on an institution that 
most of them have little regard for (AU, 2017a).  
Having expounded Africa’s peripheral location in the ICJ system and global political 
decision making, the AU outlined various measures in asserting the continent’s rightful 
place in the international (criminal justice) order. This culminated in the AU’s 
collective strategy that was steered by the Open Ended Ministerial Committee. The 
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committee outlined a number of objectives, including: (1) working towards the fair and 
transparent conduct of international justice and eliminating perceptions of double 
standards; (2) commencing legal and administrative reforms of the ICC; (3) 
regionalizing international criminal law; and (4) encouraging the adoption of African 
solutions for African problems or preserving the dignity, sovereignty and integrity of 
African states (AU 2017a, 2). 
The AU’s collective withdrawal strategy was justified under the rationale that a treaty’s 
denunciation by a few member states might signal a departure from “an old 
equilibrium” that suits some countries to others’ disadvantage, to “a new equilibrium” 
that comes with far-reaching results (Helfer 2005, 1646). Building on Helfer’s 
arguments, the Ministerial Committee further argued that, states can unite in order to 
contest and rebuke international legal rules and institutions that they perceive as unjust, 
(Helfer, cited in AU 2017a, 6). 
Consequently, for the AU, collective action would potentially alter the existing shape 
of ICJ. In this vein, the AU cited the contemplation that treaty withdrawal give critical 
states voice by elevating their leverage to restructure the treaty in line with their 
interests, or by creating a competing institution altogether (Helfer 2005, 1588).  
Predicating the collective withdrawal strategy on the slow progress of amending the 
Rome Statute as some members states had earlier proposed, the AU suggested a raft of 
measures to assert Africa’s position in the ICJ system. These consisted of: 
strengthening national and regional ICJ systems for African ownership; engaging with 
the UNSC and assertions that referrals must seek the AU’s consent; ratification of the 
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Malabo Protocol that expanded the jurisdiction of the ACJHR; and conditions and 
timelines for withdrawal from the Rome Statute (AU 2017a, 7).  
Ultimately, the AU’s threat of withdrawal was conceived as a strategy to engage with 
the ICJ system. This was envisaged on two broad approaches: legal and institutional 
strategies, as well as political engagements and strategies (ibid, 7). The two methods 
were employed against the backdrop of the mantra of African solutions to African 
problems.  
With regards to legal and institutional strategies, some AU member states, notably 
Kenya and South Africa, proposed amendments to the Rome Statute that the regional 
body endorsed. As the AU (ibid, 8) reveals, African ICC member states agreed in 
November 2009, under South Africa’s leadership, to propose amendments to Article 
16 as redress to the UNSC’s inability to decide on deferral requests. The proposals 
included the transfer of such requests to the UN General Assembly for decision and 
adoption. 
For its part, Kenya proposed a range of reforms in the Rome Statute, including changes 
to the preambular to read that “the ICC … shall be complementary to national and 
regional criminal jurisdictions” (ibid, 9). The amendment was subsequently welcomed 
by the AU as aligned to its resolutions and acknowledgement of regional judicial 
frameworks (ibid, 9). Kenya also anticipated changes to Article 63 (2), that envisages 
a trial in the absence of the accused in exceptional circumstances. According to Kenya, 
the term “exceptional circumstances” is not adequately defined in the Statute and there 
are no case laws to guide the Court on the same (ibid, 9). 
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Kenya also proposed amendments to Article 27 on “irrelevance of official capacity.” 
In Kenya’s wisdom, heads of states and governments should be insulated from 
prosecution until termination of their official capacities (ibid). This, Kenya argued, was 
in line with domestic and customary international law (ibid). Moreover, Kenya 
anticipated changes to Article 70 on the offences against the administration of justice. 
According to Kenya’s interpretation, the “article presumes that such offences save for 
70(1) (f) can be committed only against the Court” (ibid).  Hence, Kenya argued, the 
article ought to be amended to include the Court’s offences. Finally, Kenya proposed 
that an Independent Oversight Mechanism (IOM) be created to inspect, evaluate and 
investigate all the ICC’s organs.  As Kenya envisaged, the IOM would ensure the 
Court’s efficiency, economy and checks against the OTP’s excesses (ibid).  
Besides the proposed amendments, the AU sought reform of the UNSC, whose power 
it considers contentious as non-signatories to the Rome Statute have powers to refer 
situations to the ICC (AU 2017a, 11). Additionally, the AU sought to increase Africa’s 
representation in the Court in order to enhance the continent’s contribution to its 
jurisprudence (ibid, 12). This included suggestions that as the ICC’s largest regional 
block, the Court’s staffing should equally be skewed towards Africa (ibid).  
The AU also suggested a need for strengthening national legal and adjudicative 
mechanisms in order to reduce the prospects of the ICC’s interventions on the continent 
(ibid). Towards this end, the AU advocated for ratification of the protocol on 
amendments to ACJHR. This would enhance the principle of complementarity and 
reduce reliance on the ICC in furtherance of “African solution to African problems” 
(ibid, 12). 
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Amongst the AU’s political solutions were recommendations that the body engages 
with relevant actors in the ICC processes, with identifiable issues and expected 
outcomes. For the UNSC, the AU noted some core issues, such as: 
suspension/deferral/withdrawal of Bashir’s indictment, inclusion of the AU’s opinion 
on future referrals, and acknowledgement of continental solutions/mechanisms (ibid, 
13). 
To the ASP, the AU identified pending proposed amendments to the Rome Statute; 
reduction of the OTP’s powers; a need to recognize the interconnectedness between 
peace and justice, and exemption of the ICC’s arrest warrants in UN mandated 
peacekeeping operations (ibid). For these issues, the AU pegged conditions of non-
withdrawal on the reforms they proposed and a need to agree on their timelines. 
Further, the AU identified the P-5 UNSC members, whose engagements would be 
needed in appreciating Africa’s and regional mechanisms in resolving issues and 
securing their support in international endeavours. The AU expected the UNSC’s 
assurances on vetos on request for deferral of proceedings against Sudan’s Bashir. The 
AU identified China and Russia as some of the UNSC members who have previously 
supported their resolutions. For the African groups in New York and The Hague, the 
AU expected them to ensure African solidarity and facilitate the endorsement of the 
proposed amendments. Additionally, the AU designated to engage the ASP president 
in all issues and counted on him to advance its positions in the ASP (ibid). 
Therefore, the ICC withdrawal strategy emerged as the AU’s carrot and stick in pushing 
for moderation of the Court’s activities on the continent, and articulating Africa’s 
position in the unequal international (criminal justice) system. On the one hand, the 
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AU suggests a need for Africa’s withdrawal and on the other, it recommends 
corrections in the ICJ system. 
For instance, the AU commended The Gambia’s, South Africa’s and Burundi’s 
withdrawal efforts as pioneers in the anti-ICC strategy. Also, the AU requested the 
Open Ended Ministerial Committee to provide feedback on the withdrawal endeavours 
during the forthcoming July 2017 session of the AU (AU 2017b, 3). Conversely, the 
AU also appreciated the ASP President’s initiation of constructive exchanges on the 
continents’ issues, and argued it was a precursor for future dialogue, including on the 
nexus between peace and justice (ibid, 3). 
Given the apparent African exchanges on the ICC and recessions on collective 
withdrawal, the main challenge that lays ahead of the Court is how to universalise 
justice. Perhaps, the universality of the ICC’s justice would reduce incentives for the 
construction of narratives on its interventions, such as selectivity and neo-colonialism. 
Indeed, and as Bassiouni (2003,70) rightly notes, ICJ must be universalized owing to 
its realization of principles and policies that are important for the attainment of peace, 
given the increasing “xenophobic nationalism” and restatement of state sovereignty.  
In the present era, no domestic or regional institution has the relative reach, acceptance, 
and normative imperatives that the ICC possess. Cody.et.al. (2015, 59) opine that 
despite the ICC’s susceptibility to political influence, it is better placed to mete justice 
at a greater scale than local or regional judicial mechanisms. With the constant 
commission of atrocities globally, safeguarding the principle of holding perpetrators to 
account calls for considerations for the scope and type of justice the ICC dispenses, the 
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politics involved in its operations, and readiness to tackle the concerns on the Court 
(Bluen 2017, 1). 
However, the heterogeneity of actors and institutions that the ICC interacts with in the 
events of its interventions still poses the risk of contextual normative adaptions. The 
ICC will thus endure to face adversaries in its attempts to universalize justice in diverse 
sub-national, national and regional spaces.  
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